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THE BUSINESS OF EXPRESSION: ECONOMIC LIBERTY,
POLITICAL FACTIONS AND THE FORGOTTEN FIRST
AMENDMENT LEGACY OF JUSTICE GEORGE SUTHERLAND
Samuel R. Olken'
In The Business of Expression: Economic Liberty, Political Factions And The
Forgotten First Amendment Legacy of Justice George Sutherland, Samuel Olken
traces the dichotomy that emerged in constitutional law in the aftermath of the
Lochner era between economic liberty and freedom of expression. During the
1930s, while a deeply divided United States Supreme Court adopted a laissez faire
approach to economic regulation, it viewed with great suspicion laws that
restricted the manner and content of expression. During this period, Justice
George Sutherland often clashed with the majority consistently insisting that state
regulation ofprivate economic rights bear a close and substantial relationship to
public health, safety, morals, or welfare.
Bringing Sutherland's beliefs to the present, the authorfeels that constitutional
issues raised by the recent must-carry controversy reflect many of the ambiguities
raised by the Court in their handling of differential taxation of the press disputes
during the 1980s and into the 1990s. The author believes similar questions about
the relationship between economic liberty and freedom of expression are likely to
recur in other contexts as the Court struggles to adapt traditional First Amendment
analytical models to emerging forms of communications technology. From this
perspective, the author argues that Sutherland's recognition during the 1930s ofthe
convergence ofeconomic liberty, politicalfactions, and expressive activity is highly
relevant to modern constitutional inquiry. In the spirit of Sutherland's views, the
author proposes a new form of heightened scrutiny in cases involving differential
treatment of the press that more precisely considers the economic and expressive
interests at stake. Specifically, Olken argues that the Court should employ a
nuanced version ofheightened scrutiny that considers more explicitly the respective
economic and expressive interests of the affected parties when the government
regulates private entities engaged in the business of expression.
In the aftermath of the Lochner era,' a dichotomy emerged in constitutional law
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This term refers to the height of economic substantive due process during the period
spanning from the late nineteenth century into the 1930s. The seminal case of this period
was Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For an excellent overview of this era, see
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between economic liberty and freedom of expression. During the 1930s, as a
sharply divided United States Supreme Court adopted a more deferential stance
toward economic regulation,2 it maintained a vigorous skepticism of laws that
restricted the manner and content of expression.3 Over the course of the last several
decades, most claims based on substantive due process or equal protection notions
of economic liberty4 have received minimal judicial scrutiny,5 whereas many of
those derived from the First Amendment Free Speech and Press Clauses6 have often
evoked a much higher level of judicial review.7
While in theory the dichotomy between freedom of expression and economic
liberty may seem logical, at times it has fostered dubious distinctions emanating
from misconceptions of history and the distortion of precedent. Even where the
Supreme Court has ostensibly used some form of heightened scrutiny, such as the
2 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (sustaining a minimum
wage law for women); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)
(upholding a mortgage moratorium law); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)
(sustaining a milk price regulation).
3 See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating an ordinance
that prohibited the distribution of leaflets in public as an overly broad regulation of speech);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (invalidating a law that functioned as a prior
restraint).
' The term economic liberty, as used in this article, refers to the autonomy of natural
persons and businesses in their private economic affairs. The Constitution protects private
economic rights from arbitrary and unreasonable governmental authority most notably in the
following: the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of
art. IV § 2, cl. 1, and the Fourteenth Amendment; and the Contract Clause.
' See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), reh "g denied 349 U.S.
925 (1955) (upholding Oklahoma optometry restrictions).
6 In relevant part, the First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Communication that is obscene (Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)), pornographic
(Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)), constitutes fighting words (Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)), or manifests an intent to incite imminent unlawful
action (Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)) receives little, if any, protection under
the First Amendment, which does, however, offer more protection to certain forms of
commercial speech (Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980)). In contrast, the First Amendment places a premium value on the unfettered
exchange of ideas about politics and other subjects that do not fall within the aforementioned
categories. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (noting that freedom of speech is a "means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth"); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEiOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (linking freedom of expression to participatory
democracy).
' See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding a"right
of reply" law unconstitutional). As used in this article, the term freedom of expression refers
to both freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
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content-neutral 0 'Brien test,' in cases involving both economic liberty and freedom
of expression, its primary concern has been with preserving First Amendment
interests instead of private economic rights.' Indeed, in recent decisions that upheld
must..carry rules as a constitutional means of promoting the flow of information
through the medium of cable television, the Court placed more emphasis upon the
importance of public access to broadcast television programs than it did on the
manner in which mandatory carriage of such programming might impair the
business interests of private cable system operators.' 0 Yet, when viewed in
historical context, the Court's apparent willingness in these cases, as well as in
others, to embrace the myth that economic liberty merits less protection than
freedom of expression reveals a flawed constitutional jurisprudence in which the
justices, to some extent or another, exalt form over function.
, In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), reh 'g denied 393 U.S. 900,(1968),
the Supreme Court articulated a four-part test for incidental regulations of speech. Under
O'Brien, a law will be constitutional if: (1) "it is within the constitutional power of the
government;" (2) "if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;" (3) "if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;" and (4) "if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherarce of that interest." Id. at 377. Somewhat analogous to this test is the classic
standard used to assess time, place, and manner regulations whereby the Court will sustain
a content-neutral regulationjustified by a significant or substantial governmental interest that
leaves open alternative means of communication. See, e.g., Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981) (upholding a Minnesota ordinance that
restricted the distribution and sale of literature and solicitations for money to licensed booths
on state fairgrounds). By the end of the 1980s, the Supreme Court had, in effect, merged the
O'Brien test with the one for time, place, and manner regulations and devised a new standard
comprised of elements from both O'Brien and its time, place, and manner counterpart. See,
e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,798 (1989) (noting the similarity between
the constitutional tests used by the Court to assess incidental and time, place and manner
regulations). In present constitutional discourse, the term "O'Brien test" thus often refers
to the hybrid standard. See generally David S. Day, The Hybridization of the Content-
Neutral Standards for the Free Speech Clause, 19 ARiz. ST.'L.J. 195, 208-09 (1987)
[hereinafter Day, Hybridization] (criticizing the application of the O'Brien incidental
restriction test to time, place, and manner regulations). Pursuant to this application of
O'Brien to both incidental and time, place, and manner restrictions, the government, in order
to prevail, must demonstrate the regulation is: (1) content-neutral; (2) "unrelated to the
suppression of expression" (see O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377); (3) "narrowly tailored to serve
a significant governmental interest;" and (4) "leave[s] open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information." (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
9 See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997), reh'g
denied 521 U.S. 1145 (1997) (sustaining mandatory assessments for advertising pursuant
to the Agricultural Marketing Act as constitutional economic regulation rationally related
to legitimate governmental objectives).
"0 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) reh 'g denied 512 U.S. 1278 (1994). For further discussion of
these cases, see Part IV and accompanying notes.
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One of the neglected aspects of the Supreme Court's constitutional
jurisprudence of the 1930s is that, while the more heralded "liberal" wing of the
Court differentiated between the standard of review in economic liberty and
freedom of expression cases, " its "conservative"justices did not.'2 The intellectual
leader of this quartet was George Sutherland, whose trenchant dissents in Home
Building & Loan Ass 'n v. Blaisdell3 and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish14 both
criticized the Court's shifting emphasis in economic substantive due process and,
" Compare Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697(1931) (Hughes, C.J.) (closely scrutinizing
a Minnesota law restricting freedom of the press), with Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (Hughes, C.J.) (balancing the reasonable exercise of state
police powers and the obligation of contracts). Compare also Grosjean v. Am. Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233 (1936) (unpublished draft of concurring opinion of Justice Benjamin N.
Cardozo) (regarding freedom of the press as a fundamental constitutional right warranting
close judicial scrutiny of a Louisiana license tax on the gross receipts of newspaper
advertising) (transcript available in the Kaufman Cardozo Collection of the Harvard Law
School Library), with Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 580-86 (1933) (Brandeis, J. and
Cardozo, J., dissenting) (expressing considerable deference toward state tax and police
powers).
'2 After the retirements of Chief Justice Taft in 1930 and Associate Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes in 1932, the nine justices who sat on the Court during the rest of the decade
often voted in blocs. Justices Louis D. Brandeis, Benjamin N. Cardozo, and Harlan F. Stone
(and in the 1920s, Holmes) comprised the wing of the Court most deferential to the exercise
of state police powers in the context of economic regulation and more outspoken about the
importance of the First Amendment in a constitutional democracy. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 523-24 (1934) (upholding a regulation of milk prices); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (linking freedom of
expression and deliberative democracy). On several occasions, the more moderate Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts joined the trio of
Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone to form the majority in a series of seminal cases that marked
the Court's increasing reluctance to overturn economic regulation. See, e.g., West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a minimum wage law for women as
a reasonable exercise of local police powers). In contrast, Justices George Sutherland, Pierce
Butler, Willis Van Devanter, and James C. McReynolds often formed a more a conservative
bloc that sought to preserve a more traditional jurisprudence of police powers. See, e.g., id.
at 400-14 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (maintaining that economic regulation must bear a
'close and substantial relationship to the public welfare and thus be more than merely
reasonable). The terms "liberal" and "conservative," as used in this article, do not refer
either to the political beliefs or judicial motivations of the justices, but instead function as
shorthand labels to describe the tendency of these jurists to either depart from or adhere to
certain jurisprudential premises prevalent throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century
and into the early decades of the twentieth century. For an excellent overview of the
transformation of constitutional jurisprudence during the first half of the twentieth century,
see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000); see also BARRY
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION (1998).
"3 290 U.S. 398, 449-83 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
14 300 U.S. 379, 404-14 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 10:2
THE BUSINESS OF EXPRESSION
like his majority opinions in other cases,15 asserted the transcendent importance of
constitutional limitations as a means of protecting private economic rights from the
ephemeral whims of democratic majorities."
For Sutherland, the emerging Court majority of the 1930s incorrectly presumed
the legitimacy of local police powers when it cast aside rigorous judicial review of
economic regulations in favor of a more flexible, pragmatic approach that balanced
the public welfare and private interests. 7 Despite mounting criticism from both
within and outside the Court, Sutherland steadfastly insisted that state regulation of
private economic rights bear a close and substantial relationship to public health,
safety, morals, or welfare. 8 This was a stringent standard of judicial scrutiny that
emphasized the primacy of individual rights in a democratic republic in general and,
in particular, reflected a traditional presumption against government intervention
in private economic affairs born from a longstanding fear of political factions that
predated the formation of the Constitution. 9
Although the nature of Sutherland's economic liberty jurisprudence has been
the subject of recent scholarship,2" the manner in which his views of economic
liberty influenced his understanding of the First Amendment has drawn relatively
little attention. In part, this may be because during his years on the Court,
Sutherland authored only two significant opinions concerning freedom of
expression. In 1936, he wrote for a unanimous Court in Grosjean v. American
Is See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in part by 300
U.S. 379 (1937) (invalidating a minimum wage law for women); Tyson and Bros., Co. v.
Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927), overruled in part by 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (invalidating aNew
York regulation of ticket brokers); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932)
(invalidating an Oklahoma law restricting the manufacture, sale, and distribution of ice).
16 See, e.g., Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 449, 451-52, 465, 472-73, 482-83 (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting) (strictly construing the Contract Clause as a prohibition of all laws that impair
the obligation of contracts).
"T See, e.g., West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 401-04 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (discussing
judicial review and constitutional interpretation); Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at448-53,473,482-83
(Sutherland, J. dissenting) (invoking the unchanged meaning of constitutional limitations).
IS See, e.g., West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 411-13 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (strictly
interpreting the concept of public welfare); Adkins, 261 U.S. at 549, 554-61 (construing a
minimum wage law for women as illegitimate class legislation). For criticism of Sutherland's
police powers jurisprudence, see id. at 568-71 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (asserting the need
for judicial deference toward legislative classifications made pursuant to the reasonable
exercise of local police powers).
'9 See Samuel R. Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty:
Constitutional Conservatism and the Problem of Factions, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1,
9-35, 57-88 (1997) [hereinafter Olken, Justice George Sutherland].
20 See generally HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING
A JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1994) (attributing Sutherland's views to natural
rights). For criticism ofArkes's approach and an alternative analysis of Sutherland's notions
of economic liberty, see generally Olken, Justice George Sutherland, supra note 19
(emphasizing Sutherland's aversion toward political factions).
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Press Co.,2 which invalidated a Louisiana licensing tax imposed on large
newspapers. The following year Sutherland penned a dissent in Associated Press
v. NLRB.2' because he believed that the application of the National Labor Relations
Act to the editorial operations of a news gathering association violated the First
Amendment. Both cases, moreover, signaled an emerging distinction in the minds
of some ofthejustices between economic regulations and regulations affecting First
Amendment rights,23 a difference Sutherland himself was reluctant to recognize.
Understandably, on the basis of his opinions in these cases, scholars have often
attributed to Sutherland a strong penchant for protecting freedom of expression.24
In large part, this is because he used the type of rhetoric one would normally
associate with a passionate defense of this constitutional freedom. However,
Sutherland may actually have been less a champion of freedom of expression than
one might otherwise think, especially because in the vast majority of First
Amendment cases that came before the Court during his tenure from 1922 to 1938,
he often voted against the First Amendment claimants."
Indeed, a more accurate way of understanding Sutherland's opinions in
Grosjean and Associated Press is from the perspective of his economic liberty
jurisprudence. Indeed, his deep-set aversion toward political factions heightened
his sensitivity about the vulnerability of individual rights in a democratic republic.
As such, Sutherland recognized in the constitutional protection of privateeconomic
interests a paradigm for the preservation of other civil rights, such as freedom of
expression, from the incursion of transient democratic majorities.26 Both Grosjean
21 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
2 301 U.S. 103, 133-41 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., id. at 128-33 (Roberts, J.) (upholding the application of the National Labor
Relations Act to the editorial department of the Associated Press as a reasonable Commerce
Clause regulation of incidental effect upon the news agency's First Amendment rights); see
also Grosjean-v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (unpublished draft of Cardozo
concurring opinion at 10) (refusing to invalidate the Louisiana license tax on equal
protection grounds but arguing that it violated freedom of the press).
24 See, e.g., ARKES, supra note 20, at 250-63; JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE
SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE 205-07, 216-17 (1951).
2 See, e.g., Hemdon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 274-75 (1937) (Van Devanter, J., and
Sutherland, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority should have upheld the criminal
syndicalism conviction of a man for the possession of Communist literature with the intent
to distribute it and incite an insurrection); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 723-38 (1931)
(Butler, J., and Sutherland, J., dissenting) (Sutherland joining in a dissent that would have
upheld a Minnesota law authorizing injunctive relief to prevent the publication of periodicals
regarded as nuisances); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) (Sutherland, J.),
overruled by Girourard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946) (asserting the primacy of
national security over freedom of conscience); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)
(sustaining a criminal syndicalism statute); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
(upholding a conviction for seditious speech). Sutherland was part of both the Whitney and
Gitlow majorities.
26 See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932). See also Olken,
254 [Vol. 10:2
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and Associated Press raised closely related issues of economic liberty and freedom
of expression in ways that most other First Amendment disputes during
Sutherland's era did not." Each case arose when political factions exerted
enormous pressure upon the legislature to enact measures that actually benefitted
some economic groups at the expense of others in ways that affected the manner,
or business, of expression.2" Sutherland implicitly perceived this connection
between the rights of business (essentially ones of property) and those of
expression, and so he imbued his analysis of the First Amendment with his
understanding of economic substantive due process and equal protection.
Accordingly, he may have been more receptive to the First Amendment arguments
in this context than in others where he did not necessarily sense that the government
regulation arbitrarily singled out a particular business that happened to be involved
in the business of expression.29
Much of this article links Sutherland's economic liberty jurisprudence with his
First Amendment views. To this extent, it offers a new way of understanding both
Grosjean and Associated Press. In turn, reappraisal of these cases may provide
additional insight into some flaws with the modem Court's approach toward
Justice George Sutherland, supra note 19, at 71-72.
" Whereas Grosjean andAssociatedPress involved economic regulations of some effect
upon expressive interests, the other First Amendment cases Sutherland encountered, for the
most part, implicated primarily only issues of free speech, freedom of the press, or freedom
of association. See, e.g., Herndon, 301 U.S. at 245 (invoking freedom of association and
freedom of speech); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 652 (upholding a seditious speech conviction).
2 In Grosjean, a Louisiana license tax on two percent of the gross advertising receipts
applied to only those newspapers whose weekly circulation exceeded 20,000 copies. As
such, only thirteen of the state's 163 papers were subject to this seemingly neutral tax with
differential effects. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 240-41 (1936). In
Associated Press, the NLRB ordered the Associated Press to reinstate an editorial employee
discharged, in large part, because of his leadership in the union that represented the news
agency's editorial staff. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 123-25 (1937). The
adversely affected newspapers in Grosjean claimed the Louisiana license tax abridged both
their property and First Amendment rights. The Associated Press challenged the application
of the National Labor Relations Act to its editorial operations, in part, as an infringement of
both substantive due process and the First Amendment.
' For example, in Near, Sutherland joined in Justice Butler's dissenting opinion, which
argued that the state could abate as a public nuisance the publication of a defamatory article
in a newspaper. 283 U.S. at 723-38 (Butler, J., dissenting). While the dissenters implicitly
recognized that the Minnesota law operated to curtail the economic liberty of publishers,
they understood the Minnesota law as a reasonable exercise of state police powers for the
benefit of the public as a whole. Id. at 735-37. Had the dissenters viewed the state law as one
that operated for the benefit of one group at the expense of another - the sine qua non of
political factionalism - they would have joined the majority in invalidating the law as a
form of prior restraint. However, for Sutherland and the others in the Near dissent, the law
in question did not operate unequally, and thus the state could restrict the offensive
publication pursuant to common law concepts of nuisance. Id. at 735.
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differential treatment of the press in general, and must-carry rules in particular. In
many respects, each of these types of cases shares related characteristics with those
of the 1930s in which Sutherland articulated, in inchoate judicial form, the nexus
between economic liberty and freedom of expression. Essentially, the Court's
present analysis of differential treatment of the press and must-carry rules lacks
precision because many of the justices fail to perceive the close connection between
economic liberty and freedom of expression, a relationship perhaps best
characterized by the term "the business of expression."
As used in this article, the term "business of expression" refers to situations in
which the legislature, at the behest of factions, has enacted a law that ostensibly
regulates not only the manner of communication or expression within an industry,
but also benefits certain businesses at the expense of their competitors. Distilled
from the intersection of the First Amendment, economic substantive due process,
and equal protection of the laws, the concept "business of expression" describes a
relatively narrow set of circumstances in which under the guise of a seemingly
neutral law, the legislature, through the influence of political factions, has created
economic distinctions within a particular type of business or industry whose core
activity is the dissemination of speech. "Business of expression" cases differ from
those involving commercial speech3" or limits on campaign spending3' where First
Amendment rights clearly overshadow incidental, or secondary, economic behavior,
and the restrictions in question are laws of general application that do not promote
one class of businesses to the detriment of others.32
In contrast, Grosjean and Associated Press, as well as their modem
counterparts such as Minneapolis Star and Turner, exemplify how differential
treatment of the press often arises through the existence of partial laws that affect
both the First Amendment and economic interests of private parties. As a hybrid
constitutional doctrine, the business of expression recognizes that the expressive
and business functions of those affected by the governmental regulations may
become so intertwined that, as a practical matter, it is impossible to consider the
30 See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (invalidating an administrative order that proscribed utility companies from using
advertising to encourage the consumption of electricity).
3 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1969) (sustaining limits on campaign
contributions but holding unconstitutional restrictions on campaign expenditures).
32 For example, a law prohibiting the advertisement of cigarettes on billboards affects
all cigarette makers and their advertisers the same way. Conversely, a law that distinguishes
between types of cigarette manufacturers, for example, on the basis of sales revenue, and
thus permits smaller companies to advertise cigarettes on billboards but restricts larger
companies from so doing would illustrate a partial law that benefits one group of businesses
to the detriment of others. See, e.g., Grosjean, 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (involving a differential
license tax on newspaper advertising). As such, this scenario might present a business of
expression claim, whereas the first example would only involve commercial speech.
[Vol. 10:2
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free expression issues in the absence of economic liberty.33 Yet modem
constitutional jurisprudence, with its ready distinction between economic and First
Amendment rights, often sanctions partial economic laws as incidental restrictions
of expression. 4 In so doing, it neglects the interplay between economic liberty and
freedom of expression that forms the essence of business of expression cases.
In the gloaming of the Lochner era, Sutherland, through his insistence upon
applying the same exacting standards ofjudicial review to economic and expressive
regulations alike and his aversion toward political factions, intuitively formulated
the business of expression concept. His legacy, however, remains forgotten as the
Supreme Court has adhered to a traditional dichotomy between economic liberty
and the First Amendment that, in a special set of cases, often ignores the extent to
which regulations of expression may actually exemplify partial laws that really seek
to benefit one group economically at the expense of other similarly situated
businesses. In such cases, the Court should employ a nuance version of heightened
scrutiny that considers more explicitly the respective economic and expressive
interests -of the affected parties when the government regulates private entities
engaged in the business of expression.
The constitutional issues raised recently by the must-carry controversy reflect
ambiguities in the Court's handling of differential taxation of the press disputes
during the 1980s and into the 1990s. Accordingly, similar questions about the
relationship between economic liberty and freedom of expression may very well
reassert themselves in other contexts as the Court struggles to adapt traditional First
Amendment analytical models to emerging forms of communications technology.35
From this perspective, Sutherland's fundamental recognition during the 1930s of
the convergence of economic liberty, political factions, and expressive activity is
highly relevant to modem constitutional inquiry.
The first part of this article examines Sutherland's commitment to individualism
and explains how it, together with his aversion toward political factions, influenced
his economic liberty jurisprudence. Part two places Sutherland's thought in
historical perspective. The third and fourth parts discuss in depth both the context
of Grosjean and Associated Press and the manner in which Sutherland's analysis
33 See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First
Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 54-57, 63, 91, 93, 97, 99, 110-15 (discussing the
tendency of essentially bifurcated First Amendment judicial review to neglect the nexus
between property rights and the First Amendment).
' See infra Part IV text and accompanying notes.
31 See, e.g., Donald E. Lively, The Information Superhighway: A First Amendment
Roadmap, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1067, 1067-69, 1076-91, 1091 (1994) (criticizing the use of
different First Amendment standards for different forms of media notwithstanding the
increasing convergence of media); Matthew D. Segal, Note, The First Amendment and
Cable Television: Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), 18
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 916,928 (1995) (noting the competition posed by direct broadcast
satellite television and telephone companies).
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of the First Amendment in these cases reflected his conception of economic liberty.
The fifth segment assesses the modem Court's analysis of differential treatment of
the press and contends the Court has essentially ignored the connection between
economic liberty and freedom of expression Sutherland implicitly set forth during
the 1930s. The article ends with some thoughts about how the justices have
compounded this problem in the context of their attempt to determine the
constitutional status of must-carry rules. In conclusion, this article proposes a new
form of heightened scrutiny in cases involving differential treatment of the press
that more precisely considers the economic and expressive interests at stake.
I. JUSTICE GEORGE SUTHERLAND, ECONOMIC LIBERTY AND CONCERNS ABOUT
POLITICAL FACTIONS
While in-depth analysis of Justice Sutherland's jurisprudence of economic
liberty is beyond the scope of this article, an overview of its main tenets provides
an essential perspective from which to assess his Supreme Court opinions in
Grosjean and Associated Press. Sutherland's implicit recognition of the nexus
between economic and expressive rights emanated from his notions of individual
liberty, political factions, and the role of government in a constitutional democracy.
These ideas shaped his judicial thinking and reflected Sutherland's respect for legal
tradition and historical custom.
A. Individualism, Democracy and Government
1. The Paramount Importance of Individual Liberty
Sutherland's profound concern for the individual influenced his views of law
and government. Largely a self-made man and a product of the hard scrabble Utah
frontier of the late nineteenth century, Sutherland, from an early age, appreciated
the personal qualities of hard work, diligence, and initiative. 6 As a public figure
before his years on the Supreme Court, and even in the twilight of his life after he
left the bench, Sutherland often praised self-reliance and "sturdy individualism,"37
which he considered important components of a thriving democracy. For example,
in a commencement address at his alma mater, Brigham Young University, the
36 Born in England in 1862, Sutherland thereafter emigrated with his family to the Utah
territory. For an account of the financial hardships endured by the Sutherlands and a brief
chronicle of young Sutherland's varied work experience, see PASCHAL, supra note 24, at 3-
5.
3" George Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, American Bar
Association Annual Address (Sept. 4, 1917) (transcript available in the Sutherland Papers
at the Library of Congress), reprinted in A.B.A., REPORT OF THE 40TH ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ABA 202 (1917) [hereinafter Private Rights].
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elderly jurist exhorted the young graduates to "be independent. Do your own
thinking. Act upon your own judgment and responsibility. Cultivate self[-]
reliance."3 He also warned that "nothing so soon and so effectually destroys the
moral fibre as the habit of constantly referring doubts and difficulties to others.
Solve them for yourselves. Look the world in the face as an individual unit and not
merely as a part of the general mass."39
From Sutherland's perspective, robust individualism contributed to a vibrant
democracy in which people learned to overcome personal hardship through earnest
struggle and embraced responsibility for the course of their lives. To this extent,
he thought that personal freedom was necessary to better oneself in both a material
and moral sense, and that individual liberty strengthened the social fabric of
democratic society.' The democracy he cherished was one marked by a dynamic
culture that fostered productive activity and personal growth.
Accordingly, Sutherland was critical of governmental programs that he
considered detrimental to the democratic values of individual initiative and self-
reliance.4' In particular, he worried that too much public interference in private
economic affairs might "encourage .. .indolen[ce]" '2 and create a system of
perverse incentives in which lethargic dependence upon others would eclipse the
characteristics of personal independence imperative to long-term public welfare.43
Writing to labor leader Samuel Gompers in 1916 during the height of Progressive
era agitation for widespread economic and industrial reform, Sutherland, then a
United States senator from Utah, confided that "[w]e must be careful not to overdo
" George Sutherland, Commencement Address at Brigham Young University 9 (n.d.)
(transcript available in the Sutherland Papers at the Library of Congress) [hereinafter
Brigham Young Commencement Address].
39 id.
o "[I]ndividual initiative [and] self-reliance .. .were necessary to develop a real
democracy." Letter from George Sutherland, to Henry M. Bates, Dean, University of
Michigan Law School (Apr. 21, 1937) (transcript available in the Sutherland Papers at the
Library of Congress) [hereinafter Letter to Henry M. Bates].
41 Id.
42 George Sutherland, The Economic Value and Social Justice of a Compulsory and
Exclusive Workmen's Compensation Law, Address before the Third Annual Convention of
the International Association of Casualty and Surety Underwriters 11 (July 14, 1913)
(Quebec, Canada) (transcript available in the Sutherland Papers at the Library of Congress),
reprinted in S. Doc. No. 131 (1913) [hereinafter Economic Value and Social Justice].
43
One objection to governmental interference with the personal habits, or even the
vices of the individual, is that it tends to weaken the effect of the self-convincing
moral standards and to put in their place fallible and changing conventions as the
test of right conduct, with the consequent loss of the strengthening value to the
individual of the free exercise of his rational choice of good rather than evil.
Private Rights, supra note 37, at 203.
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our legislation and take from the individual the strengthening effect which comes
from the struggle to help himself.'"
As a legislator, he admonished both colleagues and constituents alike to "never
lose sight of the vital distinction between helplessness, which is a misfortune, and
laziness, which is a vice." '4 Wary of popular panaceas that offered imperfect and
partial solutions to important problems, Sutherland steadfastly maintained that such
irresponsible legislation "will not only fail to bring about the good results intended
to be produced, but will gravely threaten the stability and further development of
that sturdy individualism, to which is due more than any other thing our present
advanced civilization."46
Throughout his public career Sutherland emphasized the primacy of individual
liberty in a democratic republic. Personal autonomy, he insisted, meant freedom
from governmental interference "except where necessary to protect the liberties or
rights of other individuals or to safeguard society." ' 7 Insofar as he recognized the
inherent tension between private rights and public order, Sutherland reasoned that
the ultimate strength of society derived from its individuals. Government, therefore,
was most effective when it did not impede the initiative of independent persons
engaged in productive and moral activities but instead enhanced "the release of
individual creative energy"' and maintained the security of personal rights through
the equal operation of its laws. As Sutherland observed, "[i]ndividual liberty and
the common good are not incompatible, but are entirely consistent with one
another."'
Sutherland, however, was not an ardent Social Darwinist intent on minimizing
the role of government in order to preserve a process of natural selection by which
only the most fit citizens would survive in a ruthless competition for finite natural
resources." He appreciated how government could "stimulat[e] . . . personal
44 Letter from George Sutherland to Samuel Gompers 3 (Jan. 15, 1916) (transcript
available in the Sutherland Papers at the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Letter to Samuel
Gompers]. Sutherland, for example, questioned the wisdom of proposals to enact minimum
wage regulations that interfered with the private contractual relationship between an
employer and his employee.
4' Economic Value and Social Justice, supra note 42, at 12.
46 Private Rights, supra note 37, at 202.
47 Id.
41 JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW ANDTHE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY UNITED STATES 7 (1967). The eminent legal historian J. Willard Hurst used this
phrase to describe the early nineteenth century transformation of American culture.
Sutherland, who came of age during the latter half of the nineteenth century, embraced the
Jacksonian ideals of equal opportunity and rugged individualism that Hurst's apt phrase
described. See generally Olken, Justice George Sutherland, supra note 19 (placing
Sutherland's jurisprudence of economic liberty in historical context).
'9 Private Rights, supra note 37, at 213.
" The leading proponents of late nineteenth century Social Darwinism were Herbert
Spencer of Great Britain and William Graham Sumner, a professor at Yale. Essentially, a
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effort"'" through programs intended "to prevent or minimize the evils which give
rise to the necessity for assisting the helpless. 52 Indeed, Sutherland's advocacy of
worker's compensation and support for legislation to improve labor conditions
demonstrated his awareness that material progress was not without its harmful
personal consequences. 5' Explaining the need for a fixed compensation system to
redress the inequities under common law negligence often sustained by laborers in
industrial accidents, Sutherland remarked with a mixture of compassion and gritty
realism that:
There is a growing feeling that the individualistic theory has been pushed
with too much stress upon the dry logic of its doctrines and too little regard
for their practical operation from the humanitarian point of view ... we can
not always regulate our economic and social relations by scientific
formulae, because a good many people perversely insist upon being fed and
clothed and comforted by the practical rule of thumb rather than by the
exact rules of logie.54
Government aid pursuant to a uniform scheme of compensation would, therefore,
provide to injured workers and their families some economic independence they
theory ofpolitical economy which drew upon Malthusian economics and Darwinian notions
of evolution, Social Darwinism posited that societal perfection could only arise through a
process of natural selection by which those who developed the best adaptive attributes would
become the most fit to survive. With its emphasis upon ruthless individual competition,
Social Darwinism relegated government to a minimal role as peacemaker in social relations.
Relatively few Americans subscribed to its orthodox tenets, which opposed public
education, bi-metallism, protective tariffs, and labor regulations; policies which, to one
extent or another, the vast majority of Americans supported. See Olken, Justice George
Sutherland, supra note 19, at 31-33, 38.
"' Economic Value and Social Justice, supra note 42, at 12.
52 Id.
" In favor of worker's compensation for railroad laborers, Sutherland remarked "we
must take care that these people do not become wrecks, human driftwood in society. .. The
law of negligence is hard; it is unjust, it is cruel in its operation. The law of compensation
proceeds upon broad humanitarian principles." 48 CONG. REc. 4846,4853 (1912) (statement
of Sen. Sutherland). In addition, Sutherland supported a compulsory eight-hour day for
industrial workers because the inherent disparity between an employer and employee in most
industries was not often alleviated by private contract, a problem he thought affected the
public as a whole and not just a particular set of workers. See 48 CONG. REC. 6796, 6797
(1912) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). He also recognized the right of labor to organize
unions and to strike for higher wages and improved working conditions. See Letter to
Samuel Gompers, supra note 44. See also 51 CONG. REC. 11802, 11803 (1914) (statement
of Sen. Sutherland). As a Utah politician, Sutherland had introduced legislation to regulate
working conditions and hours in dangerous industries such as mining and smelting. See
PASCHAL, supra note 24, at 36.
4 Economic Value and Social Justice, supra note 42, at 11.
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might not otherwise enjoy.55
2. Inherent Distrust of Democratic Majorities
For Sutherland, the ultimate objective of government was to preserve individual
rights through the impartial restraint of the law.16 Insofar as he cherished personal
liberty, he remained throughout his life acutely aware of human foibles and their
effects upon democracy. Consequently, he perceived that ignorance, intolerance,
and selfishness were characteristics easily assumed by unrestrained democratic
majorities. Sutherland worried about the "individual fallibility of the average
man"'5" who, affected by caprice and the tide of popular sentiment, might accede to
policies detrimental to long-term public welfare. "There can be no greater delusion
than to suppose that by putting a ballot into the hands of a voter you thereby put
wisdom into his head [... ],""' Sutherland archly observed. Popular sovereignty was
essential, but he also knew that "the will of the people as expressed from time to
time through the decrees of the changing majority may be often unwise and
sometimes unjust." 9
He distinguished between a "pure democracy'" without limits marked by "the
spasmodic and ... despotic rule of the fluctuating majority"' and a democratic
republic in which elected representatives engaged in the deliberate process of
lawmaking pursuant to constitutional restrictions designed to curb popular
tyranny.62 Only a constitutional democracy, he thought, could preserve individual
rights and liberties from the whims ofmajoritarian sentiment. Inherently distrustful
of democratic majorities, he at times expressed open disdain for their abuse of
power and refused to accept that popularity will alone render a cause of action wise
or prudent.63
" Id. at I 1-12; see also 48 CONG. REc. 4846,4853 (1912) (statement of Sen. Sutherland)
(commenting that in the absence of a compulsory compensation system, "the injured man
or the family that is left ... not compensated by the industry directly... [may] ... become
a charge upon society").
56 See Private Rights, supra note 37, at 204.
51 47 CONG. REc. 2793, 2795 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
" George Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, Address Before the American
Bar Association (Aug. 28, 1912), reprinted in A.B.A., REPORT OF THE 35TH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssociATioN 383 [hereinafter The Courts and the
Constitution].
" Id. at 381; see also Sutherland, What Shall We Do With the Constitution?, at 3 (Utah
Independent 1912) [hereinafter Sutherland, What Shall We Do With the Constitution?].
6 The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 58, at 372 [emphasis in original]; see also
Sutherland, What Shall We Do With the Constitution?, supra note 59, at 2.
61 Sutherland, What Shall We Do With the Constitution?, supra note 59, at 2.
62 Id.
63 See The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 58, at 373, 383. A constitutional
democracy with a representative form of government enabled "the sober and deliberate will
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An incident from early in Sutherland's career illustrates this point. In 1906, the
Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections recommended that the full Senate
remove Utah's senior senator, Reed Smoot, from its membership because of
allegations from Utah Protestants that Smoot, an apostle in the Mormon Church,
endorsed polygamy and impermissibly allowed other Church leaders to influence
his political judgment. Though not a Mormon, Sutherland knew that the charges
against Smoot, elected to the Senate in 1903, were untrue and the product of vicious
political machinations by enemies of both Smoot and the Mormon Church."
In a speech noteworthy for its appeal to reason and logic, Sutherland urged his
colleagues to not "permit themselves to be swayed in the slightest degree from ajust
determination of this case upon the merits by petitions, however numerous or by
whomever signed."'6  Sutherland emphasized that removal on the basis of
unsubstantiated hearsay evidence would punish Smoot because of misconceptions
about his personal religious beliefs.66 "[T]his is a case where the right of an
individual is more sacred than the mere demand of all the people,"' 7 Sutherland
exclaimed, as he admonished the Senate to refrain from yielding to political
expediency. Ultimately, Sutherland's view prevailed, and Reed Smoot retained his
Senate seat.
Sutherland's skepticism about the wisdom of democratic majorities also
prompted his opposition to the initiative, referendum and recall provisions of the
constitution Arizona submitted for congressional approval in 1911 as a prerequisite
to statehood.68 Critical of the initiative and referendum because it encouraged direct
of the people... [to]... be effectuated without... becoming the mere mechanical and
helpless register of the passing whims and caprices and fleeting emotions of the constantly
changing numerical majority." Id. at 373; see also 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2796-98 (1911)
(statement of Sen. Sutherland) (suggesting that the referendum in the proposed Arizona
constitution would substitute the transient will of popular majorities for careful lawmaking
characterized by thorough consideration of the facts and compromise in the public interest).
' Smoot was neither a polygamist nor did he endorse this practice. Instead he, like other
Church leaders, adopted an attitude of benign neglect, thinking the rumors would die out
naturally. In its manifesto of 1890, the Mormon Church officially disavowed polygamy, but
it also realized the difficulty of retroactively prohibiting polygamous relationships. See 41
CONG. REC. 1486-97 (1907) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (attributing the charges against
Smoot to public hysteria and popular misconceptions about the Mormon Church and its
influence in political affairs).
65 Id. at 1486.
Id. at 1497; see also 40 CONG. REc. 8218, 8226-28 (1906) (statement of Sen. Forager
in dissent of Committee on Privileges and Elections recommendation to unseat Reed Smoot
and suggesting adverse action against Smoot might violate his Free Exercise rights).
67 41 CONG. REC. 1486-87 (1907) (statement of Sen; Sutherland).
68 The initiative and referendum bypassed the normal legislative process by allowing
citizens to enact legislation or to veto it based on the wishes of a majority of voters.
Similarly, recall permitted citizens to remove an elected official, or in some instances a
judicial decision, at any time by a majority of votes. See GEORGE E. MOWERY, THE ERA OF
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN AMERICA 1900-1912 81-82 (Harper
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participation of the people in the framing, execution, and interpretation of laws,
Sutherland regarded these reform measures as harmful because of their emphasis
upon immediate satisfaction of the whims of popular majorities.69 "[C]areless
ignorance of the facts"7 and impatience would supplant the deliberate process of
lawmaking. Laws "would be framed, not by those who see the situation from
different angles, but by those who all occupy the same point of view."'"
Accordingly, Sutherland believed the initiative and referendum impeded social
progress because of the enormous pressure it placed on elected representatives to
put the interests of particular factions before those of the whole nation. He also
worried that recall of elected officials and unpopular court decisions would make
public servants more vulnerable to the fickle emotions of ephemeral majorities and
thus compromise their judgment.72
3. Factional Aversion
Much of Sutherland's apprehension emanated from his aversion toward
political factions." He thought the transient nature of democratic majorities
rendered them inept at protecting individuals in the minority. Their myopic
behavior, he reasoned, undermined the legitimacy of government as those in
dominance often promoted their interests at the expense of others.74 As a realist, he
recognized that the natural turbulence within democracy enabled factions to control
popular majorities and thus distort the democratic process for their selfish ends.75
In particular, Sutherland associated the illegitimate exercise of governmental
authority with the pernicious influence of factions, whose emphasis on expediency
often resulted in ill-conceived laws that benefitted a favored segment of the
Torchbooks 1962). Arizona and its sister territory, New Mexico, submitted model
constitutions to Congress for approval in 1911 pursuant to the Enabling Act of 1910.
69 See 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2797-98,2800,2802 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
70 Id. at 2800; see also id. at 2897-98, 2800, 2802 (discussing the need for deliberation
in lawmaking). Sutherland discounted the fleeting desires of the populace as a reliable
criterion for governmental action. See The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 58, at
383. However, he did trust "the wisdom and justice of the persistent majority," whose will
emerged gradually and expressed itself best through the deliberative compromise of the
legislative process. 47 CONG. REc. 2800 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
" 47 CONG. REc. 2798 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
72 Id. at 2800.
73 Olken, Justice George Sutherland, supra note 19, at 46.
71 See id. at 45-46. He feared the tendency of factions "to subvert the liberties of the
individuals, who, .. . may constitute the majority today and the minority tomorrow." The
Courts and the Constitution, supra note 58, at 381.
71 See George Sutherland, The Law and the People, Address Before The Pennsylvania
Society 6 (Dec. 13, 1913) (transcript available in the Sutherland Papers at the Library of
Congress) [hereinafter The Law and the People].
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populace and rarely bore a substantial relationship to the public welfare.76 Laws
that distinguished between groups on the basis of factional imperative, Sutherland
derided as impermissible class legislation, or partial laws, because of their unequal
effects: "[A]ny law which arbitrarily separates men into classes to be punished or
rewarded, not according to what they do but according to the class to which they are
assigned, is... despotic, no matter how large a majority may have approved it." 77
Moreover, class legislation was the "most odious form of legislative abuse,"7 8 in
contravention of the fundamental premise that the "law . . . shall operate
generally." 9
Sutherland's criticism of partial laws reflected longstanding concerns about the
problem of factions. Indeed, his emphasis upon public welfare was reminiscent of
English political reformers from centuries earlier for whom the legitimate exercise
of power in a commonwealth derived from the neutrality of governmental action
and the impartial restraint of the law. ° In America, a plethora of post-revolutionary
class legislation for the benefit of debtors that impaired the contract rights of
creditors and undermined the security of private property fomented much anti-
factional sentiment and led to the formation of the Constitution, with its limitations
upon democratic majorities and restrictions upon arbitrary governmental power."'
Yet James Madison, the Constitution's principal draftsman, knew that the inherent
inequality of people's ability to acquire property created social divisions from
which factions emerged "whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the
whole... united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adverse-to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests
of the community." 2 Consequently, Madison emphasized the importance of
impartial laws in neutralizing political factions. 3
76 See George Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, Address to the New York State Bar
Ass'n 19 (Jan. 21, 1921), [hereinafter Principle or Expedient?]. Sutherland feared that class
legislation "may constitute the first link in a chain of precedents which, beginning in
necessity, passes from one gradation to another until, at length, it rests in mere favor." Id.
77 id.
78 Private Rights, supra note 37, at 212.
7' The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 58, at 384.
80 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OFTHE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 54-55
(1972); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning
and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REV. 293, 314-17 (1985).
81 See WOOD, supra note 80, at 53-65; Benedict, supra note 80, at 316-17.
82 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 55 (James Madison) (The Heritage Press ed. 1945); see
also id. at 56-67 (discussing inevitability of factions and their cause). See generally THE
FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison) (expressing disapproval of class legislation).
83 See THEFEDERALISTNO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 82, at 58-61 (explaining that
factions should neutralize each other in a large democratic republic); THE FEDERALISTNO.
51 (James Madison) (noting the attributes of separation of powers as a limitation upon
governmental authority and a means for preserving individual rights from political factions);
see also JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
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Subsequent generations of American statesmen and jurists shared these
convictions; perhaps the most noteworthy of whom was Thomas Cooley, one of
Sutherland's law professors, author of an influential constitutional law treatise, and
a member of the Michigan Supreme Court during the latter half of the nineteenth
century. Cooley distinguished between partial laws that inured to the benefit of
select groups and those of general application that advanced the interests of society
as a whole.84 A proponent of Jacksonian democracy, he approved of government
action intended to promote equal opportunity and was critical of measures whose
tenuous relationship to public welfare arbitrarily infringed upon individual liberty
- especially the pursuit of property, which he regarded as essential to the
enjoyment of other civil rights. 5
Sutherland embraced this historical tradition and opposed "statutes... which
select for privilege one class of great voting strength or set apart for special burdens
another class of small numerical power at the polls." 6 Accordingly, he regarded
the initiative, referendum, and recall with suspicion, convinced that if implemented
they would release the unbridled passions and fleeting emotions of popular
democratic majorities and facilitate factions. 7  Similarly, he opposed the
Underwood Tariff Bill of 1913 because its reduced rates favored Southern cotton
and sugar growers while leaving Western wool producers at a competitive
disadvantage.8
Throughout his public career, Sutherland decried "the artificial inequalities of
special privilege."89 He perceived that class legislation delegitimized the principal
components of a healthy democracy: individual initiative, self-reliance, and merit.
A year before he joined the Supreme Court Sutherland explained:
[Flor if the hand of power shall ever be permitted to take from "A" and
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 43-45, 177-80, 207
(1990).
84 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 355, 389-94
(Da Capo Press 1972) (1868) [hereinafter COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS]; see also
People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452,486-87 (1870) (Cooley, J.) (invalidating a law that conferred
special economic benefits on a railroad as illegitimate class legislation).
85 See, e.g., Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley, and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism ":
A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751, 752, 755-58, 760, 762-63 (1967) (attributing
Cooley's anti-factionalism to Jacksonian Democracy).
86 Private Rights, supra note 37, at 212.
87 See 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2797-98, 2800 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland); see
also The Law and the People, supra note 75, at 6 (characterizing the recall of judicial
decisions as partial laws); Olken, Justice George Sutherland, supra note 19, at 45-47.
8" See 50 CONG. REc. 4297 (1913) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (explaining the
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give to "B" merely because "A" has much and "B" has little, we shall
have taken the first step upon that unhappy path which leads from a
republic where every man may rise in proportion to his energy and
ability, to a commune where energy and sloth, ability and ignorance,
occupy in-common the same dead level of individual despair."
Consequently, Sutherland was aghast at the proliferation of partial laws intended
to indulge the ephemeral desires of popular majorities and the factions which
controlled them.9'
4. The Equal Operation of the Laws as a Democratic Ideal
Like Cooley, Sutherland realized that the legitimacy of governmental authority
derived from the equal operation of its laws. Otherwise, chaos would ensue and in
place of a government of laws would be one based upon fickle emotion.92 Through
the impartial restraint of its laws, government could neutralize political factions and
protect individual rights from the unreliable tides of democracy. Laws that
arbitrarily distinguished between groups or citizens were presumptively illegitimate
and impaired true social progress.
Sutherland demonstrated his commitment to equality through the legislation he
sponsored. For example, he enthusiastically supported universal suffrage because
it afforded women voting rights equal to those of men and removed the artificial
barrier of gender as an impediment to the exercise of a vital citizenship right.93
Moreover, Sutherland advocated worker's compensation because its uniform
allocation of benefits replaced the uncertain amount of damages available to injured
9o Principle or Expedient?, supra note 76, at 18-19.
9' See Private Rights, supra note 37, at 203-05. "[T]oo many laws are being passed in
haste. Too many that simply reflect a temporary prejudice, a passing fad, a fleeting whim,
a superficial view or an exaggerated estimate of the extent, or a mistaken impression of the
quality of an evil." Principle or Expedient?, supra note 76, at 20; see also Private Rights,
supra note 36, at 199.
92 See Principle or Expedient?, supra note 76, at 8-9.
93 See 51 CONG. REc. 3598, 3600-01 (1914) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). Sutherland
explained that:
To deprive... [women] of the right to participate in government is to make an
arbitrary division of the citizenship of the country upon the sole ground that one
class is made up of men, and should therefore rule, and the other class is made up
of women, who should therefore be ruled.
George Sutherland, Speech at Women's Suffrage Meeting, Belasco Theatre 3-4 (Dec. 12,
1915) (transcript available in the Sutherland Papers at the Library of Congress). Sutherland
also introduced ajoint resolution recommending a constitutional amendment giving women
the franchise. See 53 CONG. REC. 75 (1915) (statement of Sen: Sutherland).
2002"1
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
laborers under the common law and equitably spread the risk of loss within an
industry.94 These measures were consistent with his creed that "[t]he course of
safety for society, as well as liberty for the individual, is to make and enforce laws
which will keep free the gates of equal opportunity." '95 Equality before the law was
the sine qua non of Sutherland's political philosophy and would become the
touchstone of his jurisprudence.
5. Constitutional Limitations and an Independent Judiciary
Sutherland understood that without a written constitution, a government of laws
would be an illusion. He knew from practical experience that democratic majorities
could not always implement the actual will of the people because of their
vulnerability to political factions.96 Though relatively pessimistic about the wisdom
of democratic majorities, he realized that the legitimacy of the Constitution derived
from the will of the populace." Yet he insisted that for the Constitution to function
as the fundamental law of the land, it must curb the excesses of democracy.98 Only
then could individual rights be secure and the enduring will of the people remain
paramount to political expediency and factional self-interest. Long before hejoined
the Court, Sutherland remarked:
Constitutions are made not only for the purpose of confining the
representative agents of the people within definite boundaries, but also for
the purpose of preventing hasty, ill-considered, and unjust action on the
part of the majority of the people themselves. The written constitution is
the shelter and the bulwark of what might otherwise be a helpless
minority.99
Sutherland further explained that the Constitution was "the shield of the weak
against the powerful and of the few against the many. The majority can always take
care of itself, but without the checks of the Constitution the minority would live
under the constant menace of the dangers which flow from sudden popular emotion
or prejudice."'" Unchanged in the meaning of its limitations since its ratification
" See Economic Value and Social Justice, supra note 42, at 5-11. "[T]he compensation
law substitutes the communistic idea of the benefit for the whole class in place of the
individualistic theory which permits a minority of the class to recover much and the majority
little or nothing." Id. at 9.
9' Principle or Expedient?, supra note 76, at 19.
96 Id. at 18-19.
9 See The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 37, at 375.
98 Id. at 381-83.
47 CONG. REc. 2793, 2800 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
'o George Sutherland, Undated/Untitled Speech 2 (transcript available in the Sutherland
Papers at the Library of Congress).
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and subject to alteration only through the lengthy and deliberate process of
amendment, the Constitution therefore made possible the impartial restraint of the
law within a democratic republic.'O'
Insofar as Sutherland considered the Constitution a safeguard from the tyranny
of democratic majorities, he thought an independent judiciary could best- interpret
the meaning of its provisions and thus preserve the primacy of law in a society
based upon popular sovereignty. Sutherland attributed this special role of judges
to their training in the common law and the respect for historical custom
characteristic of stare decisis. °2 Unlike legislators expected to heed the popular
demand for making laws, judges, whether appointed or elected, must "simply ...
declare and apply the law of the Constitution."' 3 Accordingly, he criticized the
recall of unpopular judicial decisions and other attempts to restrict judicial
review."0 4 That which threatened an independent judiciary, he felt, impaired the
ability of judges to protect individual rights through the careful scrutiny of laws to
ensure their equal operation.
11. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND, THE CONSERVATIVE JUDICIAL TRADITION AND HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF ECONOMIC LIBERTY
A. The Conservative Judicial Tradition
Once on the Supreme Court, Sutherland closely adhered to a conservative
judicial tradition in which jurists, influenced by factional aversion, often invalidated
partial laws that benefitted some groups at the expense of others and upheld
measures of equal operation that clearly promoted the public interest in health,
101 See Sutherland, What Shall We Do With the Constitution?, supra note 59, at 1-4. "The
great purpose of the Constitution is to... preserve the rights of the citizen by the definite
and unchanging law of the land, instead of leaving him at the mercy of the transitory
opinions of a constantly changing majority." Id. at 4.
102 See Olken, Justice George Sutherland, supra note 19, at 54-56.
103 George Sutherland, Undated Speech on Utah Judiciary 4, 18 (transcript available in
the Sutherland papers at the Library of Congress). Moreover, Sutherland noted that,
whereas legislators might enact some laws because of political expediency, a judge has no
constituents and therefore need not base a decision upon the apparent popularity of a law.
See The Law and the People, supra note 75, at 5. An independent judiciary, therefore, would
likely eschew political expediency and maintain the equal operation of the law. "The law
must apply to all alike. The making of law is an exercise of the will of the state; the
interpretation and application of the law is an exercise of the reason of the judge." Private
Rights and Government Control, supra note 37, at 204-05.
'04 See The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 58, at 384. Sutherland believed that
recall "advocate[s] a method by which the rights of the minority shall be subordinate to the
will of those who for the time being predominate in numbers." Sutherland, What Shall We
Do With the Constitution?, supra note 59, at 3.
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safety, morals, or welfare."5 A student of history with a strong sense of the
common law, Sutherland implicitly understood that class legislation and the
political factions responsible for its creation threatened the security of personal
rights in a democratic society.
1. Judicial Skepticism of Political Factions in Historical Perspective
From the outset, the constitutional Framers realized that those with relatively
little property would comprise the majority of citizens, from whom factions would
likely arise to facilitate the passage of laws favorable to their self-interest but
harmful to those in the minority with large amounts of property. Alexander
Hamilton, among others, foresaw judicial review as a mechanism for preserving
private property from the fleeting emotions of popular democratic majorities,"°' and
under the leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall the Supreme Court invoked the
Contract Clause to protect private economic rights from the redistributive effects
of partial laws. Ostensibly distinguishing between law and politics, the Marshall
Court applied the concept of vested rights to prevent political factions from
impairing the obligation of contracts and infringing upon the security of private
property through retroactive legislation. 7 As Marshall explained in Fletcher v.
Peck, '0 wherein the Court invalidated Georgia's revocation of a prior legislative
land grant through which hundreds of bona fide third party purchasers claimed title
to millions of acres, the Contract Clause was meant "to shield... propertyfrom the
effects of those sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed."'"
Over time, the Marshall Court's solicitude for vested rights yielded to a more
instrumental conception of public welfare critical of government intervention that
conferred exclusive monopolies and other special economic privileges. Influenced
by Jacksonian democracy, which promoted individualism and equality before the
law, judges began to regard the impartial restraint of the law as integral to economic
os See generally GILLIAN, supra note 1 (discussing the pattern of Lochner era police
powers jurisprudence); see also Olken, Justice George Sutherland, supra note 19, at 9-36
(describing the conservative judicial tradition).
106 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Heritage Press ed.
1945).
07 See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (holding
the Contract Clause prohibited New Hampshire from divesting the pre-existing charter rights
of a private college); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) (invalidating
a New York insolvency statute that retroactively discharged a debtor from an antecedent
contract obligation). But see Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827) (upholding
a prospective New York insolvency law). Marshall, however, thought that both retroactive
and prospective insolvency laws violated the Contract Clause. See id. at 354-57 (Marshall,
C. J., dissenting) (attributing these acts to factional impulses comparable to those responsible
for post-revolutionary debtor relief laws).
10 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810).
I Id. at 138.
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liberty and equal opportunity."' They construed "law of the land" provisions
within state constitutions to mandate the neutrality of government in private
economic affairs and equated laws of general application with the public good."'
Consequently, they differentiated the right to acquire property through the equal
operation of the law from the creation of artificial privilege with which they
associated vested rights.
Thus, in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,"2 the Supreme Court rejected
the contention of a toll bridge company that Massachusetts's subsequent charter of
a competitor impaired its exclusive franchise rights in violation of the Contract
Clause." '3 Chief Justice Taney's narrow reading of the initial corporate charter
eschewed any implication of monopoly, and he instead sustained the authority of
the commonwealth to foster competition in the public interest. " In other instances,
courts upheld legislation that advanced public health, safety, morals, or welfare, but
invalidated partial laws that arbitrarily distinguished between groups or persons by
singling them out for either preferential or discriminatory treatment.'
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, judges began to use substantive
due process to assess the legitimacy of state police powers. Long part of the
common law tradition, due process initially functioned as a procedural restriction
upon government when it sought to infringe upon a person's life, liberty, or
property without a judicial proceeding." 6 Yet as local governments increasingly
used their police powers to regulate private economic affairs, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and comparable provisions within state
constitutions, emerged as substantive limitations. Concerned with preserving both
the value and use of property,"' judges examined not only the form of legislation
"o See Olken, Justice George Sutherland, supra note 19, at 17-20.
.. See, e.g., Vanzant v. Waddel, 8 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 230, 239-40 (1829) (defining "law of
the land" as a law of general application and upholding legislation that provided additional
remedies to bank creditors).
12 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
"' Id. at 548-52.
.. Taney said: "[I]n grants by the public, nothing passes by implication." Id. at 546. See
also id. at 552-53 (claiming an implied monopoly would impede progress and promote
economic waste in the use of an important river); see generally STANLEY I. KUTLER,
PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1971)
(suggesting Taney's literal construction of the charter reflected his preference for local
economic development over stagnant vested rights).
"5 See, e.g., Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843) (invalidating, under the
Contract Clause, an Illinois law that extended the period for redeeming foreclosed real
property).
16 See Paul Kens, The Source of a Myth: Police Powers of the States and Laissez Faire
Constitutionalism, 1900-193 7, 35 J. AM. LEG. HIST. 70, 75 (1991).
"17 Justices Stephen J. Field and Joseph P. Bradley, in particular, understood that both
tangible and intangible property rights inhered within liberty of contract. See, e.g., Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 141 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting) ("All that is beneficial in property
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enacted pursuant to local police powers, but also its substance in order to
distinguish between illegitimate partial laws and those that bore a substantial
relationship to the public interest. 8 Consequently, laws that did not fit within the
narrowly prescribed police power categories of public health, safety, morals, or
welfare rarely withstood close scrutiny byjudges committed to preserving economic
liberty from the whims and passions of transient democratic majorities." 9
Within this context, judges increasingly relied upon the doctrine of liberty of
contract to determine whether the spate of reform measures enacted to improve
industrial conditions interfered with "the right to pursue any lawful business or
vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others."'2 ° Based
upon the premise that a person has a property interest in his labor, freedom of
contract evolved into both a property right and a liberty interest protected by the
Constitution from the partial laws of political factions.' Insofar as judicial
arises from its use, and the fruits of that use; and whatever deprives a person of them
deprives him of all that is desirable or valuable in the title and possession."); see also
Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746,757 (1884) (Field, J., and Bradley,
J., concurring); id. at 762 (both characterizing freedom of contract as an inalienable right
integral to the pursuit of personal happiness); The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 122
(1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (invoking liberty of contract). Eventually, a majority of the
Court adopted Field's and Bradley's view. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (invalidating maximum hours legislation as an unconstitutional abridgement of liberty
of contract).
"' See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (asserting that "courts are not
bound by mere forms ... [but] are at liberty- indeed, are under a solemn duty - to look at
the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has
transcended the limits of its authority"). In Mugler, the Court upheld Kansas' proscription
of the manufacture or sale of alcohol as a legitimate exercise of its police powers.
'1 As Justice Stephen Field explained:
If the courts could not. . . examine ... the real character of the act, but must accept
the declaration of the legislature as conclusive, the most valued rights of the citizen
would be subject to the arbitrary control of a temporary majority.. . , instead of
being protected by the guarantees of the Constitution.
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 696-97 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting).
120 See Butchers' Union Co., Ill U.S. at 757. (Field, J., concurring).
121 See, e.g., The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 83-111 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at
111-24 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (both asserting that a slaughterhouse monopoly infringed
on the property and liberty rights of independent butchers to pursue a lawful trade). As
Bradley explained, the New Orleans ordinance interfered with the butchers' freedom of
contract when it "deprive[d] them of liberty as well as property, without due process of law.
Their right of choice is a portion of their liberty; their occupation is their property." Id. at
122. Insofar as Justices Field and Bradley acknowledged the city of New Orleans could
regulate the location of animal slaughter pursuant to its police powers, they doubted whether
the creation of a butchers' monopoly actually promoted the public interest in public health
or safety. Id. at 87 (Field, J. dissenting). Bradley said the monopoly "is not a police
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adoption of liberty of contract reflected traditional skepticism about class
legislation, it also showed how judges assumed, sometimes naively and incorrectly,
that employers and employees could bargain on equal terms with each other about
conditions of employment.
Consequently, the application of liberty of contract to labor regulations could
be quite inflexible where, as in Lochner v. New York,'22 a divided Court invalidated
part of a state law that prescribed maximum hours for bakers because of the
perception that it did not bear a close relationship to public wealth, safety, morals,
or welfare. Justice Holmes, in a caustic dissent, criticized the Lochner majority for
its narrow view of state police powers and suggested that economic substantive due
process merely disguised the personal prejudices of judges who imbued
constitutional analysis with principles of laissez faire economics and Social
Darwinism." 3
Yet in the vast majority of cases, courts sustained legislative attempts to
regulate private economic affairs, 24 belying Holmes's view that the predominantly
conservative characteristics of economic substantive due process reflected a
conscious effort by judges to maintain the industrial status quo and preserve the
property rights of an economic elite. Indeed, the principal concern of Lochner era
jurists was with ephemeral popular majorities and the political factions that
controlled them. Relying primarily upon historical custom and common law
methodology, rather than on principles of laissez faire economics, natural law, or
Social Darwinism, courts sought to protect economic liberty from popular
democratic majorities and political factions.' 25 In essence, liberty of contract
signified a broad conception of individual freedom,'26 and the close scrutiny of
regulation. . . it is one of those arbitrary and unjust laws made in the interests of a few
schening individuals." Id. at 120 (Bradley, J., dissenting). The United States Supreme Court
formally endorsed the concept of liberty of contract in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897).
122 198 U.S. 45, 57-64 (1905).
123 Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for a decision based "upon
an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain" and proclaiming
that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics").
Holmes also remarked that "a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory", and accused the Court of using substantive due process to "prevent the natural
outcome of a dominant opinion." Id. at 75-76.
124 See Olken, Justice George Sutherland, supra note 19, at 7, 31.
125 Id. at 33-35.
126 Implicit within the Court's late nineteenth and early twentieth century recognition of
economic substantive due process was an expansive definition of liberty. Both Justices
Bradley and Field initially articulated this notion in their dissenting opinions in The
Slaughterhouse Cases, when they suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause protected the freedom of individuals to pursue lawful occupations and that such
freedom emanated from the pursuit of personal happiness at the heart of constitutional
liberty. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 87-89, 93, 101-11 (1873) (Field, J.,
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economic regulations conducted by Lochner era judges, presaged modem judicial
recognition of non-economic interests involving the First Amendment and the right
to privacy.' George Sutherland would draw upon these jurisprudential premises
dissenting); id. at 116-122 (Bradley J., dissenting). In Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City,
Co., they reasserted that liberty meant more than freedom from physical constraint - it also
signified "[t]he right to follow any of the common occupations." 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884)
(Bradley, J. concurring). See also Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (implicitly
acknowledging the constitutional importance of liberty of contract while upholding a
Pennsylvania oleomargarine law as a legitimate police power regulation). In Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), the Supreme Court formally recognized liberty of contract
as part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thereafter, liberty of contract enjoyed preeminent constitutional status until the 1930s. See,
e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). As a constitutional doctrine, liberty of
contract accommodated both tangible and intangible property rights. Indeed, its emphasis
upon preserving the pursuit of property through a lawful occupation - in and of itself an
intangible property right - ultimately made possible the Court's eventual recognition that
the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also protected individuals' other intangible
rights such as freedom of expression from incursion by the states. See Charles Warren, The
New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REv. 431,446-58 (1926).
127 In 1925, the Supreme Court expressly ruled for the first time that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the First Amendment's Free Speech and
Free Press Clauses. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). In Gitlow, Justice
Sanford, writing for the majority, stated that "we ... assume that freedom of speech and of
the press - which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress -
are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States." Id. at 666. Gitlow's acknowledgment that
freedom of expression is part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment emanated, in large part, from a growing recognition by several
members of the Court that liberty encompassed a broad spectrum of personal rights aside
from the freedom of contract. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc. of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(decided one week before Gitlow) (finding that Fourteenth Amendment liberty includes
parental/guardian autonomy concerning their children's education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (ruling that the acquisition of useful knowledge is within the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 343 (1920)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (suggesting that if freedom of contract is within the ambit of liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, so should the liberty to teach
others and communicate about pacifism); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)
(suggesting in dicta that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from state encroachment included some of the rights guaranteed in the first
eight amendments). Twining, therefore, anticipated both the expansive concept of Fourteenth
Amendment liberty characteristic of subsequent twentieth century constitutional
jurisprudence and the process of selective incorporation by which the Court would identify
which portions of the Bill of Rights would be made applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S.
45, 67 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the right to teach is not only a property
right akin to freedom of contract but also a fundamental liberty protected from state
incursion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Patterson v. Colorado,
[Vol. 10:2
THE BUSINESS OF EXPRESSION
when, in his opinions in Grosjean and Associated Press, he set forth the close
connection between economic liberty and freedom of expression.
2. Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty
George Sutherland was an associate justice of the United States Supreme Court
from 1922 to 1938. His jurisprudence of economic liberty, with its emphasis upon
the preservation of private economic rights through the equal operation of the law,
bore the influence of longstanding constitutional values shaped by historical custom
and the common law. Factional aversion underscored this tradition, which guided
Sutherland throughout his public career. Like conservative jurists before him,
Sutherland sought to protect individual rights and liberties from the whims of
democratic majorities manipulated by political factions eager to promote their
selfish needs at the expense of the public good. From this perspective, Sutherland
differentiated between partial laws, enacted on behalf of special interest groups that
did not substantially advance public health, safety, morals, or welfare, and laws of
equal operation for the benefit of the community as a whole. During his sixteen
years on the Court, he persisted in carefully scrutinizing economic regulations even
as the realities of the Depression rendered obsolete many of the Lochner era's
assumptions about the government's role in private economic affairs. Insofar as
Sutherland may have erred in his assessment of local police powers during his last
years on the Court, his commitment to equality, intuition about political factions,
and recognition of property rights as a constitutional paradigm for other individual
liberties ultimately enabled him to perceive a nexus between economic liberty and
freedom of expression he may not have otherwise appreciated.
Sutherland's aversion toward political factions was the linchpin of his
jurisprudence, and liberty of contract the prism through which he determined the
constitutional limits of governmental intervention into private economic affairs.
While he acknowledged that freedom of contract was not absolute, 2 ' he
nevertheless considered it an element of personal liberty as well as a property right,
and throughout his tenure on the Court he remained skeptical of legislative schemes
that threatened the autonomy of businesses to establish wages, 29 the prices they
205 U.S. 454, 465 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting "that the privileges of free
speech and of a free press. . . constitute an essential part... of everyman's liberty, and are
protected against violation by that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbidding a State
to deprive any person of his liberty without due process of law"). But see Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 538, 543 (1922) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
make the First Amendment applicable to the states). Gitlow disavowed this observation from
Prudential Ins. Co. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666. For an excellent discussion of these cases,
see Warren, supra note 126, at 432, 451-58.
128 See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 546.
129 See, e.g., id.; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 401-14 (1937)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting). He also joined in the majority opinion in Morehead v. New York
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charged, 30 or restricted their access to local markets.' 3' Though much maligned for
his often inflexible application of late nineteenth century economic substantive due
process concepts to the industrial problems spawned by the Depression,
Sutherland's jurisprudence of economic liberty reflected his relatively progressive
views as a senator and influenced his inchoate recognition in Grosjean and
Associated Press of the business of expression.
a. Class Legislation and Private Economic Affairs
Sutherland's analysis of minimum wage regulations is a prime example of how
anti-factional bias pervaded his constitutional interpretation and molded his
conception ofjudicial review. InAdkins v. Children 's Hospital,' Sutherland wrote
the majority opinion for a divided Court that invalidated a District of Columbia
minimum wage law applicable only to women. Unpersuaded that this measure
actually promoted the health or moral welfare of its intended beneficiaries,
Sutherland regarded the minimum wage provision as a capricious interference with
contractual liberty that disrupted the inherent equality he presumed existed between
employers and employees to bargain over the actual value of labor.' In part, he
thought the law unreasonable because it imposed a minimum wage requirement in
disregard of either the worth of the services provided by female workers or the
ability of employers to make such payments. 34 Moreover, he considered this type
of industrial regulation unnecessarily paternalistic because it assumed that women
ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), that invalidated New York's minimum wage law.
30 See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (Sutherland, J.)
(invalidating a Tennessee law setting price of gas); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928)
(Sutherland, J.) (invalidating a New Jersey regulation of fees charged by employment
agencies), overruled by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 244 (1941); Tyson and Brother
v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (Sutherland, J.) (invalidating a New York law regulating the
resale prices for entertainment tickets).
a ' See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Sutherland, J.)
(invalidating an Oklahoma law restricting the manufacture, distribution, and sale of ice);
Frost v. Corp. Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515 (1929) (Sutherland, J.) (invalidating an Oklahoma
statute exempting agricultural and horticultural cooperatives from cotton gin licensing
requirements).
132 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
'13 Id. at 545 (asserting that "the parties have an equal right to obtain from each other the
best terms they can as the result of private bargaining"); see also id. at 555-62.
14 Id. at 555-58. Sutherland explained:
The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to the contract. It ignores
the necessities of the employer by compelling him to pay not less than a certain
sum, not only whether the employee is capable of earning it, but irrespective of the
ability of his business to sustain the burden.
Id. at 557.
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could not bargain as effectively for a living wage as their male counterparts, a
premise he believed untenable in light of advances in women's suffrage and their
increased political power.'35
After Adkins, Sutherland continued to view laws that prescribed a minimum
wage as illegitimate class legislation whose unequal operation created arbitrary
distinctions unrelated to the public interest in health, safety, morals, or welfare. 36
He also dissented in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,' which sustained a
Washington state minimum wage regulation for women as a reasonable exercise of
local police powers and thus overruled Adkins. Appalled at the deference the
majority accorded this law, Sutherland explained that to prohibit women from
voluntarily working at substandard rates ironically encouraged employers to instead
hire men for whom there was no such minimum wage requirement and thus
impeded the economic opportunity of women. 3
Primarily concerned with preserving individual economic rights and liberties
from the artifice of political factions, Sutherland considered minimum wage
legislation particularly inimical to the public welfare because it allowed the whims
of transient democratic majorities to interfere with the sanctity of private contracts,
a pervasive theme in his jurisprudence. Three years earlier, for example, in Home
Building & Loan Ass 'n v. Blaisdell,'39 Sutherland had argued, in dissent, that a
Minnesota statute violated the Contract Clause when it retroactively extended the
period for mortgagors to redeem foreclosed property in contravention of the express
terms of a mortgage contract. " A bare majority of the Court had sustained the law,
enacted on behalf of anxious mortgagors, as a reasonable exercise of local police
powers intended to provide temporary relief during an economic emergency '" In
contrast, Sutherland believed it impermissibly impaired the contract rights of the
mortgagee and decried "the attempt... to shift the misfortune of the debtor to the
'3 Id. at 553 (discussing the 1920 ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment). Sutherland
commented: "No distinction can be made between women ... and men, for certainly, if
women require a minimum wage to preserve their morals men require it to preserve their
honesty." Id. at 556.
136 Prior to 1937, Sutherland joined in three Court decisions that struck down minimum
wage legislation for women. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587
(1936); Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927) (per curiam); Murphy v.
Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925) (per curiam).
117 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
131 Id. at 409-13 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). In Adkins, Sutherland noted that one of the
plaintiffs, Willie Lyons, lost herjob as a hotel operator for which she would have voluntarily
continued to work at a wage below that prescribed by the D.C. labor board, when her
employer fired her to avoid criminal sanctions for violating the minimum wage standard. See
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 542-43 (1923).
139 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
, See id. at 448-83 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 435, 437-39, 442-47 (Hughes, C.J.).
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shoulders of the creditor. .. "as illegitimate class legislation. 4
Like Blaisdell, West Coast Hotel required the justices to reassess constitutional
limits on police powers in the context of an unprecedented depression which shook
to the core fundamental assumptions about the appropriate role of government in
private economic affairs. In both cases, the same five justices' 43 sought to replace
the relatively narrow, categorical conception of local police powers upon which
Adkins and Lochner rested with a more pragmatic, deferential standard that
essentially balanced private rights with the public interest.'" Sutherland, however,
vigorously resisted this jurisprudential shift; his fear of factions and strong sense
of judicial duty compelled him to observe that "the meaning of the Constitution
does not change with the ebb and flow of economic events.' 45 Though no longer
part of the Court majority in many economic regulation cases by the late 1930s,
Sutherland never wavered from his conviction that "the good of society as a whole
cannot be better served than by the preservation against arbitrary restraint of the
liberties of its constituent members."'" Constitutional limitations such as the
Contract Clause or economic substantive due process, therefore, existed to restrain
the tyranny of popular democratic majorities under all circumstances.147
Sutherland, like conservative jurists before him, considered economic
regulations invalid unless they bore a close and substantial relationship to some
aspect of the public welfare.'" Thus, he differentiated minimum wage laws, which
he thought remotely advanced the needs of society, from worker's compensation
149
and maximum hour regulations " intended to improve the health, safety, and moral
14' Id. at 472 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
143 Chief Justice Hughes and Associate Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts
comprised the majority. Associate Justices Sutherland, Butler, McReynolds, and Van
Devanter were the dissenters.
'" See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,391,398-400 (1937) (Chief
Justice Hughes explaining the need for governmental intervention in the workplace to
prevent the self-interest of some employers from subverting the public welfare); Blaisdell,
290 U.S. at 442 (Chief Justice Hughes noting "a growing appreciation of public needs and
of the necessity for finding a rational compromise between individual rights and the public
welfare").
"I West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 402 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); see also Blaisdell, 290
U.S. at 450-51 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
146 Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923).
14 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 401-04; Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 448-53, 465,
482-83.
14 See, e.g., Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-12 (1928) (invalidating a
Pennsylvania restriction on ownership of pharmacies). In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 279 (1932), Sutherland explained that to be reasonable police powers must
be "applied with appropriate impartiality." Id. at 279.
141 See, e.g., Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154 (1928) (Sutherland, J.)
(sustaining worker's compensation laws); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418
(1923) (Sutherland, J.) (same).
IS See, e.g., Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (sustaining maximum hours
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welfare of many citizens. He also worried that some legislative attempts to fix the
prices of commodities and services merely represented illegitimate forms of class
legislation enacted for the benefit of some groups at the expense of others in
derogation of the principle that the government should not interfere in private
economic affairs unless it does so pursuant to a compelling public purpose in an
impartial manner calculated to benefit the community in its entirety."' In Tyson
and Brother v. Banton,"2 for example, Sutherland rejected the notion that New
York could prescribe the resale price of theater tickets charged by private
companies pursuant to merely the general objective of protecting consumers from
exorbitant fees and fraud. He reasoned that this type of commercial activity did not
comprise at common law a business sufficiently affected with the public interest to
warrant so intrusive an interference with the freedom of ticket brokers to peddle
their items."3
b. Economic Liberty as a Constitutional Paradigm
Skeptical of partial laws that restricted private enterprise through the guise of
local police powers, Sutherland applied substantive due process in part to preserve
economic opportunity. In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,"54 he criticized an
Oklahoma law that authorized a state commission to issue licenses for the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of ice only to those applicants who could prove
a public need existed for these services in their intended geographical markets.
Sutherland, who wrote the majority opinion for a divided court, believed this
limitation arbitrarily reduced competition within the ice industry for the benefit of
regulation for women). Whereas in Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) and
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), Sutherland did not think
physiological differences between men and women were relevant in minimum wage
legislation, and he considered them a legitimate basis for distinction in the state's attempt
to protect women's health and welfare. See id. at 295 (distinguishing Adkins).
151 See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (Sutherland, J.)
(invalidating a Tennessee gas price fixing law); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928)
(Sutherland, J.) (invalidating a New Jersey price regulation of employment agency fees),
overruled by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 244 (1941).
152 273 U.S. 418 (1927). In fact, Sutherland found no connection between the asserted
state interest and the resale of tickets in excess of the fifty-cent charge permitted by law. Id.
at 445.
".. See id. at 430-31 (asserting that the state could only regulate the prices of a business
affected with a public interest). At common law, a business became affected with a public
interest when it: (a) was created by a public grant or charter; (b) provided an essential
public service; or (c) was a monopoly. Sutherland found all three criteria lacking in this case,
though he conceded that the state could regulate the conduct of a business, as opposed to its
prices, even if the business was entirely private. Id. at 439-42.
Im 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
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established businesses 5' and infringed upon the contractual freedom of others to
pursue an otherwise lawful endeavor."6 While he recognized the importance of ice
to Oklahomans, he doubted that commerce in it was a public matter that justified
the imposition of a novel, yet discriminatory, licensing requirement.
5 7
Sutherland ended his opinion in New State Ice Co. with the suggestion that
"[t]he opportunity to apply one's skill and labor in an ordinary occupation."
deserved as much constitutional protection as rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment."Is Though intended as a rhetorical flourish in an analysis of economic
substantive due process, this statement nevertheless indicates that Sutherland
perceived economic liberty as a constitutional paradigm. In essence, he viewed the
sanctity of contracts and private property in the broader context of personal liberty
and understood that their vulnerability to the whims of ephemeral popular majorities
could affect the stability of other individual rights in a democratic republic.
A decade before he joined the Court, Sutherland explained:
There is no such thing as rights of property apart from the rights of man.
... The thing protected by the Constitution is not the right of property, but
the right of a person to property, and this right to property is of the same
character as the right to life and liberty."'
He also noted in this same speech that "[p]roperty per se, has no rights; but the
individual ... has three great rights, equally sacred from arbitrary interference: the
right to his life, the right to his liberty, the right to his property."'6 ° Accordingly,
Sutherland regarded the right to property as an element of individual liberty, and
indeed his emphasis upon the equal operation of the law reflected an overriding
concern with personal freedom.
" Id. at 278-79. As Sutherland explained: "The control here... does not protect against
monopoly, but tends to foster it. The aim is not to encourage competition, but to prevent it;
not to regulate the business, but to preclude persons from engaging in it." Id. at 279.
156 Id. at 277-80. "Here we are dealing with an ordinary business ... as essentially private
in its nature as the business of the grocer, the dairyman, the butcher, the shoemaker...
Id. at 277.
1' Id. at 277-80. In contrast, Justice Brandeis, who was generally far more deferential
towards local economic regulations, in dissent, proclaimed the authority of the state "to
remould, through experimentation ... economic practices and institutions to meet changing
social and economic needs." See id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Frost v. Corp.
Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 520-25 (1929) (Sutherland, J.) (invalidating an Oklahoma gin
licensing scheme that granted preferential exemptions to agricultural/horticultural businesses
as an arbitrary law unrelated to the public welfare). But see Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S.
140, 143-45 (1924) (Sutherland, J.) (sustaining a New York law that required hired motor
vehicles to carry liability insurance or post a bond as a legitimate public safety measure).
'5 New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 280.
'5 The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 58, at 390.
160 id.
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In part, Sutherland's broad view of economic liberty derived from seventeenth
century Whig theory, which considered freedom of speech and property rights as
complementary components "of an indivisible concept of liberty."'' Influenced by
this tradition, James Madison, the most notable of the Constitution's Framers,
perceived freedom of expression as an inherent individual property right.'62 In a
1792 newspaper article, Madison, the author of the First Amendment, explained that
"a man has a property right in his opinions and the free communication of them."'6 3
He then went on to remark that: "Government is instituted to protect property of
every sort; as well as that which lies in the various rights of individuals.... This
being the end of government, that alone is ajust government, which impartially
secures to every man, whatever is his own. '' "6 Thus, Madison may have expressed,
in inchoate form, what ultimately became a guiding principle for Sutherland in his
interpretation of the business of expression.
As a Supreme Court justice, Sutherland invoked the limitations of the
Constitution to preserve private economic affairs from partial laws that bore the
influence of political factions and the tyranny of democratic majorities. Factional
aversion and a fervent belief in the impartial restraint of the law shaped the contours
of his jurisprudence, rather than principles of laissez faire economics or Social
Darwinism. For Sutherland and other conservative jurists of the Lochner era,
economic regulations that drew arbitrary distinctions unrelated to the long-term
public welfare threatened personal liberty and thus required close judicial scrutiny.
From this premise, Sutherland, like Madison before him, eventually forged a link
between economic rights and freedom of expression.
mH. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND'S RECOGNITION OF THE BUSINESS OF EXPRESSION
During the last two years of Sutherland's tenure, the Supreme Court confronted
for the first time economic regulations that affected freedom of the press. In
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 6 a unanimous Court invalidated on First
Amendment grounds a Louisiana licensing tax levied only on the gross advertising
receipts of large newspapers. The following year, in Associated Press v. National
Labor Relations Board,'66 a closely divided Court upheld the reinstatement of an
16' McGinnis, supra note 33, at 63. See also Roger Pilon, A Modest Proposal on "Must-
Carry," the 1992 Cable Act and Regulation Generally: Go Back to Basics, 17 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L. J. 47, 63 (1994) (suggesting that the constitutional Framers' concern for
property rights was at the root of the First Amendment).
162 See McGinnis, supra note 33, at 64-65, 67.
13 Id. at 65 (quoting James Madison, Property, (National Gazette (March 27, 1792)),
reprinted in Robert A. Rutland et al., eds., 14 The Papers ofJames Madison 266 (Virginia
1983)).
'6 Id. at 65-66 (emphasis in original).
165 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
166 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
2002]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
editorial employee, active in union affairs, who was discharged by a private
newsgathering and distribution agency. Though challenged in part as an
impermissible infringement upon the editorial discretion of the Associated Press,
a majority of the justices sustained the application of the National Labor Relations
Act to its editorial operations as a reasonable economic measure notwithstanding
the First Amendment claim of the news service.'67
Decided against the backdrop of the Supreme Court's gradual transformation
of its police powers jurisprudence during the 1930s, when a bare majority of the
justices adopted a more deferential attitude toward economic legislation, 68
Grosjean and Associated Press reflected a deep schism within the Court over the
appropriate constitutional limits of government intervention into private economic
affairs. Modem scholars often view Grosjean and Associated Press through the
perspective of this jurisprudential shift and attribute their different outcomes to the
contemporaneous dichotomy that emerged between economic liberty and freedom
of expression. 69 In so doing, they obscure the context of these cases and somewhat
distort their meaning.
Justice George Sutherland, who wrote the majority opinion in Gros/ean and the
dissent in Associated Press, found the distinction between economic and expressive
rights assumed by the Court majority inAssociatedPress largely untenable. In both
cases he invoked the First Amendment while steadfastly clinging to the fundamental
tenets of Lochner era police powers jurisprudence. Sutherland's aversion to
political factions and concomitant emphasis upon the equal operation of the law
enabled him to meld the seemingly disparate concepts of economic liberty and
167 Id. at 130-33.
68 See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-41 (1937) (upholding
application of the National Labor Relations Act to intrastate manufacture of steel); West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (sustaining minimum wage legislation for
women); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding a regulation of milk prices);
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (sustaining a Minnesota
mortgage moratorium). See generally CUSHMAN, supra note 12; WHITE, supra note 12 (both
providing an excellent overview of the changes that occurred in the Supreme Court's
constitutional jurisprudence during the early decades of the twentieth century).
169 See, e.g., DAVIDP. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREMECOURT: THE SECOND
CENTURY 1888-1986 260 (1990) (discussing Grosjean only as a First Amendment case);
ANDREw L. KAUFMAN, CARDOzO 546-47 (1998) (attributing the majority opinion in
Associated Press to the emerging deference among several of the justices toward economic
regulation). Kaufman, however, does address briefly the First Amendment aspects of the
case. Id. at 546-47. Moreover, Kaufman regards Grosjean primarily as a First Amendment
case, asserting that Justice Cardozo's unpublished draft concurring opinion ultimately
changed the basis of the Court's decision from equal protection grounds to those involving
freedom of expression, and that Sutherland's published opinion for the Court incorporated
most of Cardozo's points about the First Amendment. Id. at 539-41 ("Grosjean was a
landmark result in the history of the First Amendment ... [for which]... Cardozo deserves
a large share of the credit." Id. at 541.).
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freedom of the press. Indeed, for Sutherland, Grosjean and Associated Press
involved both economic and expressive rights. From his implicit recognition of the
relationship between the two, he articulated, albeit in inchoate form, the importance
of protecting the business of expression from the partial laws of political factions.
Conventional analysis of Gros/ean and Associated Press often ignores the
interplay between economic liberty and freedom of the press that actually shaped
the issues before the Court in each case and, in particular, informed Sutherland's
use of the First Amendment. 7 Careful examination of Sutherland's opinions,
however, reveals that his adherence to traditional notions of economic liberty -
from which a majority of the Court had begun to depart by 1937 - influenced his
views about some forms of expression. Reconsideration of Grosjean and
Associated Press from this perspective also suggests that more than simply discrete
restrictions upon economic rights, or freedom of the press were in issue. Instead,
class legislation, economic rights, and freedom of expression converged, giving rise
to a hybrid constitutional concept called the business of expression. Sutherland's
fledgling perception of this link between the seemingly disparate claims of
economic liberty and freedom of the press is his forgotten First Amendment legacy
and thus bears close scrutiny as the modem Court struggles to devise a coherent and
consistent jurisprudence in this area.
A. Differential Taxation of the Press and the Context of the Grosjean Decision
In Grosjean, Louisiana attempted to restrict freedom of the press through the
guise of a seemingly neutral economic regulation.' In 1934, the Louisiana
legislature imposed a two percent tax on the gross receipts of advertising sold by
and published in periodicals with a weekly circulation of 20,000 or more copies
throughout the state.' Unequal in its operation, the law differentiated between
70 Indeed, most commentators regard Grosjean solely as a First Amendment decision and
omit discussion of its economic liberty aspects. See, e.g. CURRIE, supra note 169, at 260;
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 773, 817,998, 1004, 1040 (2d ed.
1 988) (discussing various First Amendment issues and Grosjean). In addition, most scholars
primarily consider Associated Press as an economic regulation case, in large part because
it was one of five cases decided on April 12, 1937, in which the Supreme Court upheld the
application of the National Labor Relations Act to various industrial activities. See, e.g.,
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-41 (applying federal labor law to
manufacturing activities); see also CUSHMAN, supra note 12, at 133-35 (discussing context
of Associated Press).
7 297 U.S. 233, 240-41 (1936).
172 In relevant part, Louisiana Act No. 23 (July 12, 1934) provided:
Every person, firm, association, or corporation, domestic or foreign, engaged in
the business of selling, or making any charge for, advertising or for
advertisements, whether printed or published ... in any newspaper, magazine,
periodical or publication ... having a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per
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segments of the written press on the basis of circulation volume. Though nominally
a device to raise revenue, it actually functioned as a discriminatory licensing
mechanism that applied only to the thirteen largest daily urban newspapers within
the state, all but one of which openly criticized the political regime of Huey P.
Long."' However, the Act exempted from taxation one hundred and fifty of
Louisiana's other periodicals, most of which were small weekly papers from rural
areas whose publishers either supported Long's controversial socio-economic
policies or remained neutral in the disputes they spawned.'74 Included within this
favored group were four relatively large daily papers whose circulation fell slightly
below the statutory threshold and thus insulated their advertising revenue from the
scope of the license tax.'"s In essence a regulation that affected both the business
of the press and its communicative function, Louisiana Act No. 23 raised issues that
concerned both economic liberty and freedom of expression.
1. "A Tax on Lying, 2 cents a lie"' 76
week... in... Louisiana, shall ... pay a license tax for the privilege of engaging
in such business in this State of two per cent. (2%) of the gross receipts of such
business.
1934 La. Acts 23.
113 See Appellees' Brief at 5, 8,26, 36-37, Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 233. The lone paper not
especially critical of the Long political faction that came within the purview of the license
tax because of its large circulation was The Lake Charles American-Press. Id. at 8.
"4 See id. at 5, 26. Of the state's 120 weekly papers, none reached the statutory
circulation level of twenty thousand, further reinforcing the differential effect of the license
tax. See id. at 6. See also RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE KINGFISH AND THE CONSTITUTION:
HUEY LONG, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN PREss FREEDOM
IN AMERICA 3, 19-20 (1996). As originally proposed in the Louisiana House of
Representatives, the license tax would have applied to only Long's most vociferous critics
in the press, six daily newspapers of relatively large circulation in New Orleans and
Shreveport. Id. at 83. This bill passed the Louisiana House by a margin of 56-38, but Long,
worried about potential constitutional challenges, subsequently had it amended so that the
two-percent license tax would apply to all newspapers published within the state whose
weekly circulation was at least twenty thousand. Id. at 83-85. Huey Long's main political
supporters and the legislative proponents of Louisiana Act No. 23 (the license tax) came
from rural parishes within the northern and southern regions of the state. Id. at 88.
' See Appellees' Brief, supra note 173, at 6,25, 37. These four newspapers, The Ruston
Leader (Ruston, La.), The Hammond Courier (Hammond, La), The Crowley Signal
(Crowley, La.), and The MorningAdvocate (Baton Rouge, La.), were not particularly critical
of the Long political faction but competed with those of the appellees for circulation and
advertising. Id. at 6.
176 Id. at 9 ( quoting circular issued by U.S. Senator Huey P. Long and Louisiana
Governor Oscar K. Allen) (1934). See also Record at 43, Grosjean, 10 F. Supp. 161
(E.D.La. 1935) (No. 303) (quoting Affidavit of Marshall Ballard and J. Walker Ross (Nov.
23, 1934)) [hereinafter Record].
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Enacted at the behest of a powerful political faction led by Democratic United
States Senator Huey P. Long and his first lieutenant, Governor Oscar K. Allen, the
Louisiana license tax marked the culmination of Long's attempt throughout the
1930s to tax newspaper advertising and thus "control the dissemination of news in
the state."' An irrepressible demagogue and fiery agrarian populist, Huey Long
throughout his political career decried special economic privileges and sought to
enhance the welfare of common citizens. Prior to entering the Senate, as governor
of Louisiana Long advocated an ambitious public works program that featured,
among other things, improved roads and educational facilities. 78 He expected the
state to fund these internal improvements through bonds and a comprehensive
taxation scheme that would generate revenue from most forms of commercial
enterprise, yet encountered considerable opposition from large urban daily
newspapers who accused him of using the machinery of the state to accumulate his
own personal slush fund and doubted the sincerity of his convictions.' 9 In
particular, newspapers in New Orleans and Shreveport criticized proposed taxes on
oil companies and the cotton exchange and questioned the motives of a politician
whose modest background and crude manners they ridiculed, often characterizing
him as a backwoods rogue and tyrant. Moreover, their editorials usually supported
'Long's political rivals and had even endorsed an unsuccessful effort to impeach him
as governor in 1929.ISO
The relatively thin-skinned Long attributed much of the criticism he absorbed
in the urban dailies to the pernicious influence of vested corporate interests, such
as those in the businesses of oil and cotton, whom he thought compromised the
editorial judgment of the press through advertisements they placed in major papers
that subsidized, in large part, the production costs ofprintjournalism and facilitated
widespread circulation of published news stories hostile to his policies.'' Angry
at his treatment by the press and convinced that many of its stories actually harmed
177 CORTNER, supra note 174, at 96 (discussing the newspaper license tax in conjunction
with the Long political faction's creation of a board of censors with jurisdiction over movies
and newsreels). In 1935, this faction also sponsored the formation of a state printing board
that would authorize certain newspapers to print official government notices and thus
provide an essential source of revenue for those papers friendly to the Long political
machine. Id.
178 T. HARRY WILLIAMS, HUEY LONG 455, 546-47 (1969).
179 Id. at 546-47 (1969); CORTNER, supra note 174, at 3-4, 32.
ISO See CORTNER, supra note 174, at 29-30, 32. For an overview of the unsuccessful 1929
attempt to impeach Huey Long when he was governor of Louisiana and the manner in which
his political faction thwarted the impeachment process, see WILLIAMS, supra note 178, at
347-419.
181 CORTNER, supra note 174, at 70-71, 73. In 1933, American Progress (the new name
of Long's paper) complained that many of Louisiana's larger daily newspapers "existed 'for
the purpose of publishing advertisements and for spreading lies that may assist in the
propaganda against the welfare of the common man."' Id. at 70 (quotingAmerican Progress
at 6 (Oct. 19, 1933)).
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the public welfare, Long set out to counter its influence. In 1930, Long launched
his own paper that not only promoted the virtues of his socioeconomic vision but
also attacked with some frequency the veracity of journalists who lambasted the
mercurial politician and his platform. 8 2 At the same time he unsuccessfully urged
the Louisiana legislature to tax newspaper advertising at the rate of fifteen percent
in order to make the press fiscally accountable for exercising its journalistic
privileges.8 I A comparable attempt to bridle the independence of newspapers
through a prior restraint law also failed in the legislature.8 4
Three years later, however, Long renewed his crusade to tax the press,
frustrated, in particular, by the incessant opposition of the large urban dailies to his
proposal for increased taxes on personal income and commercial activity and their
unflagging support for the very businesses Long sought to weaken. In November
1933, Long explained his motivation for lobbying the legislature to impose a tax
upon the advertising revenue of some segments of the press: "We are going to sock
a tax on those damned rascals. Let them scoundrels pay for the privilege of lying.
... Newspapers get paid for lying. The freedom of the press lets those newspapers
print any kind of lies."'8 5 Several months later, in a circular he and Oscar K. Allen
distributed to the state legislature, Long articulated the salient purpose of the two
percent newspaper license tax of 1934: "It is a system that these big Louisiana
papers tell a lie every time they make a dollar. This should be called a tax on lying,
2 [cents] a lie."'186
However, throughout the litigation that ensued from the passage of this license
tax, the state expressly disavowed any punitive motive, asserting instead that the
license tax was a legitimate means of obtaining revenue from an industry whose
members had derived considerable benefit from the public largesse through the use
of mail subsidies, tax-free newsprint, and the indirect advantages accruing from
I82 d. at 34, 43-44, 49; WILLIAMS, supra note 178, at 455-60 (discussing how Long's
suspicion of the segments of the press critical of his policies influenced his formation of a
newspaper dedicated to the dissemination of his political and social views, which he called
The Louisiana Progress).
183 See CORTNER, supra note 174, at 2, 4-5.
184 id.
185 Id. at 73 (quoting Speech of Huey Long (Nov. 1933)). Long also said: "I believe in
freedom of speech, but it's got to be truthful speech, and lying newspapers should have to
pay for their lying. I'm going to help these newspapers by hitting them in their pocketbooks;
maybe then they'll try to clean up." Id. at 79 (quoting New Orleans Times-Picayune, July
3, 1934 at 10).
186 Appellees' Brief, supra note 173, at 9 (quoting from a 1934 circular issued by U.S.
Senator Huey P. Long and Louisiana Governor Oscar K. Allen). After the introduction of
a bill in the Louisiana legislature to tax newspaper advertising, Long and Allen distributed
this circular throughout the state and to members of its legislature to make sure that the bill
became law. Id. See also Record, supra note 176, at 43 (quoting Affidavit of Marshall
Ballard and J. Walker Ross (Nov. 23, 1934)).
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improvements in Louisiana's transportation facilities.'87 It also claimed that a tax
based on the volume of circulation represented the most reliable method of
ascertaining gross income within the industry.'88
Nevertheless, for the handful of large newspapers required to remit to the state
a percentage of their gross advertising receipts, the license tax threatened to disrupt
their business operations and imperil their economic viability.8 9 Highly dependent
upon advertising revenue to defray production costs and subsidize circulation, these
newspapers would face significant commercial losses if forced to comply with the
Louisiana Act because subscription fees and individual sales comprised but a
fraction of the income necessary to produce and distribute a daily paper.' 90 As such,
a tax upon advertising could adversely affect how a newspaper conducted its
business and ultimately interfere with its dissemination of news. Carl Ackerman,
Dean of the Columbia University School of Journalism, referred to this symbiotic
relationship between economic liberty and freedom of expression in a 1934 affidavit
'" See Appellant's Brief at 25,46, Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 233 (No. 303); CORTNER, supra
note 174, at 78-79. Long, in part, justified the license tax as a means of treating the press like
other businesses within the state subject to license taxes and noted that the press received
many benefits from a tax-free tariffon newsprint and public improvements within Louisiana.
Id.
18" See CORTNER, supra note 174, at 78-79. Proponents of the two percent tax believed
that a'tax levied on the net income of newspapers or on the net profits from advertising
would be less reliable as a revenue measure because newspapers could manipulate their
account books and thus reduce their tax liability. Id.
189 Appellees' Brief, supra note 173, at 6-7, 29-31 ("Newspapers are dependent, in large
measure, for the conduct of their business on the revenue from the advertising published
therein.") Id., at 6. The appellees further explained that because:
Circulation revenue meets only a portion of the... [cost of production] ... it is
necessary to depend on advertising revenues to meet the major cost of production.
Any factor which affects advertising revenue... directly affects the ability of
newspapers to serve their readers and to perform their duties and functions to the
public.
Id. at 6-7.
In their December 1935 brief to the United States Supreme Court, the appellees
reiterated many points they asserted before the federal district court in their legal action for
declaratory and injunctive relief. For the purpose of clarity, references to both the appellees'
and appellant's arguments throughout the litigation come from the Supreme Court briefs,
transcript record, or summary of the January 1936 oral arguments before the Court.,
'9' Appellees' Brief, supra note, 173, at 6-7, 23-24. Appellees noted that some daily
newspapers with relatively small circulation actually had advertising rates comparable to
those of papers with larger circulation. In this regard, they considered the license tax flawed
as a revenue measure. Id. at 7-8, 25. Appellees contended that "[c]irculation has no fixed
relation to volume of advertising or advertising revenue, and a classification based thereon
is inherently arbitrary." Id. at 23-24. Moreover, "[t]he volume of a newspaper's circulation
... has but a remote bearing on its revenues from advertising, if any at all." Id. at 33.
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he submitted in federal court on behalf of the Grosjean plaintiffs. Ackerman
observed in a statement that pithily described the seminal importance of advertising
revenue to the editorial and business functions of newspapers: "The business of
a newspaper publisher is the gathering and dissemination of information in the form
of news, editorial comment and advertising....""'
Concerned that the license tax applied only to the state's thirteen largest papers,
and in effect exempted the smaller periodicals with whom they competed for
advertising and subscribers, 92 the publishers of the targeted dailies regarded the law
as a thinly veiled attempt to curtail their circulation in violation of freedom of the
press. "'93 James Thompson, of the New Orleans Item & Tribune, a daily paper
whose weekly circulation exceeded the statutory threshold of 20,000, wrote that the
act marked "'a deliberate attempt to punish, muzzle and destroy newspapers...
they can be taxed entirely out of business. They can be ruined or confiscated at
pleasure by any political group temporarily dominating a legislature. "'94 Cognizant
of Long's hostility towards segments of the press that had criticized him, the large
newspapers believed that the license tax was a partial law calculated to restrict both
their property rights and expressive liberty. Accordingly, they perceived it as "an
attempted reprisal or punishment by the dominant political faction of the state...
against the daily press of the state for its past opposition, and a threat of future
reprisals in the event of further or future oppositions"' 95
Worried that such legislation augured their subjugation to the, whims of a
tyrannical democratic majority, the nine companies who owned and operated the
thirteen newspapers singled out by the Act filed suit in 1935 in federal district court
to enjoin Alice Grosjean, Long's purported mistress and the Supervisor of Public
Accounts, from collecting the proceeds of the two percent license tax. The district
court issued an injunction, ruling that the tax arbitrarily discriminated against the
'9' Record, supra note 176 at 56 (Affidavit of Carl W. Ackerman, Nov. 20, 1934).
Ackerman also commented that "advertising and news . . . [were] . . . absolutely
interdependent," and that the increase in advertising "made it possible for the press to
provide public information, indispensable in a democracy." Id.
'92 Appellees' Brief, supra note 173, at 5-6, 24-26, 34-35. From the Appellees'
perspective, "one of the purposes of this tax... was to divert business from newspapers
having a circulation of more than 20,000 per week to newspapers with a circulation of less
than 20,000 per week." Id. at 30. The license tax, therefore, manifested "an intent by the
legislature to interfere with the business of a particular group of newspapers and to regulate
that business through the device of taxation." Id. at 30-3 1. Given the close nexus between
the business, editorial, and distributive functions of newspapers, a "tax on the advertising
portion only of the business of the press... [was] ... in effect ... a tax upon the press
itself" and was in contravention of the First Amendment. Id. at 26. See also id. at 31-33, 35
(characterizing the license tax as a form of unconstitutional prior restraint).
193 Id. at 24-26, 34-35.
194 CORTNER, supra note 174, at 80 (quoting New Orleans Item at 1, July 4, 1934).
195 Record, supra note 176, at 6. See also Appellees' Brief, supra note 173, at 8-9, 26-27,
36-37.
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state's largest daily papers in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the provision of the Louisiana constitution that required
uniform application of license taxes.' 96
Grosjean appealed, and the case came before the United States Supreme Court,
where the parties elaborated upon their original contentions. The arguments
presented before the Court provide an essential perspective from which to
understand how the dispute reflected the confluence of economic liberty and
freedom. of press. They also lend credence to the notion that, although Sutherland
ostensibly based his opinion for a unanimous Court upon the First Amendment, he
also applied principles of economic substantive due process and equal protection
to protect the business of expression from the artifice of a political faction.
2. Economic Liberty, Political Factions, and the License Tax as Differential
Treatment of the Press
In their arguments before the Supreme Court, American Press Company and
Alice Grosj ean addressed whether the Louisiana newspaper license tax violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the uniform license tax
provision of the Louisiana Constitution and the Free Press Clause of the First
Amendment. In so doing they discussed the extent to which local government could
impose economic regulations upon the press. Whereas American Press Company,
et al., the appellees, emphasized the interaction between economic liberty and
freedom of expression, Grosjean, the appellant, differentiated between the two and
sought to limit the scope of the First Amendment in this context.
In essence, Grosjean distinguished the business of advertising from publishing
in her appeal to the Supreme Court. Her counsel characterized the law as a
permissible revenue measure that merely imposed a tax on the highly profitable
commercial enterprise of selling advertising space in newspapers;' 97 it was not,
therefore, a tax on newspaper publishing, nor, as argued by the appellees, "a tax
upon the press itself."'98 Thus, the legislative distinction between small and large
papers reflected a reasonable belief that substantial differences existed between
these types of periodicals in terms of circulation and advertising to warrant a tax
applicable to all but one-tenth of the state's publications.' 99
"' Am. Press Co. v. Grosjean, 10 F. Supp. 161,163 (E.D. La. 1935), aft'd, 297 U.S. 233
(1936).
'97 See Appellant's Brief, supra note 187, at 10, 48-56 (claiming that the license tax
reflected reasonable differences between large and small volume newspapers based upon
their gross advertising revenue and that the tax affected "all similarly situated" newspapers
alike).
198 Appellees' Brief, supra note 173, at 26. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 187, at 25,
46 (asserting that the license tax was merely a revenue measure based on the gross
advertising receipts of newspapers and not a law that abridged freedom of the press).
' Appellant's Brief, supra note 187, at 10, 48, 52, 54-56. In essence, the state argued
2002]
WILLIAM& MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Grosjean also denied that the license tax restricted freedom of the press.
Doubtful that the First Amendment even applied to the states in this context,2°
Grosjean narrowly construed its scope and claimed that because the tax only
concerned "the business 'of selling.. .advertisements"' 21' it did not function as an
unconstitutional prior restraint upon the dissemination of information.2 2 Careful
to point out that Act No. 23 did not prohibit newspapers from publishing stories,
Grosjean explained the tax did "not censure or restrict the free expression of
opinions. It merely require[d] of those who engage in the profitable business of
making others pay for the expression of their views, or for advertising their
business, a small contribution for the support of government.""2 3
In contrast, American Press Company, on behalf of the state's large daily
newspapers, assailed the two percent license tax as a discriminatory measure
intended to curb freedom of the prets through means calculated to impair the
business interests of certain newspapers. For this reason the appellees challenged
the legitimacy of a direct tax whose selective application threatened their continued
existence. In essence, their argument rested on the premise that the economic rights
and expressive functions of the affected newspapers were so intertwined that the tax
facilitated censorship. Once in effect, it would restrict both the economic liberty
of the state's large metropolitan papers and infringe upon their freedom of the press.
The appellees first claimed that Louisiana Act No. 23 violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the state's constitutional mandate that all
license taxes be uniform.2 ' From their perspective, the license tax operated
unequally because it was a partial law that imposed a distinct economic burden
upon large, urban daily papers for the benefit of small, rural newspapers with which
that it was permissible to treat large and small papers as distinct businesses for the purpose
of taxation. As such, the license tax was not unequal because it applied in the same way to
all papers whose weekly circulation exceeded 20,000. Id. at 49.
200 Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 235 (argument of Charles J. Rivet, counsel for Appellant);
Appellant's Brief, supra note 187, at 12, 41.
201 Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 237 (argument of Charles J. Rivet, counsel for Appellant).
202 Id. at 236; see Appellant's Brief, supra note 187, at 25, 46. Before the federal district
court, counsel for Grosjean had argued the First Amendment only prohibited prior restraint
by the government and did not apply to punishment subsequent to expression. See CORTNER,
supra note 174, at 141. Nor did the First Amendment prohibit the application of a general
tax to the business of newspapers. Id. See also Appellant's Brief, supra note 187, at 12, 45-
46.
203 Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 237 (argument of Charles J. Rivet, counsel for Appellant);
Appellant's Brief, supra note 187, at 46.
204 Appellees' Brief, supra note 173, at 3, 10 (quoting art X, § 8 of the 1921 Louisiana
Constitution, which prescribed the uniform levy of occupational license taxes). In essence,
the appellees argued that this provision of the Louisiana Constitution prohibited partial
legislation that taxed only some types of newspapers. See Appellees' Brief, supra note 173,
at 21-22.
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they competed for subscribers and advertising revenue."' Though the appellees
conceded the state had the authority to enact a tax of general application, they
argued that the license tax was arbitrary because it unreasonably differentiated
between newspapers engaged in essentially similar business and expressive
functions.206 In particular, the appellees challenged the legislative presumption that
a direct correlation existed between the volume of a newspaper's circulation and its
advertising revenue when in fact some of the state's smaller papers had higher
advertising rates than their larger competitors.20 ' That the number of readers "ha[d]
but a remote bearing on its [a newspaper's] revenue from advertising. .. "'0'
therefore, undermined the legitimacy of the license tax and rendered it
impermissible class legislation.
Accordingly, the large papers asserted that one purpose of the act "was to
discourage advertisers from using newspapers having a circulation in excess of
20,000 per week and to encourage them in the use of smaller newspapers."2"9 Of
particular relevance was the tax exemption enjoyed by four dailies whose
circulation was comparable to those of the thirteen largest papers required to pay
the license tax but fell just short of the taxable level prescribed by the law. The
appellees thought that this discrepancy, together with the fact that less than ten
percent of the periodicals within the state were subject to the tax, created an
inference that the legislature intended "to interfere with the business of a particular
group of newspapers and to regulate that business through the device of taxation. 2'0
In addition, the appellees asserted that the Louisiana Act violated their rights
under the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment because it "punish[ed] those
newspapers opposed to the dominant political faction in the State." '' The size of
the tax mattered little to the appellees, who perceived in its discriminatory nature
a punitive objective.21 2 The First Amendment, they argued, prohibited government
205 The appellees maintained that a main purpose of Act No. 23 "was to divert business
from newspapers having a circulation of more than 20,000 per week to newspapers with less
than 20,000 per week." Id. at 30; id. at 6, 25; Record, supra note 176, at 18 (Affidavit of
Frank A. Smith, Oct. 23, 1934); id. at21 (Affidavit of Charles P. Manship, Oct. 19, 1934);
see also id. at 23 (Affidavit of James M. Thompson, Oct. 24, 1934).
206 Appellees' Brief, supra note 173, at 24-25. The appellees argued that "the mere size
of a business affords no basis for taxing less than ten percent of the concerns engaged
therein and exempting all others. The newspapers published by plaintiffs are engaged in
identically the same business as are those newspapers which are exempted from the
operation of the statute." Id. at 24.
207 Id. at 7-8.
20 Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 240 (argument of Esmond Phelps and Elisha Hanson, counsel
for appellees). See also Appellees' Brief, supra note 173, at 29-30, 33.
209 Appellees' Brief, supra note 173, at 34-35.
210 Id. at 30-31.
211 Id. at 36. See also Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 238 (argument of Esmond Phelps and Elisha
Hansen for Appellees).
212 See Appellees' Brief, supra note 173, at 26, 36-37. Characterizing the license tax as
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restriction of the press through differential, or partial, taxation devised to license or
censor the press. 3 To this extent, they cited the legislative history of the license
tax, which manifested the repeated attempts of Huey Long to quell newspaper
opposition to his policies and his intent that the press pay for the privilege of
publishing lies through a license tax.214 Moreover, there was evidence to suggest
that in its original form, the license tax only applied to papers in New Orleans and
Shreveport, home to Long's most vociferous critics and influential political
opponents, and that the proponents of the tax had orginally sought to exclude from
its scope the only newspaper whose weekly circulation exceeded twenty thousand
copies that remained neutral toward Huey Long." 5 Ironically, American Press
Company, the lead appellee, published this paper, The Lake Charles American-
Press, which in common with the state's other large dailies, regarded the license tax
as a potential detriment to the independence of all publications within the state
because of its unequal operation and suspicious motives. 6
B. The Supreme Court's Internal Division Over the Limits of State Taxation and
How It Affected the Basis of the Grosjean Decision
On February 10, 1936, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the
Louisiana license tax as an unconstitutional restriction upon freedom of the press.2t7
All of its members joined in the opinion of Justice Sutherland, which, although it
affirmed the decree of the district court, invoked the First Amendment and not, as
"a direct tax upon the newspaper publishing business," id. at 31, the appellees argued that
"[a] tax on the principal source of revenue of a newspaper is a tax upon its subsistence," and
in violation of freedom of the press. Id. at 32-33.
213 Id. at 26-28, 31-33. See also id. at 48-70 (Appendix B) (discussing the historical
antecedents of freedom of the press in England and the United States).
214 Id. at 8-9, 26, 36-37.
215 See CORTNER, supra note 174, at 85. Thereafter, the legislature altered the tax so that
on its surface it applied equally to a similar class of newspapers, based on the volume of
their circulation, regardless of their geographical location, including The Lake Charles
American-Press, the one large paper that refrained from much criticism of the Long political
faction and the socioeconomic policies of its colorful leader. Id. With respect to The Lake
Charles American-Press, Long himself commented: 'There was only one newspaper in
the State that had not joined up with the gang opposing me... we tried to find a way to
exempt "The Lake Charles American-Press" from the advertising tax, but did not think we
could do it, but we would have done it if we could."' Appellees' Brief, supra note 173, at
9 (quoting Speech of Huey P. Long, Sulphur, La., Sept. 24, 1934).
216 Indeed, the appellees raised the possibility that once the legislature began to tax the
press at all, it eventually could tax certain segments of it out of business altogether. See
Appellees' Brief, supra note 173, at 30. Moreover, tax exempt status based upon the content
of a publication compromised journalistic independence as publishers fearful of losing their
exemption might withhold criticism of the local government. See CORTNER, supra note 174,
at 102, 114, 138.
217 See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. at 233 (1936).
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that tribunal had, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the
principal basis of its decision. Despite the apparent unanimity of the Court, internal
disagreement existed over how to characterize the case. Initially, Justice
Sutherland, and perhaps as many as five others, considered the dispute one over
economic liberty and thus were prepared to strike down the Act solely on equal
protection grounds .2 " However, Justices Cardozo and Stone, and probably
Brandeis, thought the law only infringed upon the First Amendment rights of
Louisiana newspapers. Upon reading Sutherland's draft opinion, Cardozo prepared
a concurrence so as to avoid the appearance of tacitly endorsing a narrow
conception of state regulatory authority that limited the discretion of local
governments to promote economic welfare through imperfect and sometimes
experimental means. Finding no equal protection violation, he instead argued that
the license tax constituted an impermissible form of censorship that abridged
freedom of the press." 9
1. Justice Cardozo's Deference Towards State Taxation
Cardozo's reluctance to join Sutherland's initial opinion reflected an
ideological schism within the Court over the appropriate constitutional limits of
public regulation of private economic affairs. One facet of this problem concerned
the extent to which states could tax local businesses. In many respects, the
differences that emerged among the justices about the problems of local taxation
emanated from fundamental conflicts about the nature of judicial review and the
permissible scope of state police powers. By 1936, several members of the Court
had adopted, to some degree, a more deferential approach toward local economic
regulation that substituted a pragmatic balance of public and private interests for the
more rigid categorical police powers jurisprudence of the early Lochner era to
which Sutherland, Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter stubbornly clung.22
Cardozo, an articulate and forceful proponent of this jurisprudential shift, therefore
21s See CORTNER, supra note 174, at 165; KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 169, at 539-
41.
2,9 See KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 169, at 539-41. See also Benjamin Cardozo,
Draft of Grosjean Concurring Opinion (1936) (transcription available in Cardozo Papers in
the Special Kaufman Cardozo Collection of Harvard Law School Library). Cardozo noted
in this unpublished concurring opinion that a tax of general applicability to newspapers as
a business would be permissible under the Equal Protection Clause, and that in general,
states could impose graduated taxes on some businesses and not others if the distinctions
reflected reasonable differences and the taxes were levied pursuant to legitimate police
power objectives. See id. at 5. Many thanks to Professor Andrew Kaufinan of Harvard Law
School, who graciously made available a copy of his transcription of this unpublished draft.
220 See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding a regulation of milk
prices); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (sustaining a
Minnesota mortgage moratorium).
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refused to invalidate the Louisiana law on equal protection grounds for the same
reasons he found constitutional most state taxation schemes that came before the
Court throughout the 1930s.
Together with Justices Brandeis and Stone, Cardozo advocated a relaxed
standard ofjudicial review in such cases. Recognizing the broad authority of states
to redistribute economic resources and the public interest in private business, the
Court's more progressive wing upheld the discretion of local governments to
regulate commercial activities through various forms of taxation designed to either
encourage or discourage certain types ofenterprise.22" ' Much ofthis deference came
from the notion that the conduct of business was a privilege which states, pursuant
to their police powers, could abridge altogether or otherwise subject to reasonable
restrictions.222 From this premise Cardozo, and other proponents of judicial
restraint in matters of local economic regulation, accorded the states considerable
latitude in formulating legislative distinctions that sometimes produced unequal tax
burdens. Narrowly construing the scope of the Equal Protection Clause, these
justices refused to apply the traditional exacting standards of economic substantive
due process to problems of differential taxation borne by corporate entities.2"3
Consequently, they interpreted the concept of equal protection in relative, rather
than absolute, terms that presumed the legitimacy of tax laws that used reasonable,
though not necessarily the most precise, criteria as the basis for distinguishing
between businesses. 24
221 See, e.g., Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937) (upholding a
Louisiana graduated tax that imposed more significant burdens on regional and national
chain stores); Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 100 (1935) (suggesting states could use
discriminatory taxes to discourage the proliferation of chain stores and encourage
independent stores); State Bd. of Tax Comm's v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931) (upholding
an Indiana tax on chain stores). Cardozo had articulated the growing public concern in
private contracts in a 1934 unpublished draft concurring opinion he asked Chief Justice
Hughes to consider in Blaisdell. See Samuel L. Olken, Charles Evans Hughes and the
Blaisdell Decision: A Historical Study of the Contract Clause Jurisprudence, OR. L. REV.
513, 590 (1993).
222 See, e.g., Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 301 U.S. at 424-26; Fox, 294 U.S. at 100-01;
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 544-45, 547, 569-70, 576-77 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); id. at 5 84-86 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (both expressing reluctance as jurists to
interfere with the reasonable exercise of state police and tax powers); Jackson, 283 U.S. at
537.
223 See, e.g., Fox, 294 U.S. at 102 (Cardozo noting that "[tihe operation of a general rule
will seldom be the same for every one"); see also Liggett, 288 U.S. at 547, 570-72, 575
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining that under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause a state may create differential tax classifications).
224 See Liggett, 288 U.S. at 547, 570-72, 574-75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), id. at 581-86
(Cardozo, J., dissenting). Justice Cardozo articulated the deferential standard when, in an
opinion for the Court sustaining a West Virginia chain tax on gas stations, he reasoned the
tax "has a rational relation to the subject matter." Fox, 294 U.S. at 101. See also Carmichael
v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 512 (1937) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment
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In particular, the chain tax cases illustrate the differences between the justices
that formed the backdrop of Grosjean. Throughout the 1930s, the Court sustained
the constitutionality of several state license taxes whose graduated rates imposed
higher taxes upon chain stores than on independent merchants.225 Enacted to
promote competition in retail markets, these progressive chain store taxes
exemplified government intervention into private business to improve the public
welfare by fostering widespread economic opportunity.226 Justices Cardozo, Stone,
and Brandeis were the most consistent advocates of judicial deference in this area,
reluctant to disturb legislative findings that the economic advantages enjoyed by
chain storesjustified graduated license taxes.227 "Differences in the size of business
present... an adequate basis for different rates of taxation,""22 Justice Brandeis
asserted. Similarly, Justice Cardozo thought it appropriate for the "state to
discriminate between integrated and voluntary chains, though the difference of
organization is slender and the inequality of economic benefit uncertain and
disputed., 229 Along with Chief Justice Hughes and the sometimes unpredictable
Owen J. Roberts, they comprised a majority in several of the cases that sustained
a variety of progressive, or graduated, chain store taxes.23° Unconcerned that many
allowed states "to select a particular class as a subject for taxation" if the differential
classification promotes the public welfare). In this case, Stone, writing for the Court, ruled
that Alabama could require only large employers to subsidize the state's unemployment
compensation system. Id. at 509-12. Any one of several permissible criteria constituted a
reasonable legislative basis for making tax classifications. See, e.g., Great Atd. & Pac. Tea
Co., 301 U.S. at 423-26 (competitive economic advantages enjoyed by chain stores); Fox,
294 U.S. at 101 (comparative scale of the business); Jackson, 283 U.S. at 535-36, 541-42
(business distinctions between chain stores and indpendent retailers).
225 See, e.g., Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 301 U.S. 412 (sustaining Louisiana's graduated
tax that imposed a greater burden on regional and national chains with at least one store
within the state than on intra-state retail chain stores and independent merchants); Fox, 294
U.S. 87 (upholding application of a progressive tax on chains of gasoline stations); Jackson,
283 U.S. 527 (sustaining an Indiana chain store tax). Many graduated tax schemes bore the
descriptive term "progressive" because of their graduated tax rates.
226 See, e.g., Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 301 U.S. at 426; Liggett, 288 U.S. at 568-70
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (both opinions explaining the rationale for applying progressive
license taxes to chain stores).
227 See, e.g., Fox, 294 U.S. at 101 (explaining that a West Virginia progressive chain tax
borne most heavily by large gas stations was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable because they
could afford to pay more taxes than smaller gas station chains or independent gas dealers);
Jackson, 283 U.S. at 535 (noting the comparative managerial efficiency of chain stores). See
also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 301 U.S. at 419-20, 423, 425 (discussing retail business
advantages of chain stores).
'28 Liggett, 288 U.S. at 572 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 584-85 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). Independent stores who voluntarily cooperated
with each other, sharing marketing strategies, pricing information, and in some cases,
inventory, were exempt under most chain tax schemes whereas chain stores part of a formal
integrated network were not. See also Fox, 294 U.S. at 100-01.
230 Roberts, in fact, wrote the majority opinions upholding chain store taxes in Great
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of these tax laws discriminated between retail businesses on the basis of their size
or their organizational structure, this segment of the Court often upheld the
authority of states to impose differential tax burdens on chain stores that benefitted
smaller merchants and increased their social utility."'
2. Conservative Opposition to Progressive State License Taxes
In contrast, Justice Sutherland and the more conservative members of the
Supreme Court often voted to invalidate progressive license taxes on chain stores
and other forms of business enterprise on equal protection grounds. They insisted,
as in other areas of economic regulation, that there be a close and substantial
relationship between legislative means and ends, and thus read into the Equal
Protection Clause a requirement of significant precision in all forms of legislative
classification. 232 In essence, this quartet ofjustices combined traditional notions of
economic substantive due process with equal protection to fashion a jurisprudence
of economic liberty that emphasized the equal operation of the law as the linchpin
of individual rights enjoyed alike by both natural persons and corporate entities.
Sutherland, who was the principal spokesman for this group, emphasized repeatedly
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited unequal taxation of similarly situated
persons, and, unlike Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone, he included private businesses
within the ambit of constitutional protection from discriminatory taxes.233
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. and Jackson. But see Stewart Dry Goods Co., 294 U.S. 550
(1935); Liggett, 288 U.S. 517 (invalidating state graduated taxes). Brandeis, Cardozo, and
Stone, however, remained consistent, asserting in these cases, as in those in which the Court
sustained progressive license taxes, the authority of states to impose differential taxes in
order to preserve economic competition and promote social utility. See, e.g., Liggett, 288
U.S. at 568-70, 572 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
231 See, e.g., Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 301 U.S. at 425-26 (sustaining a Louisiana chain
store tax); Fox, 294 U.S. 87 (upholding the application of a West Virginia progressive
license tax on a chain.of gasoline stations); Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (sustaining an Indiana
graduated tax on chain stores); see also Stewart Dry Goods Co., 294 U.S. at 569 (Cardozo,
J., dissenting) (arguing that "the flat rate is... less efficient than the graded one as an
instrument of social justice"). In Stewart Dry Goods Co., the Court invalidated a Kentucky
progressive gross sales tax under the Equal Protection Clause, finding no reasonable
correlation between commercial sales volume and graduated tax rates. See also Liggett, 288
U.S. at 585-86 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). Liggett and Stewart Dry Goods Co. were
aberrations from the Court's general trend of upholding graduated license taxes.
232 See, e.g., Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404,422 (1935) (asserting that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not permit gross inequality in taxes). "The classification. . . must be
founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from artificial ones." Id. at
423. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32,37 (1928) (invalidating Kentucky
mortgage recording tax only applicable to mortgages over five years).
233 See, e.g., Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 492, 527, 531 (1937)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 301 U.S. at 432 (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting); Jackson, 283 U.S. at 544, 548 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
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Sutherland was especially critical of differential tax classifications based on
the size of a business or its organizational structure. From his perspective, both
chain and non-chain stores that sold similar items engaged in the same retail
business regardless of their corporate form or volume of sales."' Differences
between the two were slight and rarely justified the imposition of heavier taxes on
those who were part of an integrated network while independent merchants enjoyed
preferential tax treatment.2" Dissenting from the Court's decision upholding an
Indiana law that imposed higher taxes on retail chain stores than on independent
merchants, Sutherland noted that it was "wholly irrelevant.., that the business of
one is carried on under many roofs, and that of the other under one only." '236
Consequently, the license tax operated unequally because of its application to
"different persons following identical occupations." '37 Thus, he considered
progressive taxes that discriminated between large and small commercial entities
arbitrary and unreasonable incursions upon economic liberty harmful to the long-
term interests of the community. However, he did not object to taxes that reflected
substantial differences between competitors within an industry and actually
promoted the public welfare.23
Inherently skeptical of political factions, Sutherland carefully scrutinized local
tax laws in order to protect private economic rights from the tyranny of ephemeral
democratic majorities. Accordingly, he and some other members of the Court
viewed graduated taxes that imposed heavier burdens on large retail stores as
illegitimate class legislation. For example, in Jackson, Sutherland's dissent
234 See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 301 U.S. at 430-34 (Sutherland, J., dissenting);
Fox, 294 U.S. at 103 (Sutherland, J.) (indicating that he would have affirmed the lower court
decision that the West Virginia gas station chain tax violated the Equal Protection Clause);
Jackson, 283 U.S. at 543-48 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). See also Stewart Dry Goods Co.,
294 U.S. 550 (invalidating Kentucky gross retail graduated sales tax); Liggett, 288 U.S. 517
(1935) (invalidating Florida chain store tax that imposed higher taxes on stores that were
part of chains with franchises in multiple counties than on independent stores and chains that
operated wholly within a single county). In each case, Sutherland and the other Four
Horsemen comprised part of the Court majority even though they disagreed with Justice
Roberts' dicta in these decisions that generally supported the concept of graduated taxes.
235 See, e.g., Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 301 U.S. at 430-34 (Sutherland, J., dissenting);
Jackson, 283 U.S. at 544-45 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
236 Jackson, 283 U.S. at 548 (Sutherland, J. dissenting); see also GreatAtl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 301 U.S. at 431 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
237 Jackson, 283 U.S. at 546 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); see also Great At. & Pac. Tea
Co., 301 U.S. at 431, 433 (Suthe'rland, J., dissenting).
238 See, e.g., Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40,43 (1934) (sustaining a fifteen-cent
Washington tax on butter substitutes as a legitimate exercise of state police powers); Great
N. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929) (sustaining a Minnesota tax levied on the
gross receipts of intrastate business of an interstate railroad); Raley & Bros. v. Richardson,
264 U.S. 157 (1924) (upholding a Georgia tax on the intrastate business of interstate
brokers).
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characterized the progressive license tax borne by chain stores as "a mere
subterfuge by which the members of one group of taxpayers are unequally burdened
for the benefit of the members of other groups similarly circumstanced., 239
Consequently, he regarded most graduated tax schemes with considerable suspicion,
aware that under the guise of local police powers transient popular majorities could,
under the pretext of manufactured reasons unrelated to the public welfare, enact
differential taxes to benefit one set of businesses at the expense of another. Thus,
when confronted in Grosjean with what was, in essence, a discriminatory license
tax based on the volume of gross advertising, Sutherland understandably regarded
the Louisiana Act as an unconstitutional restriction upon the economic liberty of
large daily newspapers and initially sought to invalidate it under the Equal
Protection Clause.
3. Cardozo's Draft Concurrence in Grosjean
Justice Cardozo, together with Brandeis and Stone, fundamentally disagreed
with this analysis. In his draft concurrence, Cardozo explained that:
If the statute were subject to no objection except the one considered in the
opinion of the court, I should be unable to pronounce it void. A distinction
between a large business and a small one, between newspapers with a
weekly circulation of more than 20,000 copies and newspapers with less,
does not exceed the bounds of legitimate classification, unless it results in
an abridgement of the freedom of the press.2"
For Cardozo, the differential tax imposed on the state's large newspapers was
unconstitutional only because it abridged freedom of the press. Relying extensively
upon the brief of the American Press Company, he compared the Louisiana Act to
the controversial taxes upon knowledge, license requirements, and other forms of
censorship used in England between the seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries,
and briefly in post-revolutionary Massachusetts, to control criticism of the
government and limit the independence of the press.24'
239 Jackson, 283 U.S. at 548 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). "The test to be applied... is
... does the statute arbitrarily and without genuine reason impose a burden upon one group
of taxpayers from which it exempts another group, both of them occupying substantially the
same relation toward the subject matter of the legislation?" Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404,
423 (1935).
240 Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. at 233 (1936). Cardozo, Draft of Grosjean
Concurring Opinion at 8; see also id. at 5 (asserting that the Equal Protection Clause permits
differential tax classifications that do not concern the press); id. at 8-10.
24 Id. at 1-4. Between the seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, there were several
attempts by the British government to restrict the press. One such restriction was a licensing
scheme enacted in the seventeenth century pursuant to which the British government
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Deeply committed to an informed democracy, Cardozo believed that by singling
out certain newspapers, the Louisiana Act threatened the experimental impulse
essential for democratic reform.242 However, despite his fervent insistence that the
case turned on the First Amendment, Cardozo nevertheless perceived that
"[f]reedom of expression in the conduct of a newspaper is the very lifeblood of the
business, and a tax upon that freedom puts the business in jeopardy .... "243
Notwithstanding this observation, Cardozo sought to isolate the First Amendment
issue because he believed the state otherwise had the power to create unequal tax
burdens.2' He therefore considered the newspaper license tax unreasonable
because its selective application impaired the overriding public interest in having
a responsible and independent press.245
Cardozo withdrew his concurring opinion when Sutherland thereafter
substantially rewrote his opinion for the Court so that it adopted Cardozo's First
Amendment rationale in place of its original equal protection premise. 246 That
Sutherland made this substantive change should obscure neither the fact that
Grosjean involved both economic liberty and freedom of expression nor
Sutherland's implicit recognition of the link between these seemingly disparate
concepts. Moreover, it would be incorrect to assume that, simply because
Sutherland incorporated Cardozo's points in the published opinion, he forsook
altogether his initial economic liberty analysis of the Louisiana act.
C. Sutherland's Grosjean Opinion: Viewing the First Amendment Through the
censored stories published about it. In 1712, Parliament devised newspaper stamp and
advertising taxes, referred to as knowledge taxes, designed to limit the circulation of the less
expensive newspapers favored by common citizens. Essentially, the knowledge taxes
functioned as a means of restricting information about public affairs so as to thwart popular
criticism of the British monarchy and Parliament. Eventually, by the middle of the nineteenth
century, Parliament repealed these types of restrictions upon the press. In 1786,
Massachusetts briefly imposed a stamp tax on periodicals and an advertising tax, only to
repeal them soon thereafter in the wake of much popular criticism. For an overview of the
history of knowledge taxes, see Appellees' Brief, supra note 173, at 48-70 (appendix B). See
generally LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY: LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (Harper Torchbook 1963) (discussing knowledge taxes
and other forms of prior restraint in the centuries preceding the First Amendment).
242 Cardozo, Draft of Grosjean Concurring Opinion, at 6.
243 Id. at 8.
244 Id. at 5, 8-10. "[Il n callings not connected with freedom of the press, exemptions from
taxation, unless wholly arbitrary or personal, are well within the scope of legislative power
... -" Id. at 8-9. See also Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 585-86 (1933) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting).
245 See Cardozo, Draft of Grosjean Concurring Opinion, at 5-6. "Once admit the
possibility of imposing upon the press a special system of taxation, and its freedom is a
myth, except indeed by dint of governmental grace." Id. at 5.
246 CORTNER, supra note 174, at 165; KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 169, at 540-41.
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Lens of Economic Liberty and Factional Aversion
Although much of Sutherland's published opinion in Gros/ean seemingly relied
upon the First Amendment, it also contained several oblique references to economic
liberty, which the author probably muted in order to appease Cardozo and maintain
what was otherwise a fragile consensus. Indeed, Sutherland's concluding remark
that it was unnecessary to address the equal protection issue2 47 masked the initial
conflict within the Court over how to decide the case. Only twelve pages in length,
the opinion reasoned that the Louisiana newspaper license tax abridged the
independence of the press through its imposition of a two percent tax on the gross
advertising receipts of the state's thirteen largest daily papers.2 48 Yet, for all of its
emphasis upon freedom of expression, the opinion also evoked Sutherland's
aversion toward political factions and concern for protecting private economic
rights from the tyranny of popular democratic majorities. While somewhat
constrained by his compromise with the Cardozo bloc, Sutherland nevertheless
imbued his analysis of the First Amendment with principles of economic liberty and
thus set forth in inchoate form the concept of the business of expression.
1. The Nexus Between Economic Liberty and Freedom of Expression
From the outset, Sutherland articulated a broad notion of liberty that
encompassed freedom of expression and economic rights. A proponent of selective
incorporation, he considered freedom of the press a fundamental constitutional right
"safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 49 Accordingly, he ruled that the constitutional limitations of the
First Amendment applied directly to the state of Louisiana through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - a conclusion based, in part, upon an
awareness that both economic rights and expressive behavior were components of
individual liberty protected by the Due Process Clause against arbitrary
governmental authority. Significantly, Sutherland cited the juxtaposed precedent
of two freedom of expression decisions and one about contractual autonomy in
support of his finding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the First Amendment.25 ° Moreover, as in the chain store tax cases, he
247 Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 251.
248 Id. at 250.
249 Id. at 243-44.
150 Id. at 244 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 697 (1931) (prior restraint); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. at 652 (1925) (free speech); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897) (liberty of contract)). In particular, Sutherland's position in three 1920s cases
illustrates how his understanding of substantive due process reflected a broad conception
of personal liberty in which economic and non-economic rights at times converged. For
example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), Sutherland was part of a
unanimous Court that struck down an Oregon law that compelled young children to attend
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rejected the assertion of the state that the corporate status of the appellees limited
the scope of their constitutional protection. For Sutherland there was no difference
between the newspaper publishers as commercial entities and natural persons in
terms of either freedom of press, due process, or equal protection.2"'
In essence, Sutherland perceived that the Louisiana newspaper license tax
affected both the business and expressive functions of the state's largest
newspapers. From this perspective, he said of the act: "It thus operates as a
restraint in a double sense. First, its effect is to curtail the amount of revenue
realized from advertising, and, second its direct tendency is .to restrict circulation
... it well might result in destroying both advertising and circulation." '252 That
Sutherland described the law in this manner perhaps reflected his colloquy at oral
argument with Elisha Hanson, counsel for the appellees, who in response to
Sutherland's question whether the Act "would tend to curtail circulation,"
responded: "Yes... [ilt would also turn the business of one newspaper group
over to another." '253 Hanson's reference to the unequal operation of the license tax
and its partial characteristics resonated, in particular, with Justice Sutherland,
whose aversion to political factions pervaded his constitutional jurisprudence and
heightened his sensitivity to the possible interplay between freedom of expression
and economic liberty.
Prior to joining the Court, Sutherland discussed the importance of judicial
review in preserving individual rights from the whims of transient democratic
majorities and the political factions that controlled them. Of particular relevance
was a speech he made before the New York State Bar Association in which he
asserted:
the state's public schools. The Court found that the statute not only unduly interfered with
the implicit First Amendment autonomy of parents and guardians to make educational
choices for their children, but also infringed upon the economic liberty of non-public
schools. Id. at 534-36. However, two years earlier, in the companion cases of Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), Sutherlandjoined
Justice Holmes in dissenting from the Court's ruling that states could not prohibit foreign
language instruction in either private (including parochial) or public schools. See Meyer,
262 U.S. at 401-03; Bartels, 262 U.S. at 411. Sutherland tacitly agreed with Holmes'
assertion that this requirement did not constitute "an undue restriction of the liberty either
of teacher or scholar." Bartels, 262 U.S. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Though his stance
in these three cases might seem inconsistent, when viewed from the perspective of his
aversion to class legislation and political factions, Sutherland's voting pattern becomes more
comprehensible. For Sutherland, a law that required children to attend public schools in the
absence of a substantial state interest was illegitimate class legislation. In contrast, a flat ban
on foreign language instruction intended to encourage fluency in English was a legitimate
exercise of local police powers pursuant to a law of equal operation.
25 See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 244.
252 Id. at 244-45.
253 CORTNER, supra note 174, at 163 (quoting New Orleans Times-Picayune, Jan. 14,
1936, at 28).
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The guaranties for safe-guarding life, liberty and property, freedom of
speech, of the press and of religious worship, and all the other guaranties
of the Constitution, would be of little value if their interpretation and
enforcement depended upon arbitrary, shifting, temporary official edicts
instead of the calm, judgment of the judiciary under the general law of the
land.2
54
Confronted in Grosjean with the issue of whether Louisiana abridged freedom of
the press through the guise of a seemingly neutral revenue measure, Sutherland
adhered to his conviction that partial laws enacted for the benefit of some groups
at the expense of others de-legitimized the exercise of governmental power and
undermined the pursuit of liberty in a constitutional democracy.
Sutherland thought the license tax violated the First Amendment because it
represented an impermissible attempt by the state to interfere with the dissemination
of news. He considered "an untrammeled press ... a vital source of public
information" and "informed public opinion... the most potent of all restraints upon
misgovernment., 25 Consequently, Sutherland regarded with suspicion a law whose
unequal operation threatened the independence of large newspapers through the
selective imposition of a tax upon their principal source of revenue-advertising. 256
Comparing the Louisiana Act to the taxes on knowledge and other discredited
methods used throughout Anglo-American history to restrict the circulation of
newspapers and stifle criticism of government, Sutherland believed the Louisiana
Act was an unconstitutional form of censorship.2"1 Cognizant of its origins, he
2" Principle or Expedient?, supra note 76, at 11.
25 Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250.
256 Id. at 244-45. In particular, Sutherland appears to have accepted the appellees'
argument that the license tax imposed economic burdens on them for the benefit of their
competitors. Id. at 241 (describing the differential effects of the tax).
257 Id. at 245-50. In essence, Sutherland thought the license tax functioned as a form of
prior restraint because it impeded the business of the press. Id. at 249-51. In so doing, he
broadly construed the concept of unconstitutional prior restraint to encompass restrictions
upon circulation after publication. Id. at 249. In contrast, the preeminent common law jurist
William Blackstone had noted: "[L]iberty of thepress ... consists in laying no previous
restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when
published." CORTNER, supra note 174, at 7 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, (J.B. Lippincott 1890 (1859))). In fact,
Sutherland went so far as to suggest that the framers of the First Amendment intended for
freedom of the press to mean more than simply freedom from prior restraint. See Grosjean,
297 U.S. at 248. It also signified protection against any form of censorship. Id. at 248-50.
For the notion that the First Amendment was not necessarily meant to depart significantly
from the Blackstonian concept of freedom of the press, see LEVY, supra note 241, at 176-
24 8 (noting that the post-revolutionary generation distinguished between prior restraint and
post-publication censorship in the form of anti-sedition laws). See also Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 691, 735-37 (1931) (Butler, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a Minnesota law
authorizing law suits to prevent future publication of periodicals considered of nuisance
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concluded that the license tax sought to curb freedom of expression and quell
criticism of the dominant political faction within the state. Its discriminatory
treatment of large, metropolitan daily newspapers critical of the Huey Long political
faction threatened to compromise the autonomy of these publications and impair the
public interest in learning about government and business affairs.258
In essence, Sutherland regarded the license tax as illegitimate class legislation,
and this enabled him to appreciate how the issue of freedom of expression, in effect,
merged with the economic liberty aspect of the case. Sutherland's emphasis upon
the value of an unfettered press as the conduit of news reflected his paramount
concern with preserving equal opportunity and individual choice in a democratic
society.259 Yet a law that exempted certain segments of the press from paying a tax
required of their competitors indicated partisan government intervention in the
marketplace of ideas inconsistent with the democratic ideals of an informed
citizenry and the impartial restraint of the law.2"
value neither constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint nor exceeded the permissible
exercise of legitimate police powers). Sutherland joined in Butler's Near dissent.
Sutherland's incorporation of Cardozo's First Amendment arguments may explain his
apparent reversal of course after Near, though it is possible to reconcile Sutherland's
seemingly contradictory views about prior restraint if one takes into consideration his
pervasive aversion toward political factions. See text infra and accompanying notes. See
LEVY, supra note 24 1, at 176-248 (presenting a view of the First Amendment in contrast to
Sutherland's). Contemporaneous commentary in several law review articles published in the
aftermath of Grosjean thought Sutherland's Grosjean opinion went considerably beyond
Blackstone's concept of freedom of the press. See, e.g., Note, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 998, 998
(1936); Note, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 671, 672 (1936) (both suggesting that Sutherland seemed
to interpret freedom ofthe press to include circulation and dissemination of published ideas).
" See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 244-45, 250-51.
259 Id. at 247, 249-50. In an undated commencement address at Brigham Young
University, Sutherland remarked: "To be wholly free consists in something more than the
absence of physical restraint; it is the ability to look your fellow in the face with the
consciousness of intellectual independence as well." Sutherland, Brigham Young
Commencement Address, supra note 38, at 9.
260 To this extent, Sutherland quoted from Thomas Cooley, his constitutional law
professor at Michigan over fifty years earlier:
The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any
action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and
general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the
people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.
Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 249-50 (quoting 2 THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
886 (8'h ed.)). Cooley, a Michigan jurist, was one of the leading constitutional theorists of
the nineteenth century whose profound concern for equal operation of the law reflected an
abiding aversion toward political factions and a penchant for Jacksonian democracy. See
Olken, Justice George Sutherland, supra note 19, at 22-24 (discussing the main tenets of
Cooley's constitutional philosophy and his influence upon Sutherland).
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Insofar as he acknowledged the authority of the state to subject the press to
generally applicable economic regulations, he remained skeptical of partial laws
intended to skew access to information about matters of public interest and
discourage criticism of government. To this extent, Sutherland remarked:
The tax here involved is not bad because it takes money from the...
appellees .... It is bad because, in light of its history and of its present
setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of
a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled
in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. A free press stands as one of
the great interpreters between the government and the people.26'
Though Sutherland ostensibly focused on the First Amendment, he also
recognized that the license tax encumbered the economic liberty of the state's
thirteen largest newspapers. The reference above to the "present setting" of the tax
and its characterization as "a deliberate and calculated device ... to limit...
circulation . . . " indicate Sutherland's acute sense of factional influence in the
passage of the law and its effects upon both the business and expressive interests
of the newspapers within the state. Sutherland realized that the legislature not only
sought to insulate the Long political regime from criticism, but that its differential
tax created distinct economic burdens for the large metropolitan dailies from which
their competitors for advertising and subscription revenue, predominantly small
rural papers, were exempt. Circulation, therefore, signified to Sutherland not only
freedom of expression, but also an activity with business implications.
Accordingly, he understood that, as a practical matter, it was very difficult to
distinguish between the business of publishing and the free press concerns of the
adversely affected newspapers. Thus, he considered the Louisiana license tax an
infringement of the business of expression in that it impaired free press rights and
economic liberty of a select group of newspapers.
Consequently, the form of the tax assumed considerable importance in
Sutherland's analysis, and his attention to it underscores the nexus he perceived
between the equal protection and First Amendment claims of the newspapers. In
this regard, he commented:
The form in which the tax is imposed is in itself suspicious. It is not
measured or limited by the volume of advertisements. It is measured
alone by the extent of the circulation of the publication in which the
advertisements are carried, with the plain purpose of penalizing the
publishers and curtailing the selection of a selected group of
261 Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250. That Louisiana was the only state with such a
discriminatory license tax also demonstrated to Sutherland its factional basis. Id. at 250-51.
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newspapers. 62
Sutherland's reference to the "form" of the license tax evoked its factional
context in which it operated as a partial law that impaired both the expressive and
business interests of the urban press targeted by Long's political cadre. As in other
economic liberty cases, Sutherland insisted that there be a close and substantial
relationship between the basis of the legislative classification and the state's
regulatory objective. From this perspective, he questioned the legitimacy of a tax
that distinguished between newspapers on the basis of their circulation volume
instead of the more relevant criterion of advertising revenue. To Sutherland, then,
the Louisiana Act was no less arbitrary and unreasonable than chain store taxes
based upon merely the size or corporate structure of a particular type of business or,
for that matter, other types of economic regulations whose tenuous assumptions
reflected the influence of political factions.263
Moreover, a fundamental tenet of Sutherland's economic liberty jurisprudence
prescribed closejudicial scrutiny of laws to ascertain whether they in fact promoted
the long-term public welfare or instead merely advanced the self-interest of political
factions able to manipulate the ephemeral whims of popular democratic
majorities.2"' Sutherland followed this approach in Grosjean when he carefully
examined a seemingly neutral economic regulation of the press and found that it
262 Id. at 251. Justice Stone advised Sutherland not to place undue emphasis upon
legislative motive in assessing the legitimacy of the license tax, especially the infamous July
1934 circular Huey Long distributed to the Louisiana legislature to convince it about the
imperative of taxing the "lying" press. In a memorandum to Sutherland, he wrote: "While
reading between the lines we may conclude that this expressed the real motives of the
legislation,. . . it would be extremely unfortunate to commit ourselves to the proposition that
could impugn the motives to the members of the legislature ... ." Memorandum from
Associate Justice Horace F. Stone to Associate Justice George Sutherland, at 1 (Feb. 5,
1936) (on file as part of the Horace F. Stone Papers at the Library of Congress). Stone also
said:
There is no need to rely on such dubious support. The tax, on its face, is a plainly
discriminatory tax.. . a burden on the exercise of the powers of the press .... It
would be wiser for use to rest the case on that unimpeachable ground than to
attribute bad motives to the legislators on the basis of what someone else said to
them.
Id.
263 See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250-51; see also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 301 U.S. at
433-34 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (finding a Louisiana chain store tax unconstitutional);
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 549-62 (1923) (Sutherland, J.) (suggesting that
a minimum wage regulation for women violated due process because it bore a tenuous
relationship to public health, safety, morals, or welfare).
264 See Olken, Justice George Sutherland, supra note 19, at 57-88 (discussing
Sutherland's economic liberty jurisprudence).
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was a partial law detrimental to the freedom of expression and economic liberty of
nearly a tenth of the state's newspapers. 265
2. Grosjean and Sutherland's Previous First Amendment Record
Perhaps the most revealing indication that Sutherland construed the First
Amendment issue in Grosjean from the perspective of economic liberty emanates
from his overall record in freedom of expression cases during his sixteen years on
the Court. In the vast majority of such cases, Sutherland often voted to sustain the
convictions of individuals under criminal syndicalism statutes enacted by the
government to suppress seditious speech. 2s6
Though he believed the paramount interest of national security generally
outweighed freedom of expression,2 6 Sutherland departed from his usual deference
when. convinced that only a tenuous link existed between the expressive activities
of the defendant and the criminal syndicalism prohibited by law.2 6 Insofar as he
sanctioned the restriction of seditious speech, he nevertheless insisted that such
265 Gros/ean, 297 U.S. at 244-45, 250-51. The American Newspaper Publisher's
Association, for which the appellees' lead attorney, Elisha Hanson, was the general counsel,
also regarded the case as one involving the attempt of a political faction to interfere with
freedom of the press through the guise of a seemingly neutral economic regulation. In this
regard, it emphasized "the principle that the freedom of the press includes the freedom from
unjust and discriminatory taxation by which hostile political factions may seek to stifle
criticism through attempting the economic destruction of their critics." CORTNER, supra note
174, at 171 (quoting Editor & Publisher, Feb, 15, 1936, at 41).
266 See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 274-75 (1937) (Van Devanter, J.,
dissenting) (Sutherland joined the dissent that would have upheld the criminal syndicalism
conviction of a man for the possession of Communist literature with the intent to distribute
it and incite an insurrection); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (sustaining a
criminal syndicalism statute); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (upholding a
conviction for seditious speech). Sutherland was part of both the Whitney and Gitlow Court
majorities.
267 See, e.g., United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) (Sutherland, J.), overruled
by Girourard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). In Macintosh, the Court held the United
States government could deny citizenship to an alien who refused to take an unqualified oath
to bear arms in defense of the country during a war. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (invoking a national security rationale in support of state
law that prohibited foreign language instruction in public schools). Sutherland, the only
other dissenter, joined in Holmes' dissent.
26 See, e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (ruling that mere participation in
a meeting that discussed revolutionary policies was not tantamount to illegal advocacy of
overthrowing the government); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (finding part
of the California criminal syndicalism statute that applied to the mere demonstration of a red
flag unconstitutionally vague); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (reversing the criminal
syndicalism conviction because of insufficient evidence). Sutherland joined in the majority
opinions of these cases.
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regulation occur pursuant to laws equally applicable to all citizens and administered
in an impartial manner for the benefit of the public welfare.269
For similar reasons, five years before Grosjean, Sutherland was one of four
members of the Court who dissented in Near v. Minnesota,270 a case involving the
constitutionality of a statute that authorized local officials to enjoin the publication
of articles in newspapers and other periodicals previously found to have contained
similar stories that constituted a nuisance.27" ' Chief Justice Hughes, writing for a
divided Court, ruled the "Minnesota gag law" contravened the First Amendment as
an impermissible prior restraint.272 However, to Justice Butler and the others who
joined in his dissent, the statute marked the reasonable exercise of state police
powers to curb a public nuisance.273 Narrowly construing the concept of prior
restraint,274 this quartet of justices, who often demonstrated a particular solicitude
for the economic liberty of private businesses, thought that the gag law operated
equally in that it applied to all publishers. As such, it was not a partial measure
intended to benefit some at the expense of others, but rather a legitimate means of
preserving community order.27 "
Sutherland's implicit endorsement of Butler's analysis suggests that in Near,
as in the seditious speech cases, he was less interested in freedom of expression for
its own sake than in protecting individual liberty from the tyranny of political
factions. Yet undue attention to the First Amendment rhetoric within his opinions
in Grosjean, and a year later in Associated Press, obscures this point. Moreover,
it is possible to reconcile Sutherland's apparent contradictory positions inNear and
Grosjean about the scope of prior restraint if one considers that Sutherland actually
incorporated many of Cardozo's points about the First Amendment when he
redrafted his Grosjean opinion. Much less a proponent of free speech in a
269 Sutherlnfid also demonstrated his aversion to political factions in other kinds of
individual liberty cases. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (finding a
prosecutor's misleading closing statement unconstitutionally impaired a defendant's right
to a fair trial because such deceptive tactics undermined the impartial restraint of the law);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (invoking the right to defense counsel when
confronted with prosecution for the commission of a capital crime where the absence of a
defense attorney would subvert a fair hearing).
270 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
271 The Minnesota law provided that a person or company "engaged in the business of
regularly or customarily producing, publishing or circulating... an obscene, lewd and
lascivious newspaper, magazine, or other periodical, or a malicious, scandalous and
defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical, is guilty of a nuisance, and ... may
be enjoined. .'. ." Ch. 285 Session Laws of Minn. 10123-1 etseq. § 1 (1925) (Mason's
Minn. Stats. 1927).
272 Near, 283 U.S. at 713, 723.
273 Id. at 731-38 (Butler, J., dissenting).
274 Id. at 735 (explaining the Minnesota law merely authorized an equitable remedy for
the proscription of a nuisance).
275 Id. at 735, 737-38.
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democratic republic than either Cardozo, or for that matter Brandeis, Sutherland
was most receptive to the concept of an untrammeled press when confronted with
cases wherein a close nexus existed between economic liberty and freedom of
expression. Fundamentally, this was how he perceived the Louisiana license tax
controversy and a year later interpreted the attempt of the National Labor Relations
Board to interfere with the firing of an editor in the New York office of the
Associated Press.
IV. EDITORIAL DISCRETION, INDUSTRIAL REGULATION AND THE BUSINESS OF
EXPRESSION REFINED DURING THE TWILIGHT OF LOCHNER
In Associated Press v. NLRB,276 Sutherland elaborated upon his views about the
business of expression when he dissented from the Court's decision upholding the
application of the National Labor Relations Act to the editorial operations of a
private news agency. One of five cases decided on April 12, 1937 that upheld the
National Labor Relations Act as a regulation of interstate commerce, 277 Associated
Press, like Grosjean, presented issues of both economic liberty and freedom of
expression before the Supreme Court. Yet unlike Grosjean, in which all of the
justices reached a consensus, in Associated Press the ideological rift that beset the
Court throughout the 1930s once again emerged as five of its members, reluctant
to interfere with the industrial policies of the federal government, sustained the
National Labor Relations Act as a legitimate economic regulation of interstate
commerce that only incidentally affected freedom of the press. 2 78 Indeed, the
contrast between Roberts' majority opinion and Sutherland's dissent underscores
the dichotomy between economic liberty and freedom of expression to which the
modern Court has adhered since the demise of the Lochner era.
Roberts expressed considerable deference toward the law as an economic
measure and thus regarded the First Amendment claim of the Associated Press in
an ancillary light. Sutherland, however, interpreted freedom of expression through
the prism of economic liberty and, therefore, perceived the nexus between the
expressive rights of the Associated Press and its private business interests. Though
276 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
277 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding application
of the NLRA to the steel industry); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937)
(upholding application of the NLRA to the trailer manufacturing industry); NLRB v.
Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937) (upholding application of the
NLRA to the clothing manufacturing industry); Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937) (upholding application of the NLRA to an interstate
transportation company). Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter
dissented from the other Commerce Clause case decided that day, Associated Press v. NLRB,
301 U.S. 103 (1937), in addition to dissenting from each of the other cases except for
Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co..
278 Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 125-30, 133.
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his constitutional analysis ostensibly focused primarily on the First Amendment, as
in Grosjean, his frequent references to political factions and conclusion that the
National Labor Relations Act was an illegitimate partial law evoked his pervasive
concern with economic liberty.
Ironically, Sutherland's insistence that the Court erred in its casual assessment
of the First Amendment has, in part, engendered the perception that freedom of
expression warrants a higher standard of review than economic liberty. Yet
nowhere in his dissent did Sutherland actually endorse this approach. Unlike a
majority of the Court, he refused to abandon, in the area of economic regulation, the
strict scrutiny characteristic of Lochner era police powers jurisprudence. Cognizant
that the NRLA affected both the business and expressive interests of the Associated
Press, Sutherland construed the law with Lochner in mind because he did not
necessarily differentiate between First Amendment and economic rights, which he
regarded as complementary aspects of personal liberty vulnerable to the ephemeral
whims of transient democratic majorities. Analysis of the issues before the Court
provides an essential context from which to understand Sutherland's nuance dissent.
A. Interstate Commerce and Economic Liberty
The case arose when the Associated Press terminated from its New York office
Morris Watson, an editor and prominent leader in the American Newspaper Guild
active in the process of collective bargaining by which the union sought to reduce
the working hours of the Associated Press' editorial employees.279 A private news
organization that collected, reformulated, and distributed stories to its member
newspapers throughout the country, the Associated Press claimed that it fired
Watson for poor performance as a news editor,28° though in all probability his
discharge emanated from his union activities and perceived bias in covering labor
matters within the news.28" ' The National Labor Relations Board intervened on
behalf of Watson, found his dismissal discriminatory, and concluded that the
Associated Press committed several unfair labor practices.282 It ordered the news
279 See Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 13, Associated Press v. NLRB,
301 U.S. 103 (1937) (No. 365) [hereinafter Brief for the NLRB]. The Guild was the
exclusive collective bargaining representative of the Associated Press's editorial employees.
280 See Brief on Behalf of Petitioner the Associated Press at 5, Associated Press v. NLRB,
301 U.S. 103 (1937) (No. 365) [hereinafter Brief of the Associated Press].
28! See Brieffor the NLRB at 9, Associated Press (No. 365) (attributing the dismissal to
Watson's union leadership).
282 Id. at 5, 9-15. The NLRB argued that Morris Watson's termination from his editorial
position at the Associated Press in apparent retaliation for his union activities as head of the
American Newspaper Guild unit of the Associated Press violated the right of employees to
organize and participate in unions and the process of collective bargaining pursuant to § 7
of the National Labor Relations Act. Moreover, the dismissal of a union leader signified
illegal interference by an employer with the union and collective bargaining rights
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organization to reinstate Watson as an editor with back pay and to cease and desist
from refusing to recognize the collective bargaining rights of its employees, a
decision affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.283
The Associated Press then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
1. Private Economic Affairs and Editorial Discretion
The Associated Press contended that the actions of the National Labor Relations
Board infringed upon its business of expression. First, it argued that the
administrative agency lacked jurisdiction to intervene in Watson's dismissal
because neither the news service in general nor its editorial employees in particular
were engaged in interstate commerce. 2 To this extent, it relied upon Supreme
Court precedent which distinguished between manufacturing and commerce.285 The
Associated Press emphasized that, although its editors rewrote news stories supplied
from sources throughout the country, their activities were analogous to those of
workers in a manufacturing plant whose production of items indirectly affected the
flow of interstate commerce.286 From this perspective, the Associated Press
differentiated between the process of editing, which it characterized as a creative
task distinct from interstate commerce, and the transmission of news across state
guaranteed by § 7 of the Act and an impermissible attempt to discourage membership in the
American Newspaper Guild. Accordingly, the labor board contended the Associated Press
also violated subsections (1) and (3) of § 8 of the Act.
283 See Brieffor the NLRB at 15-16, Associated Press (No. 365); NLRB v. Associated
Press, 85 F.2d 56 (1936).
284 See Brief of the Associated Press, supra note 280, at 10-12,40,43-45. The Associated
Press viewed itself as "'an exchange of news system and nothing more."' Id. at 43 (quoting
Transcript Record at 88, Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1936) (No. 365)). It
characterized this exchange of information as private and therefore "not interstate
commerce." Id. at 44. Arguing that in its "collection, compilation, formulation and
distribution of... news" to member newspapers throughout the country, the Associated
Press was "not a mere conduit of news," id. at 9, the news agency distinguished itself from
railroads and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Id. at 16. Moreover, since
editorial employees merely produced news stories and did not transmit them through the
channels of interstate commerce, their editorial activities did not constitute interstate
commerce. Id. at 11, 45.
285 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 238 U.S. 238 (1936) (ruling that industrial
working conditions and labor relations were not matters of interstate commerce); E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (noting that manufacturing precedes commerce).
286 See Brief of the Associated Press, supra note 280, at 45, Associated Press (No. 365).
At oral argument, John W. Davis, on behalf of the Associated Press declared: "These
employees are engaged ... in the manufacture of news . . . they are engaged in the
production of news, in its obtainment, in its formulation, in its preparation .... " Associated
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 731 (argument of John W. Davis, counsel for the Associated
Press).
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lines conducted by its non-editorial employees. 287 Narrowly construing the scope
of the Commerce Clause, the Associated Press contended that its labor relations
with editorial employees such as the discharged Watson constituted a local matter
remotely connected to interstate commerce. Accordingly, the National Labor
Relations Board lacked constitutional authority under both the Tenth Amendment
and the Commerce Clause to issue its cease-and-desist order upon the Associated
Press. 8
In addition, the Associated Press asserted that the National Labor Relations Act
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.289 Emphasizing its
primary function as a private distributor of news, the company fundamentally
objected to the compulsory system of collective bargaining imposed upon it by the
federal government.29 ° Indeed, it invoked the hoary, though by then somewhat
discredited, presumption that an inherent equality existed in the bargaining
positions of prospective employees and their potential employers.29 ' From this
premise, the news service criticized the unilateral requirement that it negotiate with
the American Newspaper Guild irrespective of whether the union represented the
287 See Brief of the Associated Press, supra note 280, at 11, 45, Associated Press (No.
365).
288 Id. at 18, 24-26, 29 (asserting that labor relations comprise local activities with no
bearing on interstate commerce).
289 Id. at 17, 64, 68, 70, 75. The news agency contended the compulsory process of
collective bargaining abridged liberty of contract by forcing both employers and employees
to relinquish their private contract rights to collective action. Id. at 68, 70, 75. Moreover,
application of the federal labor act to a private business was "an intolerable interference with
the right of employers to manage the internal affairs of their private enterprises." Id. at 92.
The Associated Press also claimed the Act abridged the news agency's right to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 17.
290 Id. at 70,75,85-88. In part, the Associated Press considered the Act arbitrary because
it ignored the common law distinction between public and private businesses when it
included within its broad scope virtually all types of businesses, regardless of their size and
the precise relationship between employers and employees. Believing that a vague
government interest in the promotion of industrial collective bargaining did not, in and of
itself, transform an otherwise private enterprise into a public endeavor, the news service
assailed the federal government's attempt to abridge liberty of contract. Id. at 68, 70, 75, 92.
At oral argument, its counsel remarked that the federal labor act was "a direct violation of
the Fifth Amendment... because it... [was] ... an invasion of freedom of contract between
an employer and an employee.., engaged in a wholly private occupation. .. ." Associated
Press, 301 U.S. at 728 (argument of John W. Davis, counsel for the Associated Press).
29 See Brief of the Associated Press, supra note 280, at 68, 70-71,AssociatedPress (No.
365) (referring to Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908)) (asserting that a
federal labor law arbitrarily interfered with contractual liberty because it disrupted the equal
rights of labor and management to bargain over terms of employment).
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actual will of the vast majority of its constituents.292 Doubtful that mandatory
collective bargaining under such circumstances bore a substantial relationship to the
public welfare, the company considered the Act an unreasonable and arbitrary
incursion upon the contractual freedom of management and workers alike.293
Accordingly, the Associated Press decried the National Labor Relations Act as an
illegitimate attempt to alter the balance of power within the industrial marketplace
through the means of a partial regulation intended to benefit some groups of
employees to the economic disadvantage of their employers. 94 Frustrated that the
National Labor Relations Board prohibited Watson's discharge, the company
assailed a federal law that impeded its economic liberty to hire and fire
employees.295
292 Id. at 85,87-88; Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 111-14 (excerpt from argument of John
W. Davis, counsel for the Associated Press) (claiming the federal labor act "fosters the
closed union shop"). Id. at 111.
293 See Brief of the Associated Press, supra note 280, at 70,75, 92,Associated Press (No.
365); Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 728-30 (argument of John W. Davis, counsel for the
Associated Press); Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 111 (excerpt from argument of John W.
Davis, counsel for the Associated Press) (characterizing the federal labor act as "an arbitrary
encroachment upon the constitutional rights of the unwilling employer and his non-
consenting employees").
294 The Associated Press argued that the National Labor Relations Act conferred on its
employees more choice in negotiating than it allowed the news agency as an employer,
because the Act forced the Associated Press to recognize a collective bargaining unit
sanctioned by the NLRB. Insofar as the employees presumably had some initial choice as
to the selection of their labor representative (or perhaps could decline union representation
altogether), the Associated Press had no other choice but to deal with the union. See
Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 729 (argument of John W. Davis, counsel for the Associated
Press). Moreover, because the Act required the Associated Press to bargain only with the
union elected by a majority of the employees, it "den[ied] minority the right to deal with the
employer... [and]... the employer the right to deal with the minority" in contravention
of freedom of contract implicit within the concept of substantive due process. Id. at 730. The
news agency also raised the possibility that a faction of workers might manipulate the union
election process to the detriment of the vast majority of their peers and thus actually "subject
the majority employees to the will of the minority." Brief of the Associated Press at 85,
Associated Press (No. 365). Additionally, while the Act restricted the economic liberty of
the employer through its provisions for compulsory bargaining and arbitration of labor
disputes, it did not impose similar limitations upon members of the union. Id. at 87-88.
295 To this extent, it commented derisively that:
[T]he AP [sic] must employ a person whom it does not want .... Neither the
subject matter, the terms, nor the duration of the contract are of its own
choosing. The AP [sic] must refrain from employing other persons more to its
liking in order to leave room for Watson, or may even be compelled to discharge
some non-union editorial employee in order to make room for Watson.
Brief of the Associated Press, supra note 280, at 94, Associated Press (No. 365).
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Of particular concern to the Associated Press was the application of the
National Labor Relations Act to the editorial operations of a private news entity.
It considered its core business, the production of news stories and their subsequent
dissemination to member newspapers, distinct from ordinary forms of commercial
enterprise that did not necessarily involve freedom of expression.2 In essence, the
Associated Press perceived that the cease-and-desist order of the National Labor
Relations Board interfered with both its economic liberty and the exercise of its
editorial discretion pursuant to the First Amendment. As the private news agency
explained:
To name the men who shall choose and write the news for publication is no
different either in principle or in result from naming what shall be [either]
written or published. Here the author and the product are one and
inseparable. If one is to be free, so must the other.297
Consequently, it considered its business and expressive interests indivisible and
sought to persuade the Court that a restriction upon its freedom of contract
undermined the integrity of its expressive endeavor. With this in mind, the
company asked: "How can a newspaper remain the master of its business if the
right to select those who compose its editorial page... those who shall compose its
news columns is no longer within its choice?
298
At oral argument, John W. Davis, counsel for the Associated Press, described
Watson as "the writer, the reporter, the rewriter, the composer of headlines" and
noted that he wrote the opening paragraphs of stories carried by the news agency's
client newspapers. 99 Drawing an analogy between the editor and manufacturer of
a product - in this case, a news story - Davis reiterated that: "The author and
the product are one and inseparable. No law, no sophistry can divide them; and if
you restrict the right to choose the one you have inevitably restricted the right to
296
[I]nterference with the internal management of any private concern is
inconsistent with due process of law. Where, however, the private concern is
not dealing in ordinary commercial commodities but is engaged exclusively in
the formulation and dissemination of news for the press, such interference is
still more intolerable in that it constitutes an encroachment upon the
management and policy of the press itself.
Id. at 99. Accordingly, the Associated Press criticized the actions of the NLRB as being "in
disregard of the First Amendment, [since it] treated as ordinary articles of commerce...
news and intelligence.... " Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 116 (excerpt from oral argument
of John W. Davis, counsel for the Associated Press).
297 See Brief ofthe Associated Press, supra note 280, at 102,Associated Press (No. 365).
29' Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 734 (argument of John W. Davis, counsel for the
Associated Press).
299 .1d. at 731.
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choose the other."300 Appalled that the federal government had intervened in what
the company considered its prerogative to keep the news it published free from bias,
the Associated Press, therefore, invoked the First Amendment to preserve its right
to terminate certain editors whose union sympathies might undermine this objective.
"How can accuracy, independence and impartiality survive a deliberate attempt by
the Government to impose upon The [sic] Associated Press a requirement that its
news editors be union men?", ' the news service wondered with dismay as it
decried the use of a partial labor regulation to skew public discourse about
industrial relations.
Though initially the company claimed it dismissed Watson because of his
unsatisfactory performance, when the case came before the Supreme Court it
suggested, perhaps unwittingly, an ulterior motive for his discharge. For in
asserting a First Amendment right to ensure that its stories remained free of bias,
especially in the area of labor relations, a topic often in the news during the 1930s,
the Associated Press imputed to Watson, in the absence of tangible evidence to the
contrary, an inability to edit the news devoid of his union sympathies.0 2 Moreover,
it feared that Watson's compulsory reinstatement subsequent to his discharge would
further compromise the news agency's efforts at producing impartial stories about
labor and business affairs.0 3 Notwithstanding the possibility that either of these
may have been straw arguments, the Associated Press, in effect, contended that its
core business was sufficiently intertwined with tlhe First Amendment that the
unequal operation of the National Labor Relations Act infringed upon both its
economic liberty and freedom of expression.
From this perspective, it concluded a regulation that encroached upon the
autonomy of the news service to manage its editorial personnel threatened the
existence of an independent press because it subjected the process ofjournalism to
"o Id. at 734.
30' Brief of the Associated Press, supra note 280, at 99, Associated Press (No. 365).
302 From this perspective, the news agency invoked not only liberty of contract but also
freedom of the press when it contested the NLRB order that it reinstate Morris Watson as
an editor. As noted at oral argument by John W. Davis, counsel for the Associated Press,
"[tihis is ordered irrespective of his present capacity or qualification or his acceptability by
his employer and irrespective of whatever bias he may have acquired by reason of his
discharge." Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 116 (excerpt of oral argument of John W. Davis,
counsel for the Associated Press). Davis also remarked that:
[I]t is not that he may be more biased, not that he may be less biased, but it is
that those who publish and print the news must have the right to choose the
people by whom the news is to be written before it is printed. You cannot
divorce.., the author from his product ....
Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 733 (argument of John W. Davis, counsel for the Associated
Press).
303 See Brief of the Associated Press, supra note 280, at 99, Associated Press (No. 365).
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government edict and the whims of political factions.3  Accordingly, the
Associated Press construed the application of the National Labor Relations Act to
its editorial process as "a direct, palpable, undisguised attack upon the freedom of
the press."30 5
2. A Regulation of Interstate Commerce of Incidental Effect Upon the Press
In contrast, the National Labor Relations Board de-emphasized the relationship
between economic liberty and freedom of expression. It argued that the Associated
Press participated in interstate commerce through its transmission of news items
notwithstanding their revision by a group of editors in the New York office, who
themselves only rewrote the stories from raw information supplied by satellite
outposts and did not physically send them across state lines."° Nevertheless,
because these editors crafted articles for nationwide distribution, their local
activities comprised an integral part of the stream of interstate commerce.
In particular, the government agency contended that potential labor strife
between the management of the Associated Press and its editorial employees
threatened to disrupt the interstate commerce in news."' Thus, the Board had
authority under the Commerce Clause to intervene in Watson's dismissal.
Moreover, it argued that the collective bargaining requirement of the National
Labor Relations Act was a legitimate industrial regulation consistent with due
process in that it sought to redress inherent inequality in the relationship between
management and employees in a business whose distribution of news implicated a
significant public interest in both the news itself and those who formulated it
through the editorial process.08
The federal government perceived the use of the National Labor Relations Act
31 Id. at 98-100; Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 733-34 (argument of John W. Davis,
counsel for the Associated Press).
305 Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 731 (argument of John W. Davis, counsel for the
Associated Press).
31 See Brieffor the NLRB, supra note 279, at 38-39, 69-71, Associated Press (No. 365).
In this regard, the NLRB emphasized the continuity in the manner in which the Associated
Press received raw items of news, transferred the information to its editors who rewrote or
reformulated news stories and thereafter forwarded the stories to another department of the
news agency, which then distributed the finished product to members' newspapers
throughout the country. Id. at 38-39. Accordingly, the editorial employees worked "at the
very hub of the petitioner's system of interstate... commerce. .. ." Id. at 71.
307 Id. at 16-19,71; Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 136 (argument of Charles E. Wyzanski,
Jr., on behalf of NLRB) (asserting that if the editorial employees of the Associated Press
went on strike "there would be a dam to the flow of... news").
308 See Brieffor the NLRB, supra note 279, at 86, 96-100, Associated Press (No. 365).
In fact, the government thought that the Associated Press invoked liberty of contract in this
case as a pretext for interfering with the collective bargaining and other legally protected
union activities of its editorial employees. Id. at 100.
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in this context as a seemingly neutral industrial regulation that only incidentally
affected freedom of the press.0 9 Absent direct proof that compliance with the
federal requirements forced the Associated Press to compromise its journalistic
integrity," 0 the Act as applied merely recognized the rights of workers to engage in
certain protected forms of union activity. Thus, its primary purpose was to promote
interstate commerce through the safeguard of a mechanism calculated to promote
fairness in labor negotiations in an industry whose product - news - affected the
public at large.3 '
With its emphasis upon the validity of the federal labor law as an economic
regulation, the National Labor Relations Board, in essence, rejected the premise that
its imposition of collective bargaining directly curtailed the First Amendment rights
of the Associated Press. Doubtful that the compulsory reinstatement of Watson
infringed upon the news agency's editorial discretion, the labor board differentiated
between economic liberty and freedom of expression.t 2 It considered the dispute
between the parties an industrial one and, therefore, urged the Court to apply an
appropriately deferential standard of review in light of recent Commerce Clause,
Contract Clause,3" 3 and substantive due process cases"" wherein the Court retreated
from precedent it considered largely inflexible and inappropriate in addressing
socioeconomic problems of the Depression.
B. Justice Roberts' Opinion and the Dichotomy Between Economic Liberty and
Freedom of Expression
3' Id. at 104-05. To this extent, the NLRB asserted that "[a] newspaper publisher does
not have a special immunity from the application of general legislation nor a special
privilege to destroy the recognized rights and liberties of others." 1d. at 104. It also explained
that the editorial operations of the Associated Press came within the purview of federal labor
law "because it engages in interstate commerce and not because the commodity with which
it deals happens to be news." Id. at 105.
310 The NLRB disputed the notion, presented for the first time by the Associated Press,
that the National Labor Relations Act's application to its editorial operations saddled it with
a biased editor. Id. at 106-08. Moreover, the NLRB asserted that notwithstanding the Act,
the Associated Press could still discharge editorial employees for bias or other reasons
having nothing to do with union activity. Id. at 86, 96-98, 106-08.
3" Id at. 96-98, 104-08.
312 Id. at 104-08. In fact, most of the labor board's legal argument concerned Commerce
Clause and substantive due process issues, which indicates that from its perspective the case
primarily involved the permissible scope of economic regulation of a private business
engaged in interstate commerce.
313 See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding a
Minnesota mortgage moratorium as a reasonable exercise of state police powers).
314 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (sustaining a District
of Columbia minimum wage for women while overruling Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261
U.S. 525 (1923)); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding milk price
regulation in the general public interest).
[Vol. 10:2
THE BUSINESS OF EXPRESSION
By the margin of a single vote, the United States Supreme Court sustained the
application of the National Labor Relations Act to the editorial operations of the
Associated Press. Insofar as the 5-4 vote reflected the division within the Court
over the constitutional limits of public regulation of private economic activity, it
also revealed the nascent dichotomy for some of the justices between economic
liberty and freedom of expression. For when the Court upheld the National Labor
Relations Board's cease-and-desist order as well as its mandate that the Associated
Press reinstate Morris Watson as an editor, this meant that, from the perspective of
five of its members, the case essentially involved an economic or labor dispute that
warranted a deferential standard of review. However, from the vantage point of
Sutherland and the three other justices whojoined his dissent, the federal labor law
infringed upon both the expressive and economic rights of a private news agency.
1. The National Labor Relations Act as a Legitimate Economic Regulation of
Interstate Commerce
Justice Owen J. Roberts wrote the majority opinion, which drew upon the
Court's rationale in four other cases, also decided on April 12, 1937, that sustained
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to regulate private, local business
activities that substantially affected interstate commerce. In each of these
Commerce Clause decisions, the Court upheld cease-and-desist orders from the
National Labor Relations Board issued to private employers to prevent them from
engaging in unfair labor practices that threatened to disrupt commerce among the
states.315 Pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, the labor board also ordered
the companies to reinstate employees discharged for membership in unions and
participation in collective bargaining activities. These, too, were upheld as
permissible Commerce Clause regulations.316
The most significant of these cases was NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.3 17 wherein the Court ruled the National Labor Relations Act prohibited the
nation's fourth largest steel manufacturer from interfering with the rights of its
315 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding application
of the NLRA to the steel industry); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937)
(upholding the application of the NLRA to the trailer manufacturing industry); NLRB v.
Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937) (upholding application of the
NLRA to the clothing manufacturing industry); Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937) (upholding application of the NLRA to an interstate
transportation company). Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter, who
dissented in Associated Press v. NLRB, also dissented from each of the other cases except
for Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co..
316 See, e.g., Washington, Va. &Md. Coach Co., 301 U.S. at 147 (upholding NLRB order
that a common motor carrier reinstate drivers and mechanics terminated because of their
union affiliation).
317 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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industrial workers to join a union and engage in collective bargaining. In so
holding, the Court expressly found that the company, whose Pennsylvania plants
produced steel and iron from mineral ore extracted from deposits in other states
before shipping the finished products throughout the country, was "a completely
integrated enterprise" engaged in interstate commerce.
3 18
Cognizant that the company's animus toward unions might precipitate a strike
that would obstruct the flow of interstate commerce, five members of the Court
rejected Jones & Laughlin's contention that labor relations within its Pennsylvania
plants bore but a remote and indirect relation to interstate commerce. Indeed, in
sustaining the labor board's actions, this slim majority of the Court substituted a
more flexible Commerce Clause approach - one that emphasized the substantial
effects of local activity upon the stream of interstate commerce - for the more
restrictive test urged by the steel company. 9
Rather than apply the traditional requirement that there be a direct nexus
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce, a rigid criterion the Court
had even used the year before in striking down a federal law that regulated wages
of intra-state coal miners,32° these justices departed from this narrow conception of
Commerce Clause powers that often distinguished between manufacturing and
commerce.
In its place, they adopted a revised notion of Commerce Clause powers that
focused on whether the aggregate effects of intrastate activities had a close and
substantial relationship to interstate commerce. 32'. As Chief Justice Hughes
explained, "[i]t is the effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which is
3 Id. at 26,35.
9 To this extent, the Court noted that the plenary powers of the Commerce Clause "may
be exerted to protect interstate commerce 'no matter what the source of the dangers which
threaten it."' Id. at 37 (quoting Second Employers 'Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 51 (1912)).
32 Id. at 34-41 (rejecting the steel company's analogy between manufacturing and labor
relations and criticizing the traditional indirect/direct test). In cursory fashion, the Court
simply noted that Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) was "not controlling." Id.
at 41. In Carter, the Court ruled the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 violated the
Commerce Clause because it attempted to regulate labor conditions in mines when the
production of coal merely preceded commerce. See Carter, 298 U.S. at 297, 303-04. Labor
relations of this kind, therefore, only indirectly affected interstate commerce. Id. at 307-09.
Justice Sutherland, who wrote the Court's opinion in Carter, explained that "[tihe
distinction between a direct and an indirect effect turns, not upon the magnitude of either the
cause or the effect, but entirely upon the manner in which the effect has been brought
about." Id. at 308.
32! "Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they
have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress
cannot be denied the power to exercise that control." Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. at 37.
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the criterion .... 322 The question is necessarily one of degree."323.
In effect, by viewing commerce as a continuum that encompassed both
production and distribution, the majority collapsed the distinction between
manufacturing and commerce critical to the assumption that labor relations bore
little direct relevance to interstate commerce. Aware that industrial strife could
disrupt the passage of steel products across state lines, the divided Court
acknowledged that intrastate labor relations had a close and substantial effect upon
interstate commerce.324 Accordingly, it used the stream of commerce theory in all
but one of the "Labor Board" cases to uphold federal interdiction of private labor
discrimination that threatened to impede the flow of interstate commerce.325
Within this context, Justice Roberts construed the application of the National
Labor Relations Act to the editorial operations of the Associated Press. He
reasoned that the Associated Press "engaged in interstate commerce" 326 by virtue
of its widespread activities in the collection, reformulation, and dissemination of
news stories throughout the country. In particular, he and the other members of the
majority found persuasive the existence of a vast network of affiliates which
enabled Associated Press to "ac[t] as an exchange or clearing house of news as
between the respective members and as a supplier to members of news gathered
through its own domestic and foreign activities."327
They considered the private news agency an instrumentality of interstate
commerce and assumed that the news items it produced from raw stories and
ultimately distributed to its far-flung press affiliates were themselves articles of
interstate commerce.3 2 From this perspective, Roberts, on behalf of the majority,
concluded that the editorial duties of those employed in the New York office
substantially affected interstate commerce.
Rather than determine whether local industrial strife directly harmed commerce
among the states, Roberts accepted that labor relations within the New York
editorial office of the Associated Press had a close and substantial effect upon
interstate commerce. Thus, he perceived that the company's intransigence towards
the collective bargaining activities of its editorial employees would probably cause
12 Id. at 32.
323 Id. at 37. In fact, Hughes was quite critical of the direct/indirect test used in Carter,
believing that its reliance upon semantical distinctions made it impractical for assessing the
actual limits of Congress' Commerce Clause powers. Id. at 41-42.
114 Id. at 37, 42-43.
3 In Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937), a unanimous
Court sustained the application of the National Labor Relations Act to an interstate carrier
under the instrumentality of commerce theory alone and not in conjunction with the
substantial effects doctrine.
326 Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 128 (1937).
327 Id.
328 Id. at 125-29.
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a work stoppage likely to obstruct the flow of news across -state lines.329
Consequently, the Court sustained the jurisdiction of the labor board to intervene
in a dispute between the Associated Press and one of its editors.
Though he did not expressly address whether the National Labor Relations Act
encroached upon the news agency's freedom of contract, Roberts noted that Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp. found the law did "not interfere with the normal exercise
of the right of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them.""33
Largely deferential to congressional authority to redress labor problems, Roberts'
majority opinion also reflected the paradigmatic shift that was occurring in the
Court's substantive due process jurisprudence. Indeed, not only the Labor Board
cases of April 12, 1937, but also other recent decisions involving economic
regulations marked an increased willingness by several of the justices to balance the
public interest with private rights and a growing awareness of the importance of
public regulation in maintaining the security of private economic rights.' As a
result, during the 1930s there emerged, to one extent or another, a tendency among
those members of the Court who comprised the Associated Press majority to
employ pragmatism in resolving constitutional issues arising from governmental
regulation of private economic affairs. 3
Close judicial examination of the connection between legislative means and
ends, therefore, began to yield to a more relaxed standard of review in such cases.
For example, in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., Chief Justice Hughes noted the
importance of interpreting the Commerce Clause in practical terms rather than "in
an intellectual vacuum., 333 In Associated Press, Roberts adopted this approach,
characterizing the federal law as an economic regulation that warranted minimal
judicial scrutiny." 4 With the broad latitude he accorded the federal labor board,
Roberts separated the business interests of the Associated Press from its editorial
329 Id. at 129-30.
331 Id at 133. Roberts applied this rationale in dispatching with the claim that application
of the National Labor Relations Act to the editorial operations of the Associated Press
interfered with the news agency's First Amendment rights. Id.
133 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937) (sustaining
a District of Columbia minimum wage regulation for women); Home Bldg & Loan Ass'n
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,434-35,438-39,443-44 (1934) (sustaining a Minnesota mortgage
moratorium as a reasonable exercise of local police powers).
13 See Olken, Charles Evans Hughes, supra note 221, at 580-82, 586-95 (discussing
constitutional pragmatism in the context of 1930s Contract Clause jurisprudence).
33' NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937); see also id. at 41-42
(stating that "interstate commerce itself is a practical conception").
131 In this regard, Roberts explained that: "Congress may facilitate the amicable
settlement of disputes which threaten the service of the necessary agencies of interstate
transportation. In shaping its legislation to this end, Congress was entitled to take cognizance
of actual conditions and to address itself to practicable measures." Associated Press, 301
U.S. at 130 (quoting Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184,
209 (1921)).
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discretion under the First Amendment.
2. Freedom of Expression in Eclipse
Insofar as the Court upheld the application of the National Labor Relations Act
to the editorial department of the Associated Press, it considered the law one of
general application that only incidentally affected the private news service's First
Amendment rights. Noting that the Associated Press claimed at the initial labor
board hearing that it discharged Watson for unsatisfactory work, Justice Roberts
regarded with much skepticism the news agency's assertion upon appeal that
reinstatement of its former editor would impair its free press rights to produce
impartial news stories about industrial relations.335 Consequently, he believed that
the Associated Press merely invoked the First Amendment as a pretext for
interfering with the collective bargaining rights of its union editors. 36 Watson's
original discharge emanated, therefore, from illegal actions by his employer in
retaliation for his leadership in the American Newspaper Guild and collective
bargaining activities, and not because his work had demonstrated any pro-union
bias.
In this regard, Roberts rejected the Associated Press's claim of an unqualified
First Amendment privilege to discharge its editorial personnel. Careful to note that
the National Labor Relations Act did not preclude the news agency from firing an
editor who was unable to formulate impartial stories or was incompetent, Roberts
insisted that the law prohibited employers from terminating editors because of their
participation in union affairs and collective bargaining.337 Notwithstanding
Watson's union activities, the Associated Press-had not presented concrete evidence
of either his past incompetence as an editor or that, once reinstated, he would imbue
the news items he wrote with a pro-labor bias.33 Under these circumstances, the
labor board intervened pursuant to a general business law that "ha[d] no relation
whatever to the impartial distribution of news." '339 Accordingly, Roberts viewed the
case primarily as one involving economic regulation rather than editorial autonomy
and refused to use a more exacting standard of review.
C. Sutherland's Dissent: The Business of Expression Refined
For Justice Sutherland and the others in dissent, the case was much more
complex because they perceived that the involuntary reinstatement of Morris
Watson encroached upon both the editorial autonomy of the Associated Press and
335 Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 131-32.
336 Id.
337 Id. at 132-33.
338 Id. at 131-32.
339 Id. at 132-33.
20021
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
the manner in which it conducted its business. Confronted with a decision that not
only contradicted their narrow view of the Commerce Clause, but also seemed to
presume the legitimacy of economic regulation, the quartet of dissenting justices,
whose aversion to class legislation often compelled them to scrutinize closely both
the content and operative effects of economic regulation, invoked the First
Amendment as a means of staving off what they regarded as the Court's unfortunate
retreat from principled judicial review." Sutherland, who had the misfortune of
witnessing firsthand the Court's rejection of Commerce Clause and substantive due
process precedent he personally authored,34" ' wrote the dissent in AssociatedPress.
While he emphasized the First Amendment, Sutherland nevertheless applied it to
the facts of this case through the prism of economic liberty.
1. Editorial Discretion and Economic Liberty
This is true despite the assertion, at the outset of his dissent, that First
Amendment rights are subject to fewer restrictions than economic ones protected
340 Sutherland expressed his dismay through metaphor, suggesting "[a] little water,
trickling here and there through a dam, is a small matter in itself; but it may be a sinister
menace to the security of the dam, which those living in the valley below will do well to
heed." Id. at 136 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). This passage evokes Sutherland's much earlier
reference to the Constitution as an edifice intended to preserve fundamental principles of
law, but whose strength would diminish if its provisions were interpreted so that they "may
change with every shifting breath of popular emotion." 47 CONG. REc. 2793, 2794 (1911)
(statement of Sen. Sutherland); see also id. at 2800 (calling the Constitution "the shelter and
bulwark of what might otherwise be a helpless minority"); George Sutherland, Address
Before the Utah State Bar Association (1924), in STATE BAR ASS'N OF UTAH, 1924
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL SESSION OF THE STATE BAR Ass'N OF UTAH 67
(likening the Constitution to a "most superb edifice" and noting that constitutional
government "requires labor and skill and infinite patience").
"' In its explicit ruling that intrastate labor relations substantially affected interstate
commerce in news, the Associated Press majority departed significantly from Sutherland's
analysis of the Commerce Clause in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936),
wherein he reasoned that a federal labor regulation of local miners was unconstitutional, in
part, because labor relations bore a remote and indirect affect upon interstate commerce.
Carter, 298 U.S. at 308-09. Critical to Sutherland's conclusion was his acceptance of the
analogy between coal mining and manufacturing, both of which he thought preceded
commerce. Id. at 303-04. In the Labor Board cases, the Court rejected this approach toward
the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 1, 32,37,
40-43 (1937) (finding that threatened industrial strife within the manufacturing component
of an interstate business bore a close and substantial effect upon interstate commerce). On
March 29, 1937, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), the same five
justices in the Associated Press majority voted to uphold a District of Columbia law that
proscribed a minimum wage for women. In so ruling, they displaced the rigorous economic
substantive due process jurisprudence Sutherland and the dissenters endorsed with a more
deferential standard of review and overruled Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525
(1921). Sutherland wrote the majority opinion in Adkins.
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by substantive due process. 4 Though he appeared to differentiate between the two
types of constitutional liberties, Sutherland expressed this point to remind the Court,
in rather stark terms, that through the guise of a seemingly neutral economic
regulation, the federal government had infringed upon the Associated Press's
freedom of expression. From his perspective, the National Labor Relations Board's
orders not only interfered with the news agency's discretion to hire and fire editors,
they also compromised its editorial autonomy. 43 Unable to dissuade the Court from
its deference to public regulation of private economic affairs, Sutherland felt
compelled to emphasize the First Amendment aspects of the case.
While he recognized the primacy of First Amendment rights within a
constitutional democracy, Sutherland did not regard them as absolute. Indeed, his
judicial record prior to 1936 suggests quite the opposite, as he often voted to sustain
seditious speech convictions3" and supported the use of prior restraint to prevent
the publication of defamatory articles.345 For Sutherland, freedom of expression and
economic liberty comprised complimentary facets of personal liberty, each
vulnerable to the ephemeral whims of transient democratic majorities. 3 " As such,
342 Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 135 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 137-40. "Due regard for the constitutional guaranty requires that the publisher
or agency of the publisher of news shall be free from restraint in respect of employment in
the editorial force." Id. at 140.
3" See, e.g., Hemdon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 274-75 (1937) (Van Devanter, J.,
dissenting) (Sutherland joining in a dissent that would have upheld the criminal syndicalism
conviction of a man for the possession of Communist literature with the intent to distribute
it and incite an insurrection); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (sustaining a
criminal syndicalism statute); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (upholding a
conviction for seditious speech). Sutherland was part of both the Whitney and Gitlow Court
majorities.
" See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 735-38 (1931) (Butler, J., dissenting).
Sutherland joined in Butler's dissent.
' See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (suggesting the
Constitution protected both liberty of contract and freedom of expression from the
illegitimate exercise of state police powers). In a 1921 address before the New York State
Bar Association, Sutherland explained:
The guarantees for safeguarding life, liberty and property, freedom of speech,
of the press and of religious worship ... would be of little value if their
interpretation and enforcement depended upon arbitrary, shifting, temporary
official edicts instead of the calm, judgment of the judiciary under the general
law of the land.
Principle or Expedient?, supra note 76, at 11. Nearly two decades after Sutherland
left the Court, Justice Felix Frankfurter, a particularly astute student of constitutional
history, noted in relation to the rise and fall of economic substantive due process that:
[P]rotection of property interests may.. .quite fairly be deemed, in appropriate
circumstances, an aspect of liberty....
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their protection warranted close judicial scrutiny of all forms of regulation. Rather
than consider economic liberty and freedom of expression in dichotomous terms,
Sutherland understood that, at times, they could converge and thus form an
essentially indivisible right. Partial laws that restricted the business interests of
those engaged in expressive activity, therefore, jeopardized the First Amendment:
Appalled that the Court neglected to consider the link between economic liberty and
freedom of expression, Sutherland believed that the National Labor Relations Act
abridged both the economic and expressive constitutional rights of the Associated
Press.34 7
2. Class Legislation and Political Factions
Acutely aware that political factions could suborn the public welfare through
class legislation, Sutherland regarded with suspicion a federal regulation that
unilaterally restricted the contractual freedom of private companies.' 41 In this
regard, his fundamental aversion to political factions enabled him to appreciate how
the application of the National Labor Relations Act to the editorial department of
the Associated Press implicated the business of expression. Interspersed throughout
his dissent are several references to factions that underscore the extent to which
Sutherland melded his analysis of the First Amendment with the tenets of his
economic liberty jurisprudence.3 49 Concerned that the labor measure was a partial
Yesterday the active area in this field was concerned with 'property'. Today it
is 'civil liberties.' Tomorrow it may again be 'property.' Who can say that in
a society with a mixed economy, like ours, these two areas are sharply
separated, and that certain freedoms in relation to property may not again be
deemed, as they were in the past, aspects of individual freedom?
Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 230
(1955), quoted in Andrew Kaufman, Benjamin Cardozo, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1150 (Leon Friedman and
Fred L. Israel eds. 1997).
17 With this sentiment in mind, Sutherland exhorted his brethren "to withstand all
beginnings ofencroachment."Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 141 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
Aghast at the Court's insouciance toward the First Amendment claims of the Associated
Press, he remarked that "the saddest epitaph which can be carved in the memory of a
vanished liberty is that it was lost because its possessors failed to stretch forth a saving hand
while yet there was time." Id. For more contemporary criticism of the majority's approach,
see CARDOZO, supra note 169, at 547 (noting, in retrospect, that Roberts neglected to
consider the adverse effects of the federal labor policy upon freedom of the press).
348 See Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 136 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) ("Congress has no
power to regulate the relations of private employer and employee as an end in itself . ").
149 Id. at 136-37 (discussing how the application of the NLRA to the editorial department
of the Associated Press could benefit editorial workers at the expense of management); id.
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law, he admonished the Court "to be most on. . , guard to protect liberty when the
government's purposes are beneficent."'35
In particular, Sutherland perceived that the unequal operation of the Act
curtailed the editorial autonomy of a private news agency whose core business
consisted of the formation and distribution of news.35" ' In contrast to Justice
Roberts, Sutherland found persuasive the notion that Morris Watson's union
background might affect his ability to formulate impartial stories about industrial
and labor affairs prevalent in the news of the 1930s.352 Critical of the federal labor
board's partisan intervention into what he considered a matter of business discretion
(the hiring and firing of editorial staff) Sutherland emphasized the correlation
between the economic and expressive interests of the Associated Press. 53
Assessing the actions of the labor agency through the vantage point of factional
aversion, Sutherland explained:
[T]he judgment of an administrative censor - cannot, under the
Constitution, be substituted for that of the press management in respect of
the employment or discharge of employees engaged in editorial work. The
good which might come to interstate commerce or the benefit which might
result to a special group, however large, must give way to that higher good
of all the people so plainly contemplated by the imperative requirement that
at 138 (averring that the news agency's involuntary compliance with the NLRB orders could
distort news about labor affairs to the advantage of union members); id. at 140 (suggesting
that government intervention in editorial personnel decisions could lead to impermissible
partial regulation of the press to the detriment of the public welfare).
350 Id. at 136. Sutherland often invoked the duty of the judiciary to uphold constitutional
limitations on the exercise of state police powers that he believed represented illegitimate
class legislation. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,401-04,409,411,
413 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (suggesting a minimum wage law for women
abridged contractual liberty); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,448-51,
483 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (literally interpreting the Contract Clause as an absolute
prohibition of a mortgage moratorium law); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 263,
279-80 (1932) (asserting the primacy of substantive due process over the experimental use
of state police powers); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525,544-45, 553-561 (1923)
(asserting the judicial prerogative to declare unconstitutional a minimum wage law for
women he viewed as partial legislation remotely connected to the public welfare).
15 Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 137-40 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
352 Id. at 138-41.
"I Id. at 138, 140; see also ARKES, supra note 20, at 260-62 (suggesting that the NLRA
really interfered with the associative freedom between the Associated Press management and
its editors inherent in liberty of contract). Though Arkes construes freedom of association
from a natural rights perspective that Sutherland may not have had, this point nevertheless
supports the notion that Sutherland interpreted the First Amendment in this case with
economic liberty in mind. See Olken, Justice George Sutherland, supra note 19, at 57, 85
(explaining that Sutherland did not follow a natural rights approach in his jurisprudence of
economic liberty).
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"Congress shall make no law .. abridging the freedom of the
press."'3m
Consequently, Sutherland broadly construed the concept of freedom of the press
to incorporate economic activity intended to facilitate expression. Control over who
edited news stories, therefore, involved a cluster of constitutional rights. From this
perspective, he refused to differentiate, as had the majority, between the business
and First Amendment interests of the Associated Press. Indeed, Sutherland
observed that "[w]hen applied to the press, the term freedom... means more than
publication and circulation. . . . [It also includes] the liberty to exercise an
uncensored judgment in respect of the employment and discharge of the agents
through whom the policy is to be effectuated."355 Restricted in its ability to choose
editorial employees because of the labor board's orders, the Associated Press could
no longer maintain complete control over the production of its news stories. For
Sutherland, this signified an intolerable incursion upon the First Amendment rights
of the news agency as well as a breach of substantive due process.
3. The Business of Expression
In essence, Sutherland worried that through the means of a partial economic
regulation the federal government was indirectly distorting the news. This, in large
part, explains why he believed the Court erred in the deference it accorded the labor
law as an industrial measure. For in relaxing the standard of review, Sutherland felt
that the majority had ignored the interplay between economic liberty and freedom
of expression that rendered the Act unconstitutional. Cognizant of Watson's role
as a union leader, Sutherland accepted the premise of the Associated Press that his
reinstatement would compromisejournalistic integrity and hinder the news agency's
efforts to distribute impartial new stories.356
While he conceded the right of news editors to engage in union activities,
Sutherland recognized the company's countervailing interest in retaining discretion
over pertinent editorial matters. " 7 Rather than question the motivation behind
Watson's termination, Sutherland assumed the First Amendment permitted the
Associated Press to determine the fitness of those entrusted to formulate and rewrite
articles. Noting the frequency of labor disputes in the news, Sutherland thought it
"reasonable prudence for an association engaged in part in supplying the public
with fair and accurate factual information with respect to the contests between labor
and capital, to see that [its editors] are free from either extreme sympathy or
4 Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 137 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (quoting, in part, the
First Amendment).
355 id.
356 Id. at 137-40.
157 Id. at 139.
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extreme prejudice one way or the other.""' 8 Otherwise, it incurred the risk of
distributing stories marred by bias.
From Sutherland's anti-factional perspective, forcing the company to retain an
editor whose objectivity it doubted in preparing news reports rife with stories about
labor disputes signified a form of compelled speech in contravention of freedom of
the press. 59 Moreover, this dual restriction of economic and expressive liberty was
detrimental to the public welfare because it distorted the marketplace of ideas.
Once again, Sutherland evoked the specter of illegitimate class legislation when he
explained that "an unbiased version of [labor relations news] is of the utmost public
concern. To give a group of employers on the one hand, or a labor organization on
the other, power of control over such a service is obviously to endanger the fairness
and accuracy of the service. 360 This, Sutherland believed, would undermine the
role of an independent press in a democratic society. 6' Consequently, he concluded
that application of the National Labor Relations Act to the editorial department of
the Associated Press violated the First Amendment.
Sutherland's Associated Press dissent, with its emphasis upon preserving the
discretion of a private news agency to hire and fire its editors, bears the
unmistakable mark of his deep-set aversion to political factions. Indeed, his
conclusion that the federal labor measure was a partial economic regulation that
infringed upon the editorial freedom of the Associated Press emanated from his
observation that the Act was a law ofunequal operation. 62 Accordingly, Sutherland
imbued his analysis of the First Amendment with principles culled from his
economic liberty jurisprudence. In tandem with his Grosjean opinion, the
Associated Press dissent demonstrates the extent to which Sutherland conflated
economic liberty and freedom of expression.
V. THE FORGOTTEN FIRST AMENDMENT LEGACY OF JUSTICE SUTHERLAND
In the modem era, the Court has continued to differentiate between economic
liberty and freedom of expression. It has consistently upheld, with considerable
deference, the authority of the government to impose generally applicable economic
3 Id. at 138.
9 Id. at 138-41 (implying the National Labor Relations Act was a "form of legislative
coercion.") Id. at 139. Sutherland noted that "the hope of benefit to a cherished cause which
may bias the editorial employee is a contingency the risk of which the press in the exercise
of its unchallengeable freedom under the Constitution may take or decline to take, without
being subject to any form of legislative coercion." Id. at 138-39.
160 Id. at 138.
361 Sutherland considered "a free press.., one of the most dependable avenues through
which information of public and governmental activities may be transmitted to the people
... ." Id. at 136.
362 Id.
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regulations on the press in many instances,363 while in others it has sought to protect
the content of expression through some form of heightened scrutiny. 64 Indeed, the
Court's persistent adherence to the distinction between content-neutral3 65 and
content-based 66 restrictions of speech assumes, in large part, a dichotomy between
economic regulation and freedom of expression. Under this conventional approach,
an economic regulation that restricts the business of one engaged in expressive
activity as either a speaker or conduit of speech often receives much less judicial
scrutiny than a measure intended to somehow limit the content or viewpoint of
communication.16' At times, in their preoccupation with applying the purported
363 See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (upholding the
application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to a private news agency).
364 See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (using strict
scrutiny to invalidate a "right of reply" law requiring newspapers to publish the responses
of political candidates to published criticism).
365 A content-neutral law "restrict[s] communication without regard to the message
conveyed." Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions ofSpeech Because of its Content: The Peculiar
Case of Subject- Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81, 81 (1979). [hereinafter Stone,
Subject-Matter Restrictions]. Some content-neutral restrictions regulate the physical form
of speech, as opposed to its substantive content. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968) (upholding the application of a federal law proscribing the knowing destruction
of military draft cards to symbolic conduct as a narrowly tailored incidental restriction of
speech). Other content-neutral restrictions regulate the time, place, or manner of
communication. See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)
(sustaining a municipal ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property).
Despite technical distinctions between these two types of content-neutral limitations, the
Supreme Court, since the 1980s, has in effect regarded both incidental restrictions and
regulations upon the time, place, or manner of speech as comparable content-neutral
restrictions subject to a uniform test. See, e.g., City ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S.
41, 50 (1986). For criticism of this merger, see generally Day, Hybridization, supra note
8, 208-209 (noting that fusion of the incidental restriction test with the standard to assess
time, place and manner regulations blurs the distinction between unintentional and
intentional limitations on speech in ways harmful to First Amendment interests); Keith
Werhan, The O'Briening of Free Speech Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635 (1988)
(asserting that application of the O'Brien incidental restriction test to time, place, and
manner regulations signifies too much judicial deference to governmental regulation of
expression).
366 A content-based law restricts expression on the basis of its content or the
communication of a particular viewpoint expressed therein. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &MARYL. REv. 189, 190(1983) [hereinafter
Stone, ContentRegulation]. Unless a content-based restriction represents the least restrictive
means of attaining a compelling state interest, it will violate the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (invalidating a municipal ordinance
prohibiting drive-in movie theaters from showing movies containing human nudity).
367 See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (upholding,
as a reasonable economic regulation rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective,
federal marketing orders enacted under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act by the
secretary of agriculture that required California growers, handlers and fruit processors to pay
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distinction between content-neutral and content-based regulations of speech, the
justices have ignored, for the most part, the correlation between economic liberty
and some forms of expression. 6 Thus, they have often failed to consider the extent
to which seemingly neutral, or even incidental, regulations of speech can reflect the
artifice of political factions. Through the guise of a law that regulates the form of
speech, factions may actually intend to benefit one group of speakers/publishers
economically at the expense of others. This implicates the business of expression
wherein the economic and expressive interests of a media actor coalesce into an
essentially indivisible right especially vulnerable to incursion by partial laws or
illegitimate class legislation. Yet constitutional analysis that assumes the primacy
of the First Amendment, on one hand, and presumes the legitimacy of economic
regulation on the other, may not necessarily detect all of the problems created by
partial economic legislation that adversely affects the business interests of those
engaged in expression.69 Indeed, this flaw is most likely to occur when a court
confronts a seemingly neutral economic regulation that incidentally affects the
press. However, such ancillary effects may actually belie a more significant threat
to the business interests that facilitate expression through either indirect or direct
means.
generic advertising fees).
368 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (sustaining must-carry
rules imposed upon cable television system operators and programmers as a content-neutral
regulation that primarily affected their business decisions rather than their First Amendment
rights as "speakers").
369 Under traditional First Amendment analysis, a law that regulates the form of speech,
regardless of its content, will likely pass constitutional muster so long as it functions as a
content-neutral, time, place, or manner restriction. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (sustaining noise ordinance). Yet under this test, if the
government's principal objective is to regulate the business of the media actor, a court will
sustain such regulation if it only incidentally affects the content or viewpoint expressed. See,
e.g., Gliclkman, 521 U.S. at 566 (upholding a federal agricultural marketing order that
required California fruit growers, handlers, and processors to pay advertising fees as an
incidental restriction of their speech); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
(upholding Oklahoma optometry restrictions as legitimate economic regulation under the
rational basis test). Given the considerable deference accorded to economic regulation by
the modem Court, close examination of whether the law itself is a partial measure designed
to benefit one group at the expense of another may not occur if this disparity appears on the
surface to only create an incidental affect upon freedom of expression. See, e.g., Turner,
520 U.S. 180 (sustaining must-carry rules as a narrowly tailored means of furthering a
substantial governmental interest in preserving the economic viability of broadcast television
as a video transmission source). This approach, however, may not account for situations
where the nexus between the expressive and economic interests of a media actor is so close
that, as a practical matter, it is nearly impossible to distinguish between the two. In this
relatively small group of cases, neither traditional content-neutral or content-based First
Amendment analysis adequately considers the extent to which a partial economic regulation
may hinder the business of expression.
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Implicit in George Sutherland's analysis of the First Amendment over sixty
years ago was his recognition of the nexus between economic liberty and freedom
of expression. From this perspective, he considered it the duty of the judiciary to
examine carefully the factional context of legislation that affects both expressive
and economic interests. Unfortunately, modem Supreme Court justices have often
neglected this nuance approach when confronted with economic regulations of
speech and the press. Recent Court decisions in two areas (differential taxation of
the press and the constitutional status of must-carry rules imposed upon cable
television system operators and programmers) illustrate this disregard of the
interplay between economic liberty and freedom ofexpression. Though an in-depth
analysis of this problem is beyond the scope of this article, discussion of some
aspects of the modem Court's jurisprudence underscores Sutherland's forgotten
First Amendment legacy.
A. The Modern Supreme Court Approach Toward Differential Taxation of the
Press and the Distortion ofGrosjean
Nearly half a century after Grosjean, the Supreme Court addressed more subtle
forms of differential taxation of the press. In a trilogy of cases, a few years apart,
the Court set forth a series of principles to determine the appropriate standard of
review. Pursuant to this analysis, differential taxation of the press is presumptively
unconstitutional where it is apparent that the state legislature has either imposed
special burdens on the press inapplicable to other businesses or singled out a
segment of the press for adverse disparate treatment."0 In either of these scenarios,
the Court has endorsed the use of strict scrutiny in order to protect freedom of
expression from the potential of government abuse. 7' Moreover, the Court has
considered strict scrutiny appropriate where the differential tax imposed on a
portion of the press reflects a content-based distinction.3" However, if a tax scheme
differentiates between different types of media, the Court has suggested that such
distinction may still be permissible because it is less likely to pose a threat of
censorship than more pernicious forms of differential taxation that either single out
the press or a subset therein for more burdensome treatment than other businesses,
or where the tax distinction actually reflects the judgment of government officials
about the content of certain publications.373 Thus, a tax that evenhandedly
370 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'rof Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983) (invalidating a Minnesota use tax on ink and paper that exempted small
publishers). This concern with differential treatment of the press also encompasses favorable
treatment afforded the press because such treatment might compromise an independent press
by making it beholden to local government. Id. at 588.
171 Id. at 585, 588.
372 See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229-32 (1987)
(invalidating an Arkansas sales tax applied only to general interest magazines).
373 See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447-49, 451-53 (1991) (upholding an
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differentiates between types of media by treating similar classes therein the same
way will most likely receive more deferential judicial treatment.374 Nevertheless,
in its multi-tiered approach to problems of differential taxation of the press, the
Court has largely ignored the confluence of economic and expressive rights, often
falling into the trap of analyzing one to the near exclusion of the other. A brief
analysis of the leading opinions illustrates this point.
1. Differential- Taxation and the Business of Expression
In the first of these cases, Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., the Court
invalidated a Minnesota use tax on the ink and paper consumed in the production
of periodicals.3" The legislature exempted the first hundred thousand dollars worth
of ink and paper used from taxation, and thus the use tax in effect only applied to
a small segment of the press comprised of the largest periodical publishers within
the state. The Court concluded that, because other businesses were not subject to
this use tax, the tax itself signified differential treatment of the press.376 Moreover,
the Court found that because the exemption only applied to small volume
publishers, the use tax scheme constituted another form of differential taxation
within the media.377
Though the Court refused to speculate about the motive behind the use tax
structure, it presumed that its differential characteristics threatened freedom of the
press in general and, in particular, infringed upon the First Amendment rights of
those few publishers who disproportionately bore the burden of the use tax because
their annual production volume exceeded the limits of the exemption. 78 To this
extent, a majority of the justices regarded the use tax and its exemption as
comparable to impermissible content-based restrictions of the expressive rights of
the state's largest publishers.379 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court rejected the
notion that the use tax represented the least restrictive means of raising revenue
from profitable publishers given the threat to editorial freedom posed by the
structure of the tax and the selective application of its exemption.8 In essence, the
Court worried that differential treatment of the press in any form, regardless of
whether the distinction inures to the benefit of some members of the press, could
Arkansas gross receipts tax that exempted certain newspapers and magazines, but applied
to cable television as a tax of general applicability not intended to "single out the press").
114 Id. at 450-53 (applying deferential review to what the Court considered a generally
applicable economic regulation).
375 460 U.S. 575, 590-92 (1983).
376 Id. at 581.
377 Id. at 591.
378 Id. at 581, 585, 591-92.
379 Id. at 585 (suggesting the differential treatment of the press in this case was "not
unrelated to suppression of expression").
380 Id. at 585-86, 588.
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subject publishers to potential legislative abuse and compromise their autonomy.
Underlying the Court's analysis was the presumption that differential taxation of the
press violates the First Amendment.38'
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted that the use tax actually benefitted the large
newspapers within the state who, though subject to taxation on the amount of ink
and paper consumed, nevertheless paid far less in use taxes than they would have
had the state instead imposed the same four percent sales tax on the press that it
exacted from other businesses.382 From this perspective, he considered the use tax
scheme a rational economic regulation of the state that did not burden the First
Amendment rights of the largest periodicals.383 In so doing, he merely perpetuated
the dichotomy between economic liberty and freedom of expression characteristic
of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence since the late 1930s.
Despite their differences, neither Justice O'Connor, who wrote the majority
opinion, nor Justice Rehnquist seemed to recognize that the case actually involved
both economic and expressive rights. Indeed, the unequal application of the
Minnesota use tax and its exemption imposed certain economic burdens on the
state's largest publishers that may have actually benefitted their media competitors
in television, radio, and among the smaller volume periodicals - none of whom
was subject to the use tax on ink and paper. The strict scrutiny adopted by a
majority of the Court only focused upon the expressive interests at stake and did not
consider the manner in which a seemingly neutral economic regulation could
actually impair the business interests of larger publishers. Moreover, because it was
not entirely clear that the tax scheme discriminated against the largest newspapers
on the basis of their viewpoints, the Court may have used the wrong standard of
review.384
381 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comn 'rofRevenue, 460 U.S. 575,585,
588 (1983).
382 Id. at 597-98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 599-604.
3' The Court usually assesses viewpoint-neutral restrictions under the more forgiving
standard of heightened scrutiny, whereby it will sustain a narrowly tailored regulation that
advances a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of speech. See, e.g.,
City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding a Los Angeles
ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public utility poles). Much of the judicial
deference accorded viewpoint-neutral restrictions emanates from the perception that they
reflect neither ill motive on the part of the government nor the intent to distort
communication of ideas. As such, they function as content-neutral restrictions. See, e.g.,
Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 366, at 193-201 (suggesting that the differences
between viewpoint-neutral and viewpoint-based restrictions reflect pervasive distinctions
between content-neutral and content-based regulations). In Minneapolis Star, the tax scheme
was not the apparent byproduct of the government's attempt to quell the content of
communication, and so it differed from the one in Grosjean, in which it was abundantly
clear that the legislature used a seemingly neutral means of accomplishing its motive to
punish those newspapers most critical of Huey Long's political regime. See Minneapolis
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Likewise, Justice Rehnquist erred in his assumption that because the tax
functioned as an economic regulation, it withstood minimal scrutiny as a legitimate
means of implementing the state's rational objective of raising revenue. Inherently
deferential in its application, the rational basis test urged by Justice Rehnquist
would have neither required close examination of the factional context of the
Minnesota tax scheme nor considered the connection between the business interests
of the adversely affected newspapers and their communicative rights."'
Accordingly, it would have eschewed judicial inquiry as to whether the use tax and
its exemption impaired the economic ability of the state's largest newspapers to
engage in some form of protected expression.
2. The Presumptive Dichotomy Between Expressive and Economic Rights
In Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,"6 the Court continued to
differentiate between economic liberty and freedom of expression. Once again, a
majority of the justices used strict scrutiny, this time to strike down an Arkansas
law that imposed a sales tax on general interest periodicals but exempted
newspapers and special interest publications from taxation on the basis of their
content. 7 Though the tax operated unequally because it applied only to three
Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 580 (differentiating, in part, Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936)). Nevertheless, the Minneapolis Star Court found that the differential
effects of the Minnesota use tax upon the state's largest newspapers warranted strict
scrutiny. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 585-86 (implying that
Minnesota's interest in collecting revenue through the method of a differential use tax was
neither compelling, nor did it constitute the least restrictive means available of attaining the
state's objective).
385 The rational basis test, with its deference toward economic regulation, merely provides
that there be some rational connection between legislative means and ends. See, e.g.,
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,488-91 (1955) (upholding an Oklahoma law
prescribing optometry requirements). Under this minimal standard of review, the government
will prevail so long as it demonstrates the economic regulation at issue constitutes a
reasonable method of furthering a legitimate objective. Id. Concerns about class legislation,
the unequal operation of the economic regulation, or its factional basis become peripheral
in this deferential analysis that often presumes the legitimacy of public regulation of
economic activity.
386 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
387 The Arkansas Times, a general interest magazine published by the appellant, was
subject to the four percent sales tax. At oral argument, counsel for the state commissioner
of revenue asserted that two other periodicals paid this tax, a fact disputed by the appellant.
Id. at 229 n.4. Noting that the tax applied to only a small number of periodicals, the Court
questioned its exemption for newspapers, many of which contained general interest stories
similar to those published by the appellant. Id. at 230-31. Nevertheless, the Court did not
analyze whether the disparate tax scheme promoted the business interests of those who
received exemptions at the expense of their competitors. Instead, it focused on the First
Amendment issue raised by the content-based regulation. Concluding that the selective
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periodicals published within the state, seven of the justices decided the case on First
Amendment grounds388 and found that the law, which authorized a public official
to determine the tax status of a publication in terms of its content, effectuated
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.389 In so holding, the Court reasoned that
neither the state's putative interests in raising revenue nor encouraging the
proliferation of smaller specialty journals through tax exemptions justified a
selective tax upon a portion of the press.39 Preoccupied with the threat of
censorship inherent in such differential treatment, the Court focused exclusively
upon the expressive harms borne by the plaintiffs and thus did not necessarily
consider whether the law itself was a partial economic regulation. In part, this is
understandable given the law's overt content-based restriction. Yet this approach
failed to refute the notion, expressed in dissent by Justices Scalia and Rehnquist,
that the tax was a reasonable economic regulation whose exemptions the state
implemented to subsidize small publishers.39' Consequently, the majority and
dissenting opinions exemplify the willingness of the modem Court to differentiate
between economic liberty and freedom of expression.
Perhaps the most problematic case in this area is Leathers v. Medlock,392 in
which the Court reversed course when it used the rational basis standard of review
to uphold a differential regulation of the press. In Leathers, the Court sustained an
Arkansas tax imposed only on cable television services that exempted broadcast
television, radio, the print media and, until the state amended the tax, satellite
television transmission.393 Because the tax affected nearly one hundred cable
service providers, a majority of the justices viewed it as a generally applicable
economic regulation.394 As a result of this deference, they never considered that the
tax may have impaired the ability of cable television system operators to compete
application of the tax on the basis of periodical content amounted to impermissible
viewpoint discrimination, id. at 229-31, 234, the Court found it unnecessary to determine
whether the tax also violated the First Amendment because it distinguished between
magazines and newspapers. Id. at 233.
38 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, explained that although the plaintiffs also
raised an equal protection issue under the Fourteenth Amendment, "Arkansas' sales tax
system directly implicates freedom of the press." Id. at 228 n.3.
389 Id. at 229-30.
310 Id. at 231-34.
"' Id. at 235-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
392 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
391 Id. at 453. Once amended, the law no longer exempted satellite television transmission.
Id. at 443. Noting the absence of evidence indicating the state intended to censor cable
speech, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, characterized the regulation as a "broad-
based, content-neutral sales tax... [un]likely to stifle the free exchange of ideas." Id. at
453. Notwithstanding its differential effect upon cable television, the tax functioned as a
"generally applicable sales tax." Id. Nor did the Court address the original disparate
treatment between cable and satellite transmission.
391 Id. at 447, 450-53.
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in the information market place with the other, more favored segments of the media
that received tax exemptions. Though the Court recognized that the cable industry
plaintiffs engaged in a form of protected speech,3" it found the tax was content-
neutral because it affected a large and heterogeneous group in a non-discriminatory
manner.396 In essence, the Court employed an ad hoc approach that presumed the
economic legitimacy of the tax397 and dispensed with analysis of whether the law
was a partial regulation that indirectly curtailed the freedom of the press.
Justice Marshall, however, recognized that because Arkansas' differential tax
placed a disproportionate economic burden on cable system operators, it restricted
their First Amendment rights. In dissent, he asserted that the tax created a content-
based distinction borne solely by those in the cable industry, whose programming
provided entertainment and news unavailable in some parts of the state from
segments of the media favored with exemptions. 98 Highly critical of the notion that
the standard of review depended upon the size of the adversely affected group,3 99
he insisted that the tax lacked a compelling justification.1 Insufficiently narrowly
tailored, its unequal operation hindered the First Amendment interests of the cable
television industry.'
3. The Distortion of Sutherland's Legacy
While Marshall implicitly understood that the tax scheme skewed business
competition within the media," 2 his primary concern was protecting the free press
395 id. at 444.
'16 Id. at 448-50.
"I Id. at 451-52. Indeed, the majority explained that "[i]nherent in the power to tax is the
power to discriminate in taxation." Id. at 451. From this perspective, it did not think that a
tax that imposed different burdens upon segments of the press necessarily implicated the
First Amendment. Id. at 451-52. For criticism of judicial deference toward structural
regulation of the media because of its tendency to neglect the factional basis of seemingly
neutral economic regulations and their differential effects upon some segments of the media,
see McGinnis, supra note 33, at 114-15 (criticizing the Court's use of fairly deferential
heightened scrutiny to assess the constitutionality of must-carry laws).
398 Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 461-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall
explained that some of the cable systems that provided unique special language, cultural, and
news programs unavailable in other forms of media were the only cable systems within some
regions of the state. Id. "[I]n any given locale, Arkansas' discriminatory tax may
disadvantage asingle actor, a'small' number even under the majority's calculus." Id. at 462.
Consequently, this belied the majority's assertion that the tax affected a large intra-media
group and created the potential for censorship reflective of government biases that would
impede the flow of information. Id.
'" Id. at 454,460-62.
Id. at 459, 464-65.
Io d. at 458-65.
402 See id. at 456-59,462,465. He noted that cable television system operators had to pay
a tax on their subscription fees while their media competitors were exempt from taxation of
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rights of cable television system operators from potential government abuse.4 °3 To
this extent, he worried that through the structure of an economic regulation, the
legislature could impair expressive rights.4°4 In this regard, of the two opinions, his
was the more consistent with Sutherland's legacy. However, unlike Sutherland,
who construed differential taxation of the press through the prism of economic
liberty, Marshall adhered to the post-1930s notion that differentiates between
economic liberty and the First Amendment. Accordingly, his analysis never really
focused on how the Arkansas tax curtailed the business of expression as a partial
economic regulation. Insofar as Marshall realized that government could impede
the flow of information through economic measures, he cared less about protecting
the business interests of the cable system operators than about preserving their
communicative autonomy."° Though he shrewdly understood that, through the
guise of a sales tax, the state infringed upon the First Amendment rights of certain
media actors, Marshall, like most modem jurists, placed more emphasis upon the
First Amendment than on economic liberty. For this reason, he thought strict
scrutiny was the most appropriate means of protecting the cable system operators'
freedom of expression.
Yet Marshall's characterization of the Arkansas tax as a content-based form of
media discrimination would not necessarily have forced the Court to determine
whether the law was a partial regulation enacted to benefit the business of a few
favored members of the media to the economic detriment of others.' The type of
strict scrutiny Marshall advocated would have, in effect, shunted the issue of
economic liberty to the side and focused exclusively on whether the tax achieved
a compelling objective through means least restrictive of the First Amendment
interests of the cable system operators. This approach, therefore, would have
their advertising revenue. Id. at 456. In this regard, Marshall suggested that the Arkansas
legislature may have enacted the differential tax at the behest of television broadcasters who
feared competition from their cable counterparts. Id. at 463. Rather than construe this as a
problem of partial economic regulation, he focused on the First Amendment censorship
implications of the differential tax. Id.
4o' Id. at 458,462-63.
404 Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 458, 462-64 (1991).
405 Id. at 45 8-59, 462-63 (explaining how differential taxation of the media "distorts the
marketplace of ideas").
406 First, it was not altogether clear that the Arkansas tax really discriminated against the
cable medium to suppress the expression of cable speech. As Justice O'Connor noted in her
majority opinion, the differential tax did not refer to the content of cable expression, and this
content, with its "mixture of news, information, and entertainment," did not really differ
from the content present in other forms of media. Id. at 449. Moreover, strict scrutiny as a
standard of review may not consider all forms of indirect abridgement of speech, such as
structural, or seemingly neutral, economic regulations of speech. See, e.g., McGinnis, supra
note 33, at 114 (strict scrutiny "does not screen for all the manipulations of speech ....
Special rules targeted at the operations or structure of the communication media inevitably
affect content, even if they do not expressly refer to it.").
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merely fostered the divergence between economic liberty and freedom of expression
that Sutherland himself rejected in both Grosjean and Associated Press.
Indeed, conventional First Amendment analysis, using either strict or
heightened scrutiny, presupposes a dichotomy between economic liberty and
freedom of expression ill-suited for careful judicial assessment of laws that may
restrict the business of expression.' °7 With their emphasis upon protecting
expressive liberty, neither type of heightened review really considers the extent to
which regulations about the form of communication may reflect the biases of
political factions who capture the legislative process in order to create economic
benefits for some segments of the media at the expense of others. Though economic
regulations of unequal operation can distort the market place of ideas, traditional
First Amendment tests rarely examine how partial legislation can disrupt the
... See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, OfMarkets And Media: The FirstAmendment, The New
Mass Media, and the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REv. 141, 142, 176
(1995) (implying that because "most mass media regulation necessarily takes into account,
to some degree, the content of the regulated speech," a judiciary preoccupied with
distinguishing between content-based and content-neutral restrictions might not detect some
ways in which modem mass media rules limit expression); McGinnis, supra note 33, at 54-
57, 91,93, 97, 99, 110-15 (discussing the tendency of bifurcated First Amendment judicial
review to neglect the connection between property rights and freedom of expression);
Laurence H. Winer, The Red Lion of Cable, and Beyond? - Turner Broadcasting System
v. FCC, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 5 (1997) (noting the conjunction of content and
structural regulation of media). Winer also criticized the Turner I Court for its failure to
perceive that the must-carry rules functioned as both aii impermissible content-based
restriction upon the editorial discretion of cable operators and programmers, see id. at 29-34,
36-45, and partial economic legislation that impeded the business interests of the cable
industry for the benefit of broadcast television. Id. at 42, 45. In essence, then, Winer, like
McGinnis and, to a lesser extent, Bhagwat, all implicitly suggest that traditional First
Amendment standards of review may not adequately assess laws that affect the interrelated
expressive and economic interests of media actors.
20021
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
symbiotic relationship between the business and expressive interests of a media
actor.4 °8 Where these interests converge to the extent that they essentially form an
408 Consider the following example. Suppose a state law authorizes a flat tax only on all
wrestling magazines sold within the jurisdiction that promote the sport's virtues. Periodicals
that criticize the sport are not subject to the tax. Further assume that many citizens purchase
the magazines that tout wrestling's benefits. Because the tax, in effect, singles out magazines
favorable to wrestling, it is probably a content-based restriction that most likely results in
impermissible viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Police Dep't.
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating a content-based restriction on certain kinds of
labor picketing). Using strict scrutiny, a court will invalidate the tax unless the state
demonstrates that the tax is the least restrictive means available of attaining a compelling
state interest other than restricting freedom of expression. This, in turn, suggests that strict
scrutiny would probably permit a significant incursion upon the economic liberty of the
publishers so long as the legislative means are so precisely tailored that they leave
undisturbed the viewpoints of the affected wrestling magazines. However, in all probability,
a court would find this tax violates the First Amendment because its highly selective
application to a group of magazines characterized by their content raises serious questions
about legislative censorship of certain viewpoints. See, e.g., id. at 95-96 (asserting that under
the First Amendment "government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content"). Therefore, a court might find that the
state could raise revenue (assuming that is its stated purpose), promote more wholesome
sports or encourage the business of other types of magazine publishers through less
restrictive, content-neutral means. At this point, it is necessary to consider an alternative
scenario.
In this second example, a content-neutral, progressive tax based on the sales volume of
all sports magazines might prevail under virtually any form of heightened scrutiny because
it would not intrude nearly so much upon the First Amendment interests of certain wrestling
magazine publishers. In other words, it would be tantamount to a viewpoint-neutral, subject
matter restriction. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U;S. 298 (1974)
(upholding a flat ban on all advertising about political and public issues on public
transportation vehicles as a viewpoint-neutral, subject matter restriction). But see Grosjean
v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (invalidating a progressive tax upon advertising
receipts that exempted small publishers). In essence, this content-neutral, progressive tax
would function as a generally applicable economic regulation of incidental effect upon
freedom of the press. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)
(upholding application of federal anti-trust legislation to a news gathering agency). Given
the current presumption accorded to most economic regulations, a court would, therefore,
only examine carefully the First Amendment effects. However, because a court might not
consider whether a seemingly neutral economic regulation is in and of itself a partial law
intended to affect business competition within the media, it is quite possible that a court
would overlook the effects of apartial economic regulation upon the ability of some media
actors to engage in the very business of expression. See McGinnis, supra note 33, at 112-15
(criticizing the Turner I Court's use of heightened scrutiny in its constitutional analysis of
must-carry rules). In this second scenario, a content-neutral progressive tax on sports
magazines may only incidentally effect the viewpoints expressed in some wrestling
magazines. However, its progressive structure might indicate that the real purpose of the tax
was to neutralize economic competition between certain highly profitable wrestling
periodicals and less popular general sports magazines. This, in turn, might interfere with the
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indivisible right, judicial subordination of economic liberty to freedom of
expression ignores subtle forms of discrimination that may undermine the very
business of the press and thus indirectly subvert its expressive function. It also
distorts the meaning of Sutherland's opinions in both Grosjean and Associated
Press.4
09
B. Must-Carry and the Business of Expression
The Supreme Court has also neglected the business of expression in its
constitutional analysis of the most recent must-carry rules. In 1992, after several
previous attempts to regulate cable television, Congress enacted the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act ("Cable Act"). 410 Pursuant
to this law, most cable television systems must carry broadcast television programs
on at least one-third of their channels.4 ' Convinced that without mandatory
carriage, broadcast television would confront economic peril because of increased
anti-competitive behavior by the cable industry,4 1 Congress devised the must-carry
requirements to protect the viability of the broadcast medium, to promote fair
competition within the video market, and to preserve the broad transmission of
news and entertainment from a diverse spectrum of sources.413 In a tandem of cases
three years apart, the Court upheld the must-carry provisions of the Cable Act as a
narrowly tailored content-neutral regulation of only incidental effect upon the First
Amendment interests of cable television system operators and programmers.41 4
underlying business interests of those wrestling magazines. Thus, the modem Court, with
its overt emphasis upon the First Amendment, might neglect the more subtle interplay
between economic liberty and freedom of expression that Sutherland perceived in Grosjean
and Associated Press.
4o In this regard, Sutherland's dissent in Associated Press is especially relevant, because
there be looked beyond the surface of a seemingly neutral economic regulation and found
a partial measure whose unequal operation hindered the business of a private new service
and compromised its editorial autonomy. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 133-
41 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
40 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in 1994 in various sections of.47 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter 1992 Cable Act].
41 Id. at § 4, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471, 47 U.S.C. § 534. Section 5 of the 1992 Cable Act
prescribes mandatory carriage by cable television systems of public broadcast stations. Id.
at § 5, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471, 47 U.S.C. § 535.
412 Id. at § 2(a)(5)(13-19), 106 Stat. 1460, 1463, 47 U.S.C. § 521 (a)(5),(13-19) (setting
forth Congressional findings about how increased vertical integration of the cable television
industry and anti-competitive cable programming practices threatened the economic viability
of broadcast television).
413 Id. at § 2(a)(6-12), 106 Stat. 1460, 1463, 47 U.S.C. § 521 (a)(6-12); Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner I].
414 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hereinafter Turner If].
(ruling that in the absence of mandatory carriage, cable television systems would continue
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In essence, the must-carry rules reflected a congressional belief that, in the
absence of mandatory carriage of its stations by cable systems, broadcast television
would falter economically and no longer remain a viable and relatively inexpensive
source of information for nearly forty percent of the American households who did
not subscribe to cable television. 15 Though the must-carry provisions implicated
both economic liberty and freedom of expression, the justices in both the majority
and dissent in each case largely ignored the confluence of these rights. As a result,
the Court's most recent must-carry decisions contain significant flaws that
perpetuate the dichotomy between economic liberty and freedom of expression and
distort Sutherland's First Amendment legacy.
1. The Turner Cases: An Overview
Concerned that mandatory carriage of broadcast television programs interfered
with their editorial autonomy under the First Amendment, cable television operators
and programmers sued the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"),
characterizing the must-carry requirement as an impermissible content-based
restriction whose imposition amounted to a form of compelled speech." 6 In
response, the FCC argued that must-carry was a legitimate economic regulation
intended to alleviate impediments to the flow of information created by the
increasingly anti-competitive behavior of cable television systems, who throughout
the previous decade had increased their stranglehold control of home video
transmission through monopolistic practices that often resulted in the dropping of
broadcast television programs from cable systems or repositioning of them to
obscure channels in favor of cable fare.4"' The lower district court granted the
government's motion for summary judgment, as two of the three judges ruled that
the must-carry provisions were content-neutral because they distinguished between
media on technological grounds designed to facilitate public access to broadcast
television." 8
On appeal, a divided Supreme Court agreed in principle with the constitutional
analysis of the lower court, but vacated its order on the grounds that insufficient
anti-competitive behavior likely to create economic peril for large segments of the broadcast
television industry and thus undermine the government's substantial interest in promoting
diversity of video information transmission); Turner 1, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (upholding
must-carry as a content-neutral restriction of incidental effect upon the First Amendment
rights of cable operators and programmers).
"I See § 2(a)(5),(13-19) of 1992 Cable Act, 106 Stat. 1460, 1463, 47 U.S.C. § 521
(a)(5),(13-19); Turner I, 512 U.S. at 626,632-34.
416 Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 645-46, 652, 656-58.
417 Id. at 632-33, 638-41 (both references summarizing Congress' rationale).
418 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 40, 43-45, 51 (D.D.C. 1993).
In dissent, Judge Williams argued the must-carry rules were impermissible content-based
restrictions on cable speech. Id. at 57-67 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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evidence existed to dismiss the cable plaintiffs' claims. In his plurality opinion for
the Court, Justice Kennedy explained that the differential burden imposed upon the
cable industry by the must-carry regime reflected technological distinctions between
cable and broadcast media unrelated to the specific content or viewpoints of cable
television programs. 9 Thus, the must-carry provisions functioned as a content-
neutral restriction. 20 While Kennedy and the four justices who joined in his
plurality opinion acknowledged the First Amendment protected the editorial
discretion of cable operators and programmers,4 2' they noted that the must-carry
rules only sought to alleviate the cable industry's bottleneck control over video
transmission in subscribers' homes.422 Moreover, they characterized as substantial
the federal government's asserted interests in promoting fair competition within the
video market and preserving broadcast television as a viable medium. 423 From this
perspective, five members of the Court reasoned that must-carry was a structural,
economic regulation intended to redress competitive imbalance within the video
transmission market in favor of diversity and not an intentional abridgement of
419 Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 623-25, 643-44, 657-62 (concluding that the special
characteristics of the cable medium justify the differential burden imposed upon the cable
industry by the must-carry rules). Thus, Justice Kennedy did not perceive in either the
structure or the application of the must-carry rules impermissible governmental motive to
suppress the viewpoints of cable operators or programmers. Id. at 660-61. Nor did he
consider the possible indirect effects upon cable speech resulting from mandatory carriage
of broadcast programs because he never examined whether the must-carry rules may have
reflected congressional content-based judgment about the respective value of some broadcast
programs. Id. at 678-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Turner,
819 F. Supp. at 58 (Williams, J., dissenting). See also Jim Chen, The Last Picture Show (On
the Twilight of Federal Mass Communications Regulation), 80 MINN. L. REv. 1415, 1468,
1470-71 (noting that the must-carry rules exemplify structural regulation intended to
promote broadcast speech at the expense of the cable industry); Winer, supra note 407, at
5, 7, 19, 29, 32-34, 36, 39, 45 (asserting the Turner I majority confused the distinction
between a permissible general business regulation and an impermissible content-based
restriction). But see C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of
Persons and Presses, 1994 S. CT. REv. 57, 61, 62, 82, 88, 90-93, 114, 121-22, 127
(asserting that the must-carry rules exemplified permissible content-based structural
regulation of the media designed to facilitate access to information).
4"0 TurnerL 512 U.S. at 644-49, 654-55.
421 Id. at 636-37. In previous cases the Court had recognized some aspects of cable
programming as constituting speech under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Los Angeles v.
Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488,494 (1986) (equating cable operators with
First Amendment speakers). The Turner I plurality opinion, however, distinguished the
editorial discretion of cable programmers who create original cable programs and of cable
operators who select cable programs from the conduit function of cable televison. From this
perspective, because the must-carry rules primarily affected the physical transmission of
speech over cable systems, they did not infringe the First Amendment interests of the cable
industry. See Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 636-37, 654-59.
422 Id. at 624-25, 656, 660-61.
423 Id. at 623-25, 647-48, 651-52, 661-64.
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speech.424 Yet the Court found genuine issues of fact remained as to whether must-
carry was essential to further the government's substantial interests, particularly the
protection of broadcast television's economic viability, and whether application of
the must-carry requirement was sufficiently narrowly tailored that it only
incidentally affected cable speech.425 Consequently, the Court remanded the case
back to the special district court for further evidentiary review.
In TurnerfI, the Court reiterated that the content-neutral characteristics of must-
carry warranted heightened scrutiny. In a plurality opinion highly deferential to
congressional findings,426 Justice Kennedy observed that ample, though not
uncontroverted, evidence indicated that in the absence of mandatory carriage, the
cable industry's anti-competitive business practices posed a significant economic
threat to local broadcasters.427 This conflicted with the substantial governmental
interest in preserving multiple and diverse sources for the transmission of video
information . 2  Noting that most cable systems voluntarily carried popular
broadcast programs, Kennedy found the must-carry rules narrowly tailored because
of their modest effects upon the editorial discretion of cable operators and
424 Id. at 640-48, 651-52, 656, 661-62.
421 Id. at 667-68.
416 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195-96, 199-202,209-11 (1997).
As if to underscore its rational basis approach toward economic regulation, a majority of the
Court deferred to congressional findings about the economic imperative for the must-carry
rules notwithstanding the existence of conflicting evidence. Id. at 195-200, 209-13
(explaining that the Court will defer to "reasonable and . . . rational . . . legislative
conclusions").
427 In particular, the Court concluded that evidence of increasing horizontal and vertical
integration within the cable industry threatened the economic viability of its broadcast
competitors and that cable system operators were more likely to displace or relegate to
obscure channels some broadcast programs in favor of those produced by cable affiliated
programmers. Id. at 191-92, 197-207. Moreover, the Court found that there was sufficient
evidence to indicate that, as the cable monopoly increased its influence within the video
transmission market, cable systems had an economic incentive to drop or reposition
broadcast television programs because both cable and broadcast television competed for
advertising revenue. Id. at 206-09. But see Ronald W. Adelman, Essay, Turner Broadcasting
and the Bottleneck Analogy: Are Cable Television Operators Gatekeepers of Speech?, 49
SMU L. REv. 1549, 1550, 1555-56 (1996) (criticizing the Court's conclusion that the must-
carry rules were necessary to alleviate cable television industry's "bottleneck" control over
video transmission); Winer, supra note 407, at 40, 47-50 (explaining that in the absence of
mandatory carriage, cable television had an economic incentive to carry the most popular
broadcast television programs and criticizing the Court's "bottleneck" rationale).
4n See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 215-16, 221. Though he was not necessarily convinced that
the evidence indicated that broadcast television would incur dire economic consequences in
the absence of mandatory carriage, Justice Breyer concurred with the notion that the cable
industry's bottleneck control over home video transmission impaired a substantial
governmental interest in promoting diverse video sources and that the must-carry rules
advanced this interest by narrowly tailored means. See id. at 226-29 (Breyer, J., concurring
in part).
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programmers.41 9  Accordingly, they comprised a content-neutral restriction of
incidental affect upon cable speech. As in Turner I, Justice Kennedy's conclusion
that the must-carry rules primarily operated as economic regulation demonstrates
the extent to which he separated the business and speech interests of the cable
industry.
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the rationale of the Turner plurality opinions.
Partially dissenting in the first case, she characterized compulsory carriage of
broadcast television stations as a content-based restriction that reflected the
government's preferences for broadcast programs about local news, education, and
public affairs.430 Applying strict, in addition to heightened, scrutiny to the must-
carry rules, Justice O'Connor argued that neither localism nor diversity comprised
compelling governmental interests, and that even if they were, the government
could have attained these objectives through less restrictive means.43'
In Turner II, Justice O'Connor remained skeptical about the government's
assertions that the business practices of the cable industryjeopardized the economic
health of broadcast television and required cable systems to carry local television
programs to ensure viewers access to multiple sources of video information.432
From this perspective, she was very critical of the Court's deference to Congress,
given the conflicting evidence concerning competition within the video
transmission market and the extent of television broadcasters' economic
problems.433 Perceiving that the must-carry rules interfered with the editorial
discretion of cable operators and programmers, Justice O'Connor believed that they
Id. at 214-18. (explaining that the government would prevail so long as mandatory
carriage was not a substantially overbroad structural, economic regulation). In essence,
Justice Kennedy interpreted the narrowly tailored language of O'Brien to mean
"reasonable," and thus demonstrated great deference to the government's economic
arguments. See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 33, at 114-15 (noting that pursuant to O'Brien,
the Court deferred to the government's interests as defined by the government and criticizing
the Court's conclusion that cable television's bottleneck control over video transmission
necessitated mandatory carriage of broadcast programs).
430 See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 676-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
13' Id. at 680. Justice O'Connor considered governmental subsidies to broadcast television
stations one less restrictive mean. Id. Alternatively, she applied a heightened scrutiny
standard (O'Brien) and ruled that the governmental interest in preserving the economic
viability of broadcast television did not outweigh the First Amendment interests of the cable
industry. Justice O'Connor considered the economic threat to broadcast television
speculative and believed that the must-carry rules were overbroad and not unrelated to the
suppression of cable speech. Id. at 682-84.
4312 See Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 232-34, 238-48 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 247-54. In particular, she criticized the Court for not more carefully scrutinizing
the government's putative substantial interests when much of the testimony before Congress
about the need for mandatory carriage came from the broadcast television industry. Id. at
237-38.
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constituted an overly broad restriction of cable speech.434
2. Criticism and Context: Judicial Failure to Recognize the Business of
Expression
Notwithstanding the internal debate over the constitutional status of mandatory
carriage, the Supreme Court failed to recognize the nexus between economic liberty
and freedom of expression at issue in the Turner litigation. Indeed, both the
plurality opinions, with their emphasis upon the must-carry rules as a structural or
economic regulation, and the dissenters' predominant concern with the must-carry
rules' effects upon cable speech, suggest that the justices as a whole never fully
appreciated the parallels between the Turner cases and the differential treatment of
the press cases previously discussed. In particular, had they followed Sutherland's
approach in Grosjean and Associated Press, they may have avoided some analytical
pitfalls.
One problem is that the distinction between content-neutral and content-based
restrictions is not always clear.435 In part, it assumes that one can clearly
differentiate content of expression from its physical form, or manner, yet in practice
the two often merge. Moreover, judicial definitions of content are often
ambiguous. 436 Accordingly, some content-neutral regulations may actually have
content-differential effects that, to some extent, distort the market place of ideas or
414 See id. at 234-35, 243-44, 249-54. Applying strict scrutiny to the must-carry rules,
Justice O'Connor concluded that neither a compelling interest justified their imposition, nor
did they comprised the least restrictive means available of attaining the stated governmental
objectives. Id. at 249-54 (arguing, in part, that leased access or subsidies were less intrusive
means). Alternatively, she would have applied the O'Brien test more stringently than did the
majority, as she questioned whether the government actually had implemented a substantial
interest unrelated to the suppression of cable speech through narrowly tailored means. Under
this approach, she found that the First Amendment interests of the cable industry outweighed
the speculative interests of the government and thus rendered the must-carry provisions
unconstitutional as well under heightened scrutiny. Id. at 251-58.
43- See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34
STAN. L. REv. 113, 113, 116-19, 128-29, 140-42 (1981) (criticizing the distinction between
content-neutral and content-based restrictions). Redish suggests that subject matter
restrictions, in particular, generate much confusion. Id. at 117. Observing that either a
content-neutral or content-based restriction ultimately "impairs the flow of free expression,"
id. at 128-29, Redish questions the utility of the content distinction in First Amendment
jurisprudence, and proposes instead a unified standard of strict scrutiny for all restrictions
of speech. Id. at 114, 129-30, 142, 150.
436 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A
Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 747 (1980) ("Although the idea behind the term
.content' is intuitively clear, it is not easy to give a precise definition."); Redish, supra note
435, at 142 (asserting that "[tihe content distinction is conceptually and pragmatically
untenable and should therefore be abandoned").
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affect communicative impact."' Restrictions that limit the access of certain types
of speakers illustrate the difficulty in differentiating content-based laws from those
that do not regulate on the basis of content.43 Similarly, laws that prescribe the
secondary effects of some kinds of expressive activity also can be difficult to
classify.439
Insofar as the content distinction differentiates between the physical form or
manner of speech and its content, it reflects the jurisprudential dichotomy between
economic liberty and freedom of expression that emerged over sixty years ago.
Within this context, most, if not all, structural regulations of the media pose special
problems. Ostensibly predicated upon specific technological or economic
characteristics, this legislation in some respects resembles content-neutral
regulation even though, at times, it relies upon content-based classifications for the
scope of its application."' Yet where there is a close relationship between
expressive and economic activity, the distinction between content-based and
content-neutral restrictions dissolves, in large part, because a regulation may not
necessarily only affect the time, manner, or place of expression. It can also yield
4" See, e.g., Day, Hybridization, supra note 8, at 224 (noting some content-neutral laws
are "not necessarily unrelated to expression"); Redish, supra note 435, at 134, 140-41
(suggesting incidental restrictions of speech may be as problematic as direct restrictions
upon the content of expression); Stone, Subject MatterRestrictions, supra note 365, at 102,
107-08 (suggesting that some content-neutral restrictions, including "[s]ubject matter
restrictions . . . distort the 'marketplace of ideas' in a content-differential manner").
Elsewhere, Stone suggests that some subject matter restrictions can create ambiguities
pertaining to the content distinction. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 366, at 239-42.
In this regard, compare Police Dep't. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (finding exemption
from a picketing prohibition for certain kinds of labor picketing an impermissible content-
based restriction), with Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (finding restriction
on political advertising on municipal public transportation vehicles viewpoint neutral).
438 Compare First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating a
Massachusetts law that prohibited only business entities from spending money on election
referenda), with Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (upholding
a federal law that authorized tax deductions only for contributions made to a tax-exempt
veterans group). See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 366, at 244-51 (noting that
speaker access restrictions at times blur the distinction between content-based and content-
neutral restrictions).
411 See, e.g., Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139
U. PA. L. REv. 615,629-35 (1991) (criticizing Court precedent upholding the use of facially
content-based laws to regulate the secondary effects of speech). In this regard, see Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (sustaining a law that restricted location of
theaters that showed films with nudity).
440 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 407, at 193-94 (suggesting that much structural media
regulation is content-based); McGinnis, supra note 33, at 114 (noting that structural
regulation of media often indirectly affects content); Winer, supra note 407, at 5
(commenting on the difficulty of distinguishing permissible structural regulation of the
media from impermissible content regulation).
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indirect effects upon the content of expression, particularly if the medium and the
message are inextricably intertwined. Indeed, Sutherland implied as much in his
Grosjean and Associated Press opinions. The confluence of economic liberty and
expression, therefore, belies the utility of the classical distinction between content-
based and content-neutral laws when applied to issues arising from differential
taxation of the press or must-carry rules.
Though Congress intended the must-carry rules to function as a structural
regulation of the cable industry, divisions within the Court emerged over whether
these provisions were content-neutral or content-based. Much of the ambiguity may
have come from the similarity of must-carry rules to either speaker access
restrictions or laws that regulate the secondary effects of speech," either of which
underscores the sometimes illusory and semantical distinction between content-
neutral and content-based regulations." 2 On a more fundamental level, however,
the internal rift may have reflected the inability of the justices as a whole to
understand how the must-carry rules affected both the economic and First
Amendment interests of the cable industry.
In the Turner cases, the business and expressive interests of cable operators and
"' Arguably, the must-carry rules resembled speaker access restrictions because, in
theory, they limited the access or opportunity of cable operators and programmers to carry
only cable programs. Compare Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37 (1983) (upholding a collective bargaining provision that only gave the union elected as
the exclusive bargaining representative access to an inter-school mail system), with Consol.
Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (invalidating a rule that prohibited
only utility companies from including certain messages with bills). Indeed, even some
adherents ofthe content distinction in First Amendment analysis concede that speaker access
restrictions at times blur the distinction between content-neutral and content-based
regulations. See, e.g., Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 366, at 244-51 (explaining that
some speaker restrictions may create content-differential effects). On the other hand,
regulation of the cable television industry intended to redress its presumed anti-competitive
behavior and preserve broadcast television as a viable source of video transmission
conceivably justifies mandatory carriage as an attempt by Congress to prescribe aspects of
cable television unrelated to the content of speech. Pursuant to the secondary effects
doctrine, these content-neutral objectives would justify incidental restrictions of cable
speech. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding
zoning restrictions imposed on adult theaters). The problem, however, is that neither
characterizing the must-carry rules as speaker access restrictions nor laws intended to
prescribe the secondary effects of the editorial discretion of cable operators and
programmers necessarily considers the indirect effects of such regulation. See, e.g.,
Williams, supra note 439, at 629-35 (positing that the secondary effects doctrine has
contributed to the Court's sometimes confused distinction between content-based and
content-neutral restrictions). This is important because the expressive and business interests
of the cable operators and programmers converge so that a seemingly viewpoint neutral law
such as mandatory carriage may actually have significant indirect effects upon the ability of
the cable industry to facilitate communication and avoid compelled speech.
44' See, e.g., Farber, supra note 436 at 747; Redish, supra note 435, at 113, 116-19, 142.
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programmers converged. Selection of programs for carriage on cable systems is not
only an economic decision but also one of editorial discretion." 3 Therefore, as a
practical matter, it is difficult to distinguish between the medium of cable television
and its message." Yet the justices, to one extent or another, persisted in
differentiating between the economic and First Amendment activities of cable
operators and programmers." 5 As a result, they placed inordinate emphasis upon
proper classification of the must-carry rules and eschewed careful analysis of how
those rules may have impaired the business of cable expression. Given the close
nexus between the expressive and economic activities of those members of the cable
industry affected by mandatory carriage, the justices erred when they applied
constitutional standards of review that presuppose a formal dichotomy between
economic and First Amendment rights.
Moreover, it is not altogether certain whether cable operators and programmers
primarily function as speakers in terms of the First Amendment or merely as
conduits of speech." 6 Arguably, the creation and selection of cable programming
,"' See, e.g., Winer, supra note 407, at 26-27,66-67 (contending cable operators' editorial
discretion warrants First Amendment protection); Josephine I. Aiello, Note, Congressional
Cable-Vision: Turner Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 231, 240 (1995) (stating that "[f]or purposes of First Amendment review, cable
television is a hybrid media resembling broadcast to viewers, sharing editorial discretion
with newspapers, and dispensing compilations of associated expressions like newsstands");
Jeff Gray, Note, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC: The Need for a New Approach
in First Amendment Jurisprudence of the Cable Industry, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 999, 1030-32,
1034-35 (characterizing the speech/conduit distinction as a fallacy because the message and
the medium of cable television are interrelated).
44 See Gray, supra note 443, at 1031-32 (explaining that because most "communication
involves conduct... [it is difficult].., to separate conduct from expression"). Moreover,
"because the purpose of cable is to deliver speech ... [a] cable operator's choice of
programming is necessarily both conduct and expression." Id. at 1031-32. See also John H.
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Role of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1495 (1975) (questioning the artificial
distinction between conduct that facilitates expression and conduct intertwined with
expression).
44' Even though Justice O'Connor sensed that the must-carry rules impaired both the
economic and expressive interests of cable operators and programmers, she essentially
believed the rules reflected content-based preferences for local broadcast programs, see
Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 676-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and
would have preferably struck down the mandatory carriage provisions under strict scrutiny,
see id. at 679-82, a constitutional standard that implicitly emphasizes the First Amendment
and might not necessarily detect partial economic regulations that indirectly infringe upon
expressive activity. See McGinnis, supra note 33, at 114.
'4 For the notion that cable operators serve as mere conduits of speech with attenuated
First Amendment rights, see Baker, supra note 419, at 63 (asserting that cable operators do
not have as strong First Amendment rights as individual speakers); Daniel Brenner, Cable
Television and the Freedom of Expression, 1998 DUKE L.J. 329,339,343,370 (arguing that
cable operators' selection of programs is primarily an economic activity and not necessarily
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involves the exercise of editorial discretion well within the rubric of the First
Amendment," 7 whereas the transmission of cable televison programs may not.4 8
Notwithstanding this theoretical distinction, the business of cable television
combines both speech and distributive functions," 9 and regulation of the economic
aspects of the cable industry could indirectly affect its freedom of expression.450
Accordingly, this close connection between the business and expressive components
of the cable medium renders an imprecise classification of the must-carry rules as
either entirely content-based or content-neutral restrictions of speech.
Justice O'Connor likened cable televison to traditional print media and thought
the Court probably should have applied strict scrutiny to must-carry rules that
explicitly sought to protect the content of the cable industry's broadcast
competitors.45 ' However, given strict scrutiny's principal emphasis upon protecting
the content of expression, it is possible that partial economic regulations that
protected speech); Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers:
Identifying the "Speaker" Within the New Media, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 79, 97-99
(concluding that the must-carry rules were permissible regulation of cable operators as
conduits of speech who function as common carriers); Frederick Schauer, Cable Operators
as Editors: Prerogative, Responsibility, andLiability, 17 HASTINGS COMM. &ENT. L.J. 161,
174-76 (1994) (reasoning that because cable operators are mere conduits ofspeech they have
attenuated First Amendment rights).
44. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 643-45; see also Eric F. Ugland, Cable Television, New
Technologies and the First Amendment After Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
60 Mo. L. REv. 799, 833 (1995) (asserting that the must-carry rules amounted to compelled
speech through their interfering with the editorial discretion of cable operators); Winer,
supra note 407, at 8, 12, 16, 66-67 (emphasizing the editorial functions of cable operators).
44 Turner!, 512 U.S. at 644-45; see also Baker, supra note 419, at 63 (differentiating
between cable operators and individual speakers); Brenner, supra note 446, at 339,343,370
(emphasizing cable television's distribution of speech); Meyerson, supra note 446, at 83-84,
89-92, 98 (noting that broadcasters have less First Amendment protection than print media);
Schauer, supra note 446, at 174-76 (asserting that cable operators' selection ofprogramniming
differs from the editorial functions of traditional print media).
49 See, e.g., Aiello, supra note 443, at 240 (calling cable television "a hybrid media" for
First Amendment purposes); Gray, supra note 443, at 1031-32 (noting the fallacy of the
speech/conduit distinction as applied to cable television because the cable medium and its
message are often interrelated).
450 See, e.g., Robert Corn-Revere, New Technology and the First Amendment: Breaking
the Cycle of Repression, 17 HASTINGS. COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247, 328 (1994) (implying that
the must-carry rules did not necessarily create an incidental restriction upon cable speech);
McGinnis, supra note 33, at 114-15 (suggesting the Turner I Court overlooked the link
between the expressive and business interests of the cable industry); Ugland, supra note 447,
at 820,*830-33 (criticizing the Turner Court's conclusion that the must-carry rules were
content-neutral structural regulation of the cable medium); see also Winer, supra note 407,
at 12, 16, 42, 45, 66-67 (contending that the must-carry rules directly interfered with the
editorial discretion of cable operators and programmers).
451 See Turner!, 520 U.S. at 247-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
[Vol. 10:2
THE BUSINESS OF ExPREssIoN
indirectly infringe upon First Amendment rights might go undetected under this
approach as implemented by a Court reluctant to invalidate many economic
regulatory schemes.452 Indeed, because of its lenient stance towards economic
regulation, the Court would probably not carefully scrutinize most laws that impose
economic burdens on one set of speakers for the benefit of their competitors.453
A law that interferes with economic liberty but appears to leave alone the
content of expression will therefore probably withstand strict scrutiny even though
a close nexus might exist between the business and expressive activities of the
affected media actor. Even though such regulation may impose distinct economic
burdens on one segment of the press, this disproportionate effect would not
necessarily convince the Court about the existence of less restrictive means. In the
post-Lochner era, any form of judicial review presupposes the legitimacy of
economic regulation, and so legislation that has differential economic effects might
still be upheld provided the government can demonstrate some legitimate interest.
This presumption becomes problematic when the partial economic regulation
indirectly abridges expression through its effects upon the business aspects of a
media entity. For these reasons, the Court, had it used strict scrutiny, would
probably not have considered whether the must-carry rules represented partial
economic legislation detrimental to the business of expression of cable operators
and programmers because such differential economic treatment would not have
ordinarily attracted the Court's attention. In fact, the Court may have sanctioned
this byproduct of the structural regulation of the cable industry if persuaded that it
represented the least restrictive means available to preserve the content of broadcast
television.
Thus, despite her assertions about the content-based characteristics of must-
carry, Justice O'Connor never addressed whether the government's preference for
local broadcast television reflected illegitimate class legislation intended to impose
an economic burden upon one class of media for the benefit of another.454 In part,
this stems from the usual deference accorded economic regulation by the Court
during the latter half of the twentieth century. However, constitutional inquiry
limited to judicial examination of a law's effect upon the content of communication
may neglect more subtle and indirect methods of infringing upon expression,
especially where the economic and expressive activities of a media actor are closely
452 See McGinnis, supra note 33, at 114 (suggesting that because strict scrutiny focuses
on content restriction it often ignores the manner in which structural regulation indirectly
affects the content of expression).
411 See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447, 450-53 (1991) (upholding, as a
seemingly neutral economic regulation, an Arkansas tax that exempted all forms of media
but cable television).
4" At best, O'Connor implied this. Though she discussed the adverse effects of must-
carry upon cable speech, she did not really analyze the provision as a partial economic
regulation and thus did not seem to understand how must-carry interfered with cable
operators' and programmers' very business of expression.
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intertwined. Indeed, one could argue that because of the Court's adherence to the
traditional two-track classification system, with that system's inherent deference to
economic regulation and implicit distinction between economic liberty and
expression, the justices failed to consider whether the must-carry rules were partial
economic legislation that created indirect, as opposed to incidental, burdens upon
the expressive activities of cable operators and programmers.
3. Content-Neutral Analysis and the Attempt to Separate Economic Liberty from
Free Expression
Alternatively, if one accepts the premise that cable operators are conduits of
speech with attenuated First Amendment rights, then significant problems emerge
with the Supreme Court's content-neutral analysis in the Turner cases. Having
reached the conclusion that the must-carry rules comprised structural regulation of
the cable medium, a plurality of the justices used the O'Brien test and upheld
mandatory carriage as a narrowly tailored means of preserving broadcast television
and of incidental effect upon the First Amendment rights of cable operators and
programmers.4" Yet because of this balancing approach, the Court did not perceive
the extent to which the must-carry rules impaired the cable industry's business of
expression.
Often employed by the Court to assess many different kinds of content-neutral
restrictions of speech,456 the O'Brien test assumes a dichotomy between economic
-" See Turner 11, 520 U.S. 180, 211-25 (1997).
456 In recent years, the Court has applied the O'Brien test to both incidental restrictions
of speech and time, place, and manner regulations on the premise that the O'Brien incidental
regulation standard is substantially similar to that which the Court had been using to assess
time, place, and manner restrictions. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
798 (1989) (upholding a noise ordinance as a content-neutral regulation of incidental effect
upon speech). In extending the purview of O'Brien to time, place, and manner regulations,
the Court has slightly modified the test, replacing the requirement that "the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [be] no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of. . . an important or substantial governmental interest," United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), with the requirement that either the incidental or time,
place, and manner restriction be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest . .. that leave[s] ... open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information." Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). One consequence of this merger is a utilitarian standard fairly
deferential to government regulation of speech that confuses the distinction between
incidental and indirect restrictions of expression. See Bhagwat, supra note 407, at 169-70
(explaining that under the hybrid test the government can prevail with a reasonable
regulation not related to the actual content of speech, which is a more forgiving standard
than pre- Ward); Williams, supra note 439, at 653-54 (calling the hybrid test a diminished
time, place, and manner standard); see generally Day, Hybridization, supra note 8; David
S. Day, the Incidental Regulation ofFree Speech, 42 MIAMIL. REv. 491 (1988) [hereinafter
Day, Incidental Regulation]; Werhan, supra note 365 (all criticizing the hybrid test for its
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liberty and freedom of expression reflected in its implicit distinction between
communication and conduct. Conceptually, its balancing test provides more
protection for speech itself than for conduct unrelated to communication, and
regards with varying degrees of solicitude activities that facilitate expression.457
Within this context, the Court generally associates many business functions of the
media with non-expressive conduct and thus considers them amenable to a broader
range of regulation than activities more directly related to the content of speech.458
At times subjective459 and lenient in its application,460 the O'Brien test rarely
scrutinizes economic regulations that indirectly affect the pursuit of expression, and
therefore does not consider the ways in which political factions can enact laws that
impose distinct economic burdens on some segments of the media for the benefit
deference to governmental regulation). But see Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Iwo:
Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HAST. L.J. 921, 927-28
(1993); (supporting the extension of O'Brien).
417 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 ("when 'speech' and 'non-speech' elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms"). Some commentators have suggested that as a practical matter it is very difficult,
if not impossible, to distinguish between conduct that facilitates expression and non-
facilitative conduct. See Williams, supra note 439, at 724. Others have noted the difficulty
of distinguishing an act that facilitates expression from speech itself. See, e.g., Alexander,
supra note 456, at 928; Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109
HARV. L. REv. 1175, 1207 (1996).
458 See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945) (ruling that
application of federal anti-trust legislation to the business practices of a news agency did not
violate freedom of the press); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 130 (1937)
(sustaining the application of the National Labor Relations Act to the editorial department
of a news agency as an incidental, and thus permissible, restriction upon the press).
419 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 407, at 169-70 (criticizing the widespread application
of O'Brien as "extremely subjective, and somewhat arbitrary and unpredictable doctrine").
Much of the problem with the O'Brien test lies in the inherent uncertainty of its balancing
of the interests associated with governmental regulation and those concerning First
Amendment expression. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI.
L. REv. 46, 117 (1987) [hereinafter Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions]. Writing about the
perils of judicial balancing in the general context of First Amendment litigation, Stone
observed that "balancing invites judges to overstate governmental interests and to defer
unduly to legislative judgments. It thus tends in practice to legitimate rather than to check
governmental abuse." Id. at 73. See also Redish, supra note 435, at 120, 125 (characterizing
judicial balancing to assess the constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions as unreliable
and ambivalent).
0 See, e.g., Day, Hybridization, supra note 8, at 209; Redish, supra note 435, at 127;
Werhan, supra note 365, at 642; Williams, supra note 439, at 747 (all noting the lax
application of O'Brien). "Ultimately, the O'Brien test for content-neutral regulations
requires nothing more than... 'no gratuitous inhibition' on speech.... ." Redish, supra
note 435, at 127 (quoting, in part; Ely, supra note 444, at 1488).
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of their competitors. Inherently deferential to governmental regulation,461 this
standard of review often sustains partial economic laws as incidental restrictions of
speech notwithstanding their significant incursion upon the business of
expression.462
A threshold issue under the O'Brien test is whether the regulation is related to
the suppression of speech.463 Ostensibly, this factor enables the Court to determine
if the restriction functions as a pretext for impermissible content or viewpoint
discrimination.4"' Beyond that, however, the unrelatedness prong assumes that a
clear distinction exists between economic and expressive activity. Given the
Court's general deference toward economic regulation, it rarely doubts the
legitimacy of governmental objectives in this area. 5 Consequently, it often
concludes that most forms of economic regulation are unrelated to the suppression
of speech and therefore incidental restrictions of expression. 1 6 In the Turner cases,
the Court erred in this assessment of the must-carry rules because of the close
connection between the business and speech activities of cable operators and
programmers. Yet mandatory carriage of broadcast televison stations impeded their
461 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 407, at 169-70 (noting that pursuant to the extension
of O'Brien to time, place, and manner restrictions, government regulations need only be
reasonable and not related to the content of speech); Day, Hybridization, supra note 8, at
209-10, 219-25 (criticizing the extensive use of O'Brien in ways that diminish judicial
review of content-neutral regulations and the presumption that government restriction of
speech is unintentional); Day, Incidental Regulation, supra note 456, at 519, 523, 529
(describing the Court's diluted standard of review of content-neutral laws resulting from the
merger of the O'Brien incidental regulation test with the one for time, place, and manner
restrictions); Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 459, at 50-51, 78-79
(characterizing the Court's application of the O'Brien test to content-neutral restrictions as
comparable to the rational basis test used in economic regulation cases); Werhan, supra note
365, at 640-42 (decrying the Court's "relaxed approach toward incidental governmental
restrictions of expression").
462 See, e.g., Turner II, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding must-carry rules as an incidental
restriction of speech under the O'Brien test). A more salient example of judicial deference
to economic regulation with possible adverse First Amendment consequences is Glickman
v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (upholding, as reasonable economic
regulation rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective, federal marketing orders
enacted under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act by the secretary of agriculture that
required California growers, handlers, and fruit processors to pay generic advertising fees
notwithstanding the claims that the marketing orders compelled speech).
463 See, e.g., Day, Incidental Regulation, supra note 456, at 508, 513; Farber, supra note
436, at 742 (both noting the importance of this issue).
464 See Day, Hybridization, supra note 8, at 207; Day, Incidental Regulation, supra note
456, at 527.
465 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (expressing deference
to state police powers in upholding Oklahoma optometry restrictions).
46 See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, at 132-33 (1937) (concluding that
the application of federal labor legislation to the personnel practices of a news agency were
unrelated "to the impartial distribution of news").
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business of expression with its restrictions upon editorial discretion and imposition
of programming requirements that interfered with the economic autonomy of cable
industry members. 7
Additional problems arise from the notion that the must-carry rules only created
incidental restrictions of cable speech. Much of the difficulty emanates from the
term "incidental" as frequently used by the Court in its application of the O 'Brien
test to laws that ostensibly regulate the time, manner, or place of expression or the
physical, as opposed to substantive, forms of speech. Construed by the Court to
mean the unintentional, non-purposeful, or ancillary limitation of expression,468 the
term "incidental" functions as a conclusion made by the Court about the purpose
and effect of a law with speech restrictive effects. Laws that reflect governmental
motive to regulate the content of some kinds of speech presumably warrant
increased scrutiny as content-based classifications, 9 whereas laws deemed of
incidental effect invoke less stringent, though often heightened, review.470
However, the incidental standard fosters widespread judicial acceptance of
indirect limits on speech. The O'Brien test's broad tolerance of incidental
restrictions in fact permits significant, indirect incursions upon expression so long
as the government regulation does not restrict more speech than necessary to
accomplish a substantial interest.47 ' However, all too often, the standard rests on
the questionable premise that a bright line distinction exists between conduct that
may, in some way, facilitate expression and expression itself.472 Given that the
467 See, e.g., Ugland, supra note 447, at 833 (arguing that the must-carry rules constituted
a form of compelled speech); Winer, supra note 407, at 12, 66-67 (emphasizing that the
must-carry rules infringed upon the editorial discretion of cable operators).
468 See, e.g., Day, Hybridization, supra note 8, at 210.
469 See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating a municipal
ordinance that prohibited all but labor picketing near schools); see also Stone, Content-
Neutral Restrictions, supra note 459, at 55-57, 72; Stone, Content Regulation, supra note
366, at 230.
470 See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (sustaining a
municipal ordinance banning the posting of signs on public property as a content-neutral,
time, place, and manner regulation of incidental effect upon speech).
47' See, e.g., Day, Incidental Regulation, supra note 456, at 505 (explaining, that under
the incidental restriction doctrine, the Court will often sustain a law of general application
that indirectly but substantially burdens speech if convinced the regulation's primary
purpose was not to abridge expression); Dorf, supra note 457, at 1204 & n. 117 (criticizing
O'Brien's conclusion that the government's interest in protecting draft registration cards
from mutilation was unrelated to the suppression of speech)
472 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 456, at 928 (asserting that speech-facilitative conduct
and expression are "ultimately inseparable"); Dorf, supra note 457, at 1207 (discussing how
conduct that facilitates speech is often intertwined with speech). Dorf contends that the
incidental burden test of O'Brien rests on the flawed assumption that one can differentiate
conduct that facilitates speech from conduct intertwined with speech. Id. at 1208. Even one
commentator who suggests that a distinction exists "between the facilitative and
communicative aspects of speech," implies that incursions upon the facilitative aspects of
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selection of cable programming involves both economic liberty and First
Amendment rights,473 the line of demarcation becomes much less clear. From this
perspective, the must-carry rules may have created more than merely an incidental
burden on cable speech because the business and expressive activities of cable
operators and programmers were so intertwined that regulation of one aspect of the
cable enterprise would invariably affect the other.
Thus,'when the Court upheld the must-carry rules as an incidental regulation of
speech, it essentially ignored the nexus between economic liberty and freedom of
expression. As a result of the O'Brien test's inherent deference to governmental
regulation, the Court did not carefully scrutinize the must-carry provisions to
determine if they were actually partial legislation intended to bestow economic
benefits on one set of media actors at the expense of their competitors. Under this
scenario, the must-carry laws may have indirectly impeded the First Amendment
interests of cable operators and programmers to the advantage of the broadcast
television industry.474
Judicial assumptions about the reasonableness of most forms of economic
regulation may also undermine the utility of the requirement under O'Brien that
incidental restrictions of speech be narrowly tailored. Though in theory this prong
of the O 'Brien test requires that a content-neutral law not curtail more speech than
necessary to attain a substantial governmental interest, it has, over the years,
evolved into a much less rigorous standard of legitimacy4  that, like other facets of
content-neutral analysis, presumes the validity of economic regulations and
perpetuates the dichotomy between economic liberty and freedom of expression.
Indeed, had the Court in the Turner cases more carefully examined the factional
basis of the must-carry rules, it may have found that mandatory carriage actually
restricted more cable speech than necessary through its regulation of economic
speech may at times violate the First Amendment, and posits that this might occur when
time, place, and manner regulations limit the media access to certain groups. See Williams,
supra note 439, at 660, 663. Conceivably, the must-carry rules exemplify this scenario. See
Corn-Revere, supra note 450, at 325 (discussing the difficulty of separating speech from
conduct in the context of analyzing mandatory carriage).
473 See, e.g., Aiello, supra note 443, at 240 (characterizing cable television as "a hybrid
media"); Gray, supra note 443, at 1031-32 (noting that cable programming is both a business
and speech decision).
474 See Chen, supra note 419, at 1470-71 ("[m]ust-carry implicitly taxes one form of
speech in order to finance another"); see also Adelman, supra note 427, at 1553
(characterizing the must-carry rules as class legislation intended to preserve broadcast
television "at the expense of a portion of the cable operators' First Amendment rights");
Winer, supra note 407, at 39, 42, 45 (referring to mandatory carriage as a direct incursion
upon the First Amendment interests of the cable industry).
475 See, e.g., Day, Hybridization, supra note 8 at 209-10, 219-25; Day, Incidental
Regulation, supra note 456, at 519, 523, 529; Werhan, supra note 365, at 640-42 (all
discussing the diminution of O'Brien standards).
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conduct that facilitated the expression of cable operators and programmers."'
Because most of the Turner justices ultimately deferred to the government's
arguments about the economic imperatives for mandatory carriage,4 they forsook
consideration of how the must-carry rules imposed a distinct set of economic
burdens on the cable industry. Had they subjected the must-carry regime to closer
scrutiny, they would have discovered that mandatory carriage came about, in large
part, through the efforts of a powerful group of broadcast television lobbyists, 478
who through the expenditure of millions of dollars ultimately convinced Congress
to enact class, or partial, legislation for the benefit of the broadcast industry and the
economic disadvantage of their cable competitors." 9 More than a mere incidental
restriction of cable speech, 480 the must-carry rules indirectly impaired the First
476 See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 33, at 114-15 (implying that because the Turner Court
assessed the must-carry rules under the inherently deferential O'Brien test, it failed to detect
the disproportionate influence exerted upon Congress by the broadcast lobby in its
successful attempt to secure preferential legislation at the expense of the cable industry);
Winer, supra note 407, at 33-34, 39, 45, 66 (decrying mandatory carriage as partial
legislation that infringed upon the economic liberty and editorial discretion of cable
operators and programmers).
477 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195-209 (plurality opinion). In
fact, die plurality found the conclusions Congress drew reasonable. Id. at 209-10. But see
id. at 236-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing plurality's deference to congressional
conclusions about economic imperative for the must-carry rules).
478 On the clout of the broadcast television lobby, see Romesh Ratnesar, A Bandwidth
Bonanza, TIME, Sept. 1, 1997, at 60 (noting the seven million dollars broadcast television
lobbyists expended between 1995 and 1997 on efforts to secure favorable federal
legislation); Paul Taylor, Superhighway Robbery, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 20
(referring to the powerful economic influence of the broadcast lobby on Capitol Hill); Leslie
Wayne, Broadcast Lobby's Formula: Airtime + Money = Influence, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
1997, at C I and C9 (describing the manner in which the broadcast television industry uses
money and lobbyists to extract favorable legislation from Congress). In his initial veto of the
1992 Cable Act, President Bush noted its factional basis when he attributed its passage to
the fact that Congress had "'fallen prey to special interests."' See Winer, supra note 407, at
17 n.55 and 19 n.65 (both quoting President George Bush, Message to the Senate Returning
Without Approval the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
28 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1860 (Oct. 3, 1992)).
" See, e.g., Donald J. Boudreaux and Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., The Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: The Triumph of Private over Public
Interest, 44 ALA. L. REV. 355, 356-57, 390 (1993) (analyzing mandatory carriage as rent
seeking legislation intended to redistribute the profits of the cable industry for the economic
self-interest of broadcast television). One commentator has gone so far as to describe the
must-carry rules as a form of "publicly sanctioned private condemnation, with local
broadcasters 'taking' the channels that belong to cable operators... [who are] ... made to
serve theirbroadcast competitors... while bearing the whole cost themselves." Pilon,supra
note 159, at 59 n.79. Doubting the economic imperative for mandatory carriage, Pilon notes
that it requires "private cable operators" to, in effect, subsidize the inefficient practices of
their broadcast television competitors. Id. at 60.
480 See Corn-Revere, supra note 450, at 328 (implying that the must-carry rules were not
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Amendment rights of cable operators and programmers because, as regulations of
their economic activities, they also interfered with their ability to facilitate
expression. As such, the must-carry rules exemplified partial legislation that
impeded the business of expression. Yet because the justices, to one extent or
another, differentiated between the economic and expressive interests of the cable
industry, they missed the close connection between the medium of cable televison
and its message. Consequently, they perpetuated the dichotomy between economic
liberty and freedom of expression George Sutherland implicitly rejected nearly sixty
years earlier in Grosjean and Associated Press.
CONCLUSION
Indeed, the inherent flaws in the modem Court's analysis of differential
treatment of the press and the constitutional status of must-carry rules reveal the
extent to which present day members of the Court have distorted, if not altogether
ignored, Sutherland's First Amendment legacy. Rather than struggle with the
sometimes illusory distinction between content-based and content-neutral
restrictions and the consequent application of some form of bifurcated judicial
review that presumes the validity of economic measures even when they result in
indirect interference with speech, the Court should instead recalibrate its analysis
of laws that affect the business of expression.
A major problem with traditional standards of First Amendment review is that
each separates economic and speech activities into distinct spheres and thus does
not account for occasions when the business and expressive interests of media
actors coalesce. Pursuant to these conventional standards of review, the Court may
fail to perceive that through the guise of seemingly neutral structural regulations
political factions might impede the freedom of expression of some segments of the
media.
Accordingly, in instances where, as a practical matter, the expressive and
business interests of a media entity converge, the Court should employ a more
precise test that considers both the economic and expressive interests at stake.
Rather than simply assume the validity of an economic regulation in this context,
the justices should carefully scrutinize the law for differential effects resulting from
the artifice of political factions. Through such heightened review, the Court would
more likely ascertain the existence of class legislation intended to benefit some
segments of the press at the expense of others whose core business is speech. Often
partial laws of this kind create overbroad and indirect restrictions of expression.
Heightened analysis of seemingly neutral economic regulations applied to the
business of expression, therefore, would provide increased protection for both the
economic and First Amendment interests of the media.
necessarily an incidental restriction on speech).
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Over six decades ago, Justice George Sutherland recognized the confluence of
economic liberty and freedom of expression. Viewed from the perspective of his
jurisprudence of economic liberty, Sutherland's opinions in Grosjean and
Associated Press suggest a nexus between these personal rights otherwise neglected
in modem constitutional law in the aftermath of the Lochner era. Drawing upon
traditional aversion to political factions, Sutherland insisted upon close judicial
review of economic legislation to preserve the equal operation of the law and
protect individual constitutional liberties from the tyranny of democratic majorities.
In so doing, he limned the contours of the business of expression. This is his
forgotten First Amendment legacy.
